Kant

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Distribution within Humanities and Social Sciences

Terms modified by Kant

  • kant argument
  • kant philosophy

  • Selected Abstracts


    JUSTICE AND PEACE IN KANT AND CONFUCIUS

    JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007
    CHUNG-YING CHENG
    [source]


    MOU ZONGSAN'S PROBLEM WITH THE HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF KANT

    JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2006
    Article first published online: 12 MAY 200, SÉBASTIEN BILLIOUD
    [source]


    THEORETICAL LINKS BETWEEN KANT AND CONFUCIANISM: PRELIMINARY REMARKS

    JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2006
    Article first published online: 21 FEB 200, CHUNG-YING CHENG
    [source]


    PROMETHEUS AND KANT: NEUTRALIZING THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE AND DOXOLOGY

    MODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 3 2009
    ANTHONY C. SCIGLITANO
    This essay argues that Kant's writings on religion recapitulate or anticipate many of the theoretical moves we find in Promethean discourses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first portion of the article lays out fundamental elements of Promethean discourse from a theological point of view, and distinguishes between "aggressive" and "urbane" Prometheanism. I contend that both types attack divine transcendence and Christian doxology, focus almost entirely on soteriology to the detriment of creation, and advocate a movement from theo-centric discourse to anthropocentric discourse. Yet urbane Prometheanism differs from its aggressive cousin by moving from hatred of God to a non-dialogical mode of indifference to God as an impotent and inconsequential deity. I argue that an urbane Prometheanism is what properly characterizes Kant's philosophy of religion,from his epistemic work in the first Critique, through his way of parsing theological and philosophical discursive responsibilities, to his actual hermeneutics of Christian doctrine. [source]


    KANT BETWEEN THE WARS: A REPLY TO HOHENDAHL

    PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM, Issue 1-2 2010
    ANDREW CHIGNELL
    First page of article [source]


    KANT, SCIENCE, AND HUMAN NATURE

    ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2009
    PAUL GUYER
    First page of article [source]


    Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism

    CONSTELLATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003
    Robert Fine
    In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post-1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth-century vision: that if we are to grapple with the complexities of present-day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation-states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the "differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him."1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl-Otto Apel: to "think with Kant against Kant" in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy. [source]


    Child-Rearing: On government intervention and the discourse of experts

    EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 6 2008
    Paul Smeyers
    Abstract For Kant, education was understood as the ,means' to become human,and that is to say, rational. For Rousseau by contrast, and the many child-centred educators that followed him, the adult world, far from representing reason, is essentially corrupt and given over to the superficialities of worldly vanity. On this view, the child, as a product of nature, is essentially good and will learn all she needs to know from experience. Both positions have their own problems, but beyond this ,internal debate', the change in the content of education (i.e. child-rearing and schooling) is now furthermore due to a radical pluralism that has swept the world. Moreover, there may be differences in value between individual parents and between values held within the family and those held in society at large. Among other reasons this has put more generally children's (and parents') ,rights' on the agenda, which differs from thinking of education in terms of a ,practice'. The paper develops this latter concept and the criticisms to which it has been subject and argues that there is no necessary incompatibility between initiation into an existing practice and transforming that practice in some way, if it is emphasized how practices are learned and enacted. It then turns to the tendency in education and child-rearing, as in other spheres of human interaction, for more laws and codes of conduct and to call upon experts for all kind of matters. It argues that performativity rules on the level of the practitioner, of the experts, and even on the level of educational research. It argues that many governments have adopted in matters of schooling the language of output and school effectiveness and that something similar is now bound to happen in the sphere of child-rearing (with talk of parenting skills and courses). This is made credible due to a particular model of educational research, i.e. an empiricist quasi-causal model of explaining human behaviour. The paper then discusses the problems with this stance and argues that we should part company from the entrepreneurial manipulative educator to open up a sphere of responsiveness for the child and that for these reasons, the concept of the ,practice of child-rearing' should be revisited. Insisting on the complexities that have to be taken into account and thus surpassing a discourse of effectiveness and output as well as of codes of conduct and rulings of courts of law, may help us to focus on what is really at stake: to lead a meaningful life, to be initiated into what is ,real for us' and what we value. It concludes that thus restoring a place for child-rearing as a practice will do justice to the responsiveness to which each child is entitled. [source]


    Kant on Recognizing Beauty

    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010
    Katalin Makkai
    This essay takes up the question of what this might mean and whether it can be taken seriously. It is often supposed that Kant's denials of ,objectivity' to the judgment of beauty express a rejection of realism about beauty. I suggest that Kant's thought is not to be understood in these terms,that it does not properly belong in the arena of debates about the constituents of ,reality',motivating the suggestion by first considering a pair of opposing views on the question of whether Kant can be understood to develop a real alternative to realism about beauty at all. [source]


