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Korean Companies (korean + company)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	83%

Selected Abstracts

The Proportion and Social Capital of Outside Directors and Their Impacts on Firm Value: evidence from Korea

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007
Yangmin Kim
This study examines the effects of outside directors' proportion and their social capital on firm value using a sample of 473 large, publicly traded Korean companies from 1998 through 2003. Outside director proportion, which is defined as the ratio of outside directors to the total number of directors of a company, is regarded as a proxy of board independence. Outside director social capital, which is defined as the degree to which outside board members have outside contacts in the external environment, is regarded as a proxy of board's ability to extract valuable resources or information from the environment. It is hypothesised that both the proportion of outside directors to the total directors and outside director social capital will be positively associated with firm value. This study reports strong GLS evidence of the relationship between outside director social capital and firm value but no significant relationship between outside director proportion and firm value. [source]

Corporate Bankruptcy in Korea: Only the Strong Survive?

FINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 4 2000
Paola Bongini
G30/G32/G33 Abstract We analyze whether the build-up of financial vulnerabilities led listed Korean companies to bankruptcy. We find that pre-crisis leverage is systematically high for both poor performing/slow growing firms and for profitable/fast-growing firms. Pre-crisis leverage raises the probability of bankruptcy, which is lower for firms: (1) relying more on (renegotiable) bank credit; (2) with less inter-firm debt; and (3) having higher interest coverage ratios. Finally, none of these liquidity variables help predict bankruptcies for chaebol-firms, suggesting that liquidity constraints are more stringent for non-chaebol. Thus, in a systemic crisis it is not only the strong/healthy that survive. [source]

Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2008
E. Han Kim
In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family-controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through "tunneling" activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The government-engineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol,the so-called "big deals" that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business,turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies,notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards,have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange,as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett,are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti-takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control. [source]

Tax Motivated Income Shifting and Korean Business Groups (Chaebol)

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 5-6 2009
Kooyul Jung
Abstract:, This paper examines tax-induced income shifting behavior among affiliated firms in Korean business groups (chaebols). Korean corporate income tax law does not require consolidated tax returns, and business groups with a large number of affiliated member firms have incentives to shift income across member firms to reduce the overall taxes of the group. For a large number of Korean companies that are subject to external audits, we perform univariate and multivariate regression analyses on the income shifting behavior of chaebol firms compared with non-chaebol control firms. Our evidence suggests that tax-motivated income shifting activities exist among chaebol firms, and that the extent of income shifting is found to depend on its effect on non-tax cost factors such as the earnings, leverage, and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. We also find that income shifting is more pronounced in chaebol firms where the control-cash flow divergence is relatively large, suggesting that income shifting is affected by the controlling shareholders' opportunism. Our study provides some insights on the intra-group income shifting activities where research is limited. [source]

Dynamic change of corporate environmental strategy: rhetoric and reality

BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Issue 3 2003
Professor Seung-Kyu Rhee
Although rhetoric involves political and symbolic posture, and does not always accurately represent reality, it plays an important role in the dynamic change process of environmental strategy. We first elaborate on the related concepts and develop frameworks to analyze corporate environmental strategy and its change. We report two case studies of Korean companies using the framework. Longitudinal case studies also provide additional implications for corporate environmental strategy in developing countries such as Korea. There is a gap between the rhetoric and reality of environmental strategy and it constantly changes over time depending on specific internal and external influences. The strength of external influences is a factor that determines whether the change is real or merely rhetorical. Internal organizational variables most likely affect the reality of environmental strategy. We show that the elaboration of rhetorical and realistic aspects of corporate environmentalism can bring out deeper insights and new theoretical developments. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment [source]