Home  About us  Contact
 

Involuntary Unemployment (involuntary + unemployment)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Employment with Alternative Incentive Schemes when Effort is Not Verifiable

LABOUR, Issue 1 2005
Nicola Meccheri
When effort is fully observable, both contracts with bonus and tournaments, unlike efficiency wages, solve the incentive problem without generating involuntary unemployment. Only tournaments, however, allow attainment of the Pareto optimal employment level. If effort is not fully observable, previous results must, to some extent, be reconsidered. Contracts with bonus also produce involuntary unemployment, while tournaments, in addition to continuing to produce a higher level of employment, generate involuntary unemployment only if a shirker who is not caught has some probability of winning. [source]

Gerechtigkeit und Marktwirtschaft , das Problem der Arbeitslosigkeit

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 4 2008
Malte Faber
Conventionally, it is argued that involuntary unemployment causes a deadweight loss in social welfare, because it involves the under-use of a productive resource. We explore this efficiency argument with a public choice approach, employing the notion of homo oeconomicus. We contrast this with a perspective using the concept of homo politicus, which stresses social justice. We apply our findings to the special case of German social reform, especially Hartz IV, and show that some of its policy recommendations are in accordance with our analysis. [source]

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN AN ECONOMY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2007
Noritaka Kudoh
D82; J65; J68 ABSTRACT This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labour market. Firms offer a contract that induces the self-selection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance , or subsidy to unemployment , reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device. [source]

Shirking in a monetary business cycle model

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2006
Michelle Alexopoulos
Abstract This paper investigates whether a limited participation model with imperfectly observed effort can reproduce the economy's responses to a monetary policy shock without appealing to high labour supply elasticities or high markups. The results demonstrate that the presence of imperfectly observed effort, in combination with the limited participation assumption, allows the model to account for the presence of involuntary unemployment, nominal wage rigidity, and the observed responses to monetary policy shocks. Ce mémoire enquête pour établir si un modèle de participation limitée où le niveau d'effort est imparfaitement observé peut reproduire les réponses d'une économie à un choc de politique monétaire sans avoir à postuler des élasticités élevées d'offre de travail ou des fortes marges bénéficiaires. Les résultats montrent que la présence d'un effort imparfaitement observé, combinée au postulat de participation limitée, permet au modèle de rendre compte de la présence de chômage involontaire, de rigidité du salaire nominal, et des réponses observées aux chocs de la politique monétaire. [source]