    Kant on the Laws of Nature: Laws, Necessitation, and the Limitation of Our Knowledge

    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2009
    James Kreines
    First page of article [source]


    Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement

    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2001
    Robert Hopkins
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can occur, and when they do it is a priori that one side has infringed the norms governing aesthetic discourse. This combination can be achieved by reading Kant's aesthetic theory in expressivist terms. The resulting view is a form of quasi-realism about beauty. The position has its merits, but cannot ultimately explain the phenomena which motivate it. This conclusion generalises to quasi-realism about other matters. [source]


    J.G. Granö and Edgar Kant: Teacher and Pupil, Colleagues and Friends

    GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER SERIES B: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, Issue 3 2005
    Olavi Granö
    Abstract This paper is adapted from an address given at the plenary session of the conference 'From Native and Landscape Research to Urban and Regional Studies, held in Tartu on 23 August, 2002, to mark the birthdays of J.G. Granö (120 years.) and Edgar Kant (100 years). The Finnish geographer J.G. Granö was Professor of Geography at the University of Tartu from 1919 to 1923, a period during which that university became the birthplace of many original geographical ideas. Edgar Kant was beginning his studies at that time, and a link was forged between the two scholars which lasted until Granö's death in 1956. The nature of this interaction and its significance for the history of geographical studies are discussed. [source]


    Edgar Kant (1902,1978): A Baltic Pioneer

    GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER SERIES B: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, Issue 3 2005
    Anne Buttimer
    Abstract It is indeed a joy to speak about Edgar Kant on this occasion which celebrates the hundredth anniversary of his birth. His lifepath traversed only two-thirds of this eventful century, yet he did experience directly many of its dreams and realities, the passion and pain of war and peace, of economic boom and bust, of national liberation, scientific revolutions, exile and the traumas of geopolitical transformations. The twentieth century also witnessed profound changes in practices of geography and the name of Edgar Kant deserves an honoured place as pioneer of many influential turns in the discipline. It is especially delightful to simultaneously honour his mentor and friend, Johannes G. Granö, who stirred his imagination in conceptual directions which were truly novel in those days-directions which later spawned enthusiastic research on environmental perceptions, time geography, and-most especially-landscape and cultural identity. [source]


    Edgar Kant and The Rise of Modern Urban Geography

    GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER SERIES B: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, Issue 3 2005
    Jussi Jauhiainen
    Abstract In every theory and worldview there are subjective and contextual elements. While knowledge is embedded and rooted in socio-spatial contexts, it is also located in the bodies of researchers and travels with them. A travelling theory of knowledge is based on several context-sensitive theories and concepts. This paper discusses Edgar Kant (1902,1978) and his work in the context of its important contribution to early modern urban geography. Kant as a person and his work is seen in the Estonian societal and academic context. [source]


    On the Genealogy of Moral Pleasure1

    GERMAN LIFE AND LETTERS, Issue 3 2009
    Duncan Large
    ABSTRACT This article explores the problematic relation between pleasure and morality in German thought, from the Enlightenment aesthetics of the eighteenth century through to early twentieth-century psychoanalysis. Specifically, by focusing on the status and function of pleasure in the moral analyses of Kant, the post-Kantians Schiller and Schopenhauer, then Nietzsche and finally Freud, it argues for a shift in emphasis, over this period, from the moral evaluation of pleasure to a recognition of the pleasurable value of morality. Along the way, it traces the German reception of the Discourse on the Nature of Pleasure and Pain (1773,81) by the Milanese philosopher and economist Pietro Verri. [source]


    Harnessing Autonomous Art: Enlightenment and Aesthetic Education in Johann Adam Bergk's Die Kunst, Bücher zu lesen

    GERMAN LIFE AND LETTERS, Issue 4 2000
    Robert Bledsoe
    This paper poses the question of the compatibility between Enlightenment and the concept of an autonoumous work of art that underlies notions of atsthetic education. The analysis focuses on Johann Adam Bergk's Die Kunst, Bücher zu lesen(1799). Bergk's work is a self-help book, for what will come to be called the 'Bildungsbürgertum', that attempts tp integrate insights from the critics of rationalism into the Enlightenment project. Bergk embraces the rationalism of the Enlightenment in the limits placed upon it by Kant, yet he supplements it with a recognition of the value of genius and imagination that was so important to the Sturm und Drang. To this he adds an arsthetic understanding of a closed work of art that reminds one more of the classical aesthetics of Moritz, Schiller and Goethe. My analysis shows that in order to engage in the search for Enlightenment through an aesthetic education, Bergk assumes a position that leaves us with an inadequate explanation of the transformative potential of literature, but that allows us to see a unique attempt to synthesise ideas from the Enlightenment and Romanticism. [source]


