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Animal Suffering (animal + suffering)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences75%

Selected Abstracts

On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument from Mercy

JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2002
Sarah Bachelard
In the euthanasia debate, the argument from mercy holds that if someone is in unbearable pain and is hopelessly ill or injured, then mercy dictates that inflicting death may be morally justified. One common way of setting the stage for the argument from mercy is to draw parallels between human and animal suffering, and to suggest that insofar as we are prepared to relieve an animal's suffering by putting it out of its misery we should likewise be prepared to offer the same relief to human beings. In this paper, I will argue that the use of parallels between human and animal suffering in the argument from mercy relies upon truncated views of how the concept of a human being enters our moral thought and responsiveness. In particular, the focus on the nature and extent of the empirical similarities between human beings and animals obscures the significance for our moral lives of the kind of human fellowship which is not reducible to the shared possession of empirical capacities. I will suggest that although a critical examination of the blindspots in these arguments does not license the conclusion that euthanasia for mercy's sake is never morally permissible, it does limit the power of arguments such as those provided by Rachels and Singer to justify it. I will further suggest that examination of these blindspots helps to deepen our understanding of what is at stake in the question of euthanasia in ways that tend otherwise to remain obscured. [source]

What are 60 warblers worth?

OIKOS, Issue 8 2007
Killing in the name of conservation
Ecological research sometimes entails animal suffering and even animal killing. The ethical appropriateness of animal suffering and killing in conservation research may entail considerations that differ from many other kinds of research. This is true, insomuch as conservation research is specifically motivated by an ethical premise: an appreciation for non-human life. In striking contrast with other academic fields (e.g. medicine), however, the ethical dimension of conservation research is only rarely discussed. When it is discussed, it tends to be characterized by logical errors. These errors are important because they are general (i.e. both common and with far-reaching implications), and they are easily made by intelligent people; especially those with no formal training in ethics or logic. Failure to recognize these errors could stymie efforts to increase the ethical quality of ecological research conducted in the name of conservation. We take advantage of a recently published dialogue concerning the ethical appropriateness of a specific field experiment that entailed killing black-throated blue warblers, Dendroica caerulescens. Both sides of this debate exemplify the kinds of errors to which we refer. In this paper we briefly review the arguments presented on each side of this debate, highlight their mistakes, and indicate necessary corrections. We argue that: (1) compliance with animal research regulations, while important, inadequately accommodates the ethical aspects of animal research, and (2) individual ecologists ought to understand themselves what does and does not represent sound and valid arguments for ethical decisions. Finally, we discuss how any ecological researcher might begin to apply our analysis to his or her own research. [source]

On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument from Mercy

JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2002
Sarah Bachelard
In the euthanasia debate, the argument from mercy holds that if someone is in unbearable pain and is hopelessly ill or injured, then mercy dictates that inflicting death may be morally justified. One common way of setting the stage for the argument from mercy is to draw parallels between human and animal suffering, and to suggest that insofar as we are prepared to relieve an animal's suffering by putting it out of its misery we should likewise be prepared to offer the same relief to human beings. In this paper, I will argue that the use of parallels between human and animal suffering in the argument from mercy relies upon truncated views of how the concept of a human being enters our moral thought and responsiveness. In particular, the focus on the nature and extent of the empirical similarities between human beings and animals obscures the significance for our moral lives of the kind of human fellowship which is not reducible to the shared possession of empirical capacities. I will suggest that although a critical examination of the blindspots in these arguments does not license the conclusion that euthanasia for mercy's sake is never morally permissible, it does limit the power of arguments such as those provided by Rachels and Singer to justify it. I will further suggest that examination of these blindspots helps to deepen our understanding of what is at stake in the question of euthanasia in ways that tend otherwise to remain obscured. [source]

Animals, Ethics and Public Policy

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2010
ROBERT GARNER
In orthodox moral thinking in the West, animals count for something but human interests take precedence. It is argued that this moral orthodoxy or animal welfare position is flawed. It fails to take into account that some animals, like humans, are persons and that some, so-called ,marginal' humans lack personhood. More importantly, although it is likely that animals do not have an interest in liberty for its own sake and have less of an interest in continued life than humans, there is little justification for the animal welfare claim that an animal's suffering should be regarded as less important morally than that of a human. It is concluded that the adoption of a ,sentiency position', whereby animals have a right not to suffer, has radical implications for the way animals are treated, ruling out intensive forms of animal agriculture and those scientific procedures that inflict suffering as morally illegitimate. [source]