Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Just War (just + war)
Terms modified by Just War Selected AbstractsTHE IDEA OF DEFENSE IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THINKING ABOUT JUST WARJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 4 2008James Turner Johnson ABSTRACT What is, or should be, the role of defense in thinking about the justification of use of armed force? Contemporary just war thinking prioritizes defense as the principal, and perhaps the only, just cause for resorting to armed force. By contrast, classic just war tradition, while recognizing defense as justification for use of force by private persons, did not reason from self-defense to the justification of the use of force on behalf of the political community, but instead rendered the idea of just cause for resort to force in terms of the sovereign's responsibility to maintain justice, vindicating those who had suffered from injustice and punishing evildoers. This paper moves through three major stages in the historical development of just war thinking, first examining a critical phase in the formation of the classical idea of just cause as the responsibility to maintain justice, then discussing the shift, characteristic of the modern period, to an idea of sovereignty as connected to the state and the prioritization of defense of the state as just cause for use of force, and lastly showing how this conception of the priority of defense became part of the recovery of just war thinking in the latter part of the twentieth century. The paper concludes by noting recent changes in thought on international law that tend to emphasize justice at the expense of the right of self-defense, suggesting that the roots of just war thinking imply the need for a similar rethinking of contemporary just war discourse. [source] Legitimate Authority and "Just War" in the Modern WorldPEACE & CHANGE, Issue 1 2002Laurie Calhoun Legitimate authority is a widely touted yet rarely analyzed concept in discourse about war. In this essay, I articulate and analyze the schema of just war theory that has dominated philosophical discourse regarding war since the early medieval period. Although the requirements for a "just war" appear to exceed the simple proclamation by a legitimate authority, in fact, all of the other requirements are subject to the interpretation of the legitimate authority. In other words, just war theory reduces, in actual practice, to the requirement of legitimate authority. A consideration of the nature of contemporary warfare further suggests that just war theory is the vestigial idiom of a world that no longer exists. What remains today of just war theory is a dangerous rhetorical weapon, deployed by the leaders of both sides in every belligerent conflict. [source] The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century , Edited by Charles Reed and David RyallRELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Myles Werntz No abstract is available for this article. [source] Jus Post Bellum: Just War Theory and the Principles of Just PeaceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 4 2006ROBERT E. WILLIAMS JR. What happens following a war is important to the moral judgments we make concerning warfare, just as the intentions going in and the means used are. There has, however, been inadequate attention paid to considerations of jus post bellum in the just war tradition. This essay seeks to contribute to recent efforts to develop jus post bellum principles by first noting some of the ways that jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations serve to constrain what can legitimately be done after war. We argue, however, that the constraints grounded in traditional just war theory do not offer sufficient guidance for judging postwar behavior and that principles grounded in the concept of human rights are needed to complete our understanding of what constitutes a just war. A just peace exists when the human rights of those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the war. [source] THE IDEA OF DEFENSE IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THINKING ABOUT JUST WARJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 4 2008James Turner Johnson ABSTRACT What is, or should be, the role of defense in thinking about the justification of use of armed force? Contemporary just war thinking prioritizes defense as the principal, and perhaps the only, just cause for resorting to armed force. By contrast, classic just war tradition, while recognizing defense as justification for use of force by private persons, did not reason from self-defense to the justification of the use of force on behalf of the political community, but instead rendered the idea of just cause for resort to force in terms of the sovereign's responsibility to maintain justice, vindicating those who had suffered from injustice and punishing evildoers. This paper moves through three major stages in the historical development of just war thinking, first examining a critical phase in the formation of the classical idea of just cause as the responsibility to maintain justice, then discussing the shift, characteristic of the modern period, to an idea of sovereignty as connected to the state and the prioritization of defense of the state as just cause for use of force, and lastly showing how this conception of the priority of defense became part of the recovery of just war thinking in the latter part of the twentieth century. The paper concludes by noting recent changes in thought on international law that tend to emphasize justice at the expense of the right of self-defense, suggesting that the roots of just war thinking imply the need for a similar rethinking of contemporary just war discourse. [source] Humanitarian Intervention, Altruism, and the Limits of CasuistryJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 1 2000Richard B. Miller This essay argues that the ethics of humanitarian intervention cannot be readily subsumed by the ethics of just war without due attention to matters of political and moral motivation. In the modern era, a just war draws directly from self-benefitting motives in wars of self-defense, or indirectly in wars that enforce international law or promote the global common good. Humanitarian interventions, in contrast, are intuitively admirable insofar as they are other-regarding. That difference poses a challenge to the casuistry of humanitarian intervention because it makes it difficult to reason by analogy from the case of war to the case of humanitarian intervention. The author develops this point in dialogue with Michael Walzer, the U.S. Catholic bishops, and President Clinton. He concludes by showing how a casuistry of intervention is possible, developing a motivational rationale that draws on the Golden Rule. [source] Misreading Islamist Terrorism: The "War Against Terrorism" and Just-War TheoryMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2004Joseph M. Schwartz Abstract: The Bush administration's military war on terrorism is a blunt, ineffective, and unjust response to the threat posed to innocent civilians by terrorism. Decentralized terrorist networks can only be effectively fought by international cooperation among police and intelligence agencies representing diverse nation-states, including ones with predominantly Islamic populations. The Bush administration's allegations of a global Islamist terrorist threat to the national interests of the United States misread the decentralized and complex nature of Islamist politics. Undoubtedly there exists a "combat fundamentalist" element within Islamism. But the threat posed to U.S. citizens by Islamist terrorism neither necessitates nor justifies as a response massive military invasions of other nations. Not only does the Bush administration's war on alleged "terrorist states" violate the doctrine of just war, but in addition these wars arise from a new, unilateral, imperial foreign-policy doctrine of "preventive wars." Such a doctrine will isolate the United States from international institutions and long-standing allies. The weakening of these institutions and alliances will only weaken the ability of the international community to deter terrorism. [source] THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SOLDIERS AND THE ETHICS OF KILLING IN WARTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 229 2007Yitzhak Benbaji According to the purist war ethic, the killings committed by soldiers fighting in just wars are permissible, but those committed by unjust combatants are nothing but murders. Jeff McMahan asserts that purism is a direct consequence of the justice-based account of self-defence. I argue that this is incorrect: the justice-based conception entails that in many typical cases, killing unjust combatants is morally unjustified. So real purism is much closer to pacifism than its proponents would like it to be. I conclude that the best explanation of the common view that unjust combatants may be defensively killed relies on a rights-based conception of self-defence. [source] | ||||||||||