    MOVING BEYOND BIOPOWER: HARDT AND NEGRI'S POST-FOUCAULDIAN SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

    HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2005
    RÉAL FILLION
    ABSTRACT I argue in this paper that the attempt by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire and Multitude to "theorize empire" should be read both against the backdrop of speculative philosophy of history and as a development of the conception of a "principle of intelligibility" as this is discussed in Michel Foucault's recently published courses at the Collège de France. I also argue that Foucault's work in these courses (and elsewhere) can be read as implicitly providing what I call "prolegomena to any future speculative philosophy of history." I define the latter as concerned with the intelligibility of the historical process considered as a whole. I further suggest, through a brief discussion of the classical figures of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, that the basic features of speculative philosophy of history concern the articulation of both the telos and dynamics of history. My claim is that Hardt and Negri provide an account of the telos and dynamics of history that respects the strictures imposed on speculative philosophy of history by Foucault's work, and thus can be considered as providing a post-Foucauldian speculative philosophy of history. In doing so, they provide a challenge to other "theoretical" attempts to account for our changing world. [source]


    Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Why It Is Worth Thinking about Kant on Marriage

    HYPATIA, Issue 2 2010
    LINA PAPADAKI
    Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place "without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws." Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary thinkers: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoxical, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant's conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context. [source]


    Why Kant and Ecofeminism Don't Mix

    HYPATIA, Issue 3 2001
    JEANNA MOYER
    This paper consists of two sections. In section one, I explore Val Plumwood's description of the features of normative dualism, and briefly discuss how these features are manifest in Immanuel Kant's view of nature. In section two, I evaluate the claims of Holly L. Wilson, who argues that Kant is not a normative dualist. Against Wilson, I will argue that Kant maintains normative dualisms between humans/nature, humans/animals, humans I culture, and men/women. As such, Kant's philosophy is antithetical to the aims of ecofeminism, which seeks to expose and dismantle such dualistic thinking. [source]


    Frege and the Surprising History of Logic: Introduction to Claude Imbert, "Gottlob Frege, One More Time"

    HYPATIA, Issue 4 2000
    EMILY GROSHOLZ
    Convinced that logic has a history and that its history always manages to surprise the philosophers, Claude Imbert has devoted much of her work to the study of the Stoic school and of the late-nineteenth-century German logician Gottlob Frege. In the fifth chapter of her book Pour une histoire de la logique, she examines the trajectory of Frege's awareness of what his new logic entails, in particular the way it subverts the project of Kant. [source]


    Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention

    INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008
    Thomas C. Walker
    Compared with the realist tradition, relatively few students of international relations explore variations within liberalism. This paper introduces a particular interpretation of Immanuel Kant's evolutionary liberalism and then compares it with Thomas Paine's revolutionary liberalism. Paine was an ebullient optimist while Kant was more guarded and cautious. These different assumptions lead to distinct liberal views on voting rights, how trade fosters peace, and defense policies. The most striking disagreement, and one that endures in contemporary liberal circles, revolves around the question of military interventions to spread democratic rule. Kant advocated nonintervention while Paine actively pursued military intervention to spread democratic rule. Differences between Kant and Paine represent some enduring tensions still residing within the liberal tradition in international relations. [source]


    Machiavelli's Legacy: Domestic Politics and International Conflict

    INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2005
    David Sobek
    Research examining the effect of regime type on conflict has focused on the democracy/autocracy continuum expounded in the political philosophies of liberal thinkers such as Kant and Schumpeter. While this concentration has yielded impressive results (democratic peace), it seems plausible that other conceptions of regime type may yield similar success. This paper examines the philosophy of Machiavelli and develops a measure of his "imperial regimes." These states, which can either be democratic or autocratic, should exhibit an increased propensity to initiate international conflict. Testing this contention in Renaissance Italy (1250,1494) and the modern international system (1920,1992), this paper finds strong empirical support. Machiavelli's views illuminate key differences between democracies and autocracies that have been previously overlooked. Thus, it deepens rather than replaces our conception of how domestic institutions affect international conflict. [source]


    The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine's Cosmopolitanism and International Relations

    INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2000
    Thomas C. Walker
    The recent questions about the viability of political realism highlight a need for alternative theoretical frameworks to guide international relations research. These alternatives, however, have been slow to emerge, due in part to the field's traditional neglect of political theory. In this essay I present an alternative based on a survey of Paine's international thought. Sir Michael Howard referred to Paine as the most important internationalist writer of all time, but his contributions have been largely ignored by students of international relations. Paine was a classic second image theorist who first posited how democratic governance would promote a peaceful world. Paine's works leave us with all the features of cosmopolitan thinking in international relations: Faith in reason and progress, the evils of authoritarian regimes, the democratic peace, the peaceful effect of trade, nonprovocative defense policies, open diplomacy, obsolescence of conquest, the universal respect for human rights, and the democratic propensity to engage in messianic interventionism. I conclude with a comparison of Kant and Paine where I argue that Paine is the more faithful representative of the Enlightenment for students of international relations. [source]


    The Public and Peace: The Consequences for Citizenship of the Democratic Peace Literature

    INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 2 2006
    GORDON P. HENDERSON
    As policymakers are increasingly tempted to act on the apparent pacifying virtues of democratization, some scholars struggle to give them reliable reasons for why it occurs while others warn of the dangers of acting on empirical regularities whose nature and cause are not fully understood. This essay undertakes a review of the democratic peace literature in order to document its largely implicit, but sometimes explicit, conceptualizations of the role of democratic citizens in achieving or frustrating the democratic peace. Because citizenship is a distinctive and defining characteristic of democracy, it may well, and perhaps ought to, be the main source of explanation for the democratic peace. The essay begins by showing that the Enlightenment social contract tradition (for example, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant) is oriented toward the achievement of domestic and international peace and that the parties to the contract,the citizens,are responsible for desiring, achieving, and maintaining peace. The essay then proceeds to categorize and review the democratic peace literature according to the degree of support found for this proposition and the role of citizens in achieving or obstructing peace. [source]


    Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?

    JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009
    KATE A. MORAN
    There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source]


    THE UNIVERSALITY OF JEWISH ETHICS: A Rejoinder to Secularist Critics

    JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2008
    David Novak
    ABSTRACT Jewish ethics like Judaism itself has often been charged with being "particularistic," and in modernity it has been unfavorably compared with the universality of secular ethics. This charge has become acute philosophically when the comparison is made with the ethics of Kant. However, at this level, much of the ethical rejection of Jewish particularism, especially its being beholden to a God who is above the universe to whom this God prescribes moral norms and judges according to them, is also a rejection of Christian (or any other monotheistic) ethics, no matter how otherwise universal. Yet this essay argues that Jewish ethics that prescribes norms for all humans, and that is knowable by all humans, actually constitutes a wider moral universe than does Kantian ethics, because it can include non-rational human objects and even non-human objects altogether. This essay also argues that a totally egalitarian moral universe, encompassing all human relations, becomes an infinite, totalizing universe, which can easily become the ideological justification (ratio essendi) of a totalitarian regime. [source]


    Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century?

    JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, Issue 4 2006
    A fresh look at Kant's old argument
    Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source]


    Melville's Transcendentals: Kant and Radical Evil in,Pierre; or The Ambiguities

    LEVIATHAN, Issue 3 2010
    Bruce Rosenstock
    First page of article [source]


    COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RADICALISM IN A GLOBAL AGE

    METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2009
    ROBERT FINE
    Abstract: The cosmopolitan imagination constructs a world order in which the idea of human rights is an operative principle of justice. Does it also construct an idealisation of human rights? The radicality of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, as developed by Kant, lay in its analysis of the roots of organised violence in the modern world and its visionary programme for changing the world. Today, the temptation that faces the cosmopolitan imagination is to turn itself into an endorsement of the existing order of human rights without a corresponding critical analysis of the roots of contemporary violence. Is the critical idealism associated with Kantian cosmopolitanism at risk of transmutation into an uncritical positivism? We find two prevailing approaches: either the constitutional framework of the existing world order is presented as the realisation of the cosmopolitan vision, or cosmopolitanism is turned into a utopian vision of a world order in which power is subordinated to the rule of international law. I suggest that the difficulties associated with both wings of cosmopolitanism threaten the legitimacy of the project and call for an understanding and culture of human rights that is less exclusively "conceptual" and more firmly grounded in social theory. [source]


    On the Structure of Twentieth-Century Philosophy

    METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2004
    Tom Rockmore
    Abstract: It makes sense to ask from time to time where we are in the philosophical discussion. This article reviews the debate in the twentieth century. Michael Friedman has recently argued that the split between Continental and analytic philosophy is due to the inability, because of war, to carry forward a genuine debate begun by Heidegger and Carnap around the time of Heidegger's public controversy with Cassirer at Davos in 1929. I, however, argue that there was not even the beginning of a genuine debate between Heidegger and Carnap. I argue further that the split between analytic and Continental philosophy originated earlier, in the analytic attack on idealism at the beginning of the century. And finally I argue that the differences among analytic philosophy, Continental philosophy, and pragmatism, the third main current of twentieth-century philosophy, can be traced to differing reactions to Kant. [source]