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Investment Program (investment + program)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences40%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting40%

Selected Abstracts

Effects of Earnings-Supplement Policies on Adult Economic and Middle-Childhood Outcomes Differ for the "Hardest to Employ"

CHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2003
Hirokazu Yoshikawa
Data from the Minnesota Family Investment Program and the New Hope demonstration were used to determine whether experimental effects of antipoverty policies differ by parents' risk for nonemployment. Using propensity score analysis, increases in employment and income were largest in the harder-to-employ halves of both samples. However, only children in the moderately hard-to-employ quartiles (50th to 75th percentile) consistently showed improvements in school and behavior outcomes. The very-hardest-to-employ 25% experienced decreases in school engagement, and increases in aggressive behaviors, despite substantial increases in parental employment and income. In this group, increases in maternal depression, reductions in regular family routines, and smaller increases in job stability and center-based child care occurred. These factors may have counteracted the potential benefits of increased income on children. [source]

Implementation from Above: The Ecology of Power in Sweden's Environmental Governance

GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001
Lennart J. Lundqvist
This paper seeks to assess the tenability of Rhodes' view of the "new governance" as "governing without government," as well as the validity of Pierre and Peters' assertions that the state is still at the center of structures and processes of governance. The case used for analysis is Sweden's ecological modernization and the implementation of Local Investment Programs for Sustainable Development. This case provides a crucial test of the contradictory propositions of Rhodes and Pierre and Peters. Contrary to Rhodes' assertions, central government held the initiative in the process of implementing Sweden's ecological modernization. In line with the arrguments of Pierre and Peters central government created new structures and processes of governance to keep its initiative over constitutionally independent expert agencies and municipal governments,exactly those actors that, in Rhodes' view, could make central governmental steering well nigh impossible. As the paper illustrates, what government gains in direct control over the process, it may well lose in terms of the end results. The case of "new governance" analyzed here thus directs attention to the critical interplay between structure, process, and end results, and to government's role in governance. [source]

Lindahl Pricing, Nonrival Infrastructure, and Endogenous Growth

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2001
Dipankar Dasgupta
The paper constructs a model of endogenous growth where infrastructure is an accumulable stock generating a nonrival input service. A typical market economy cannot attain the socially optimum steady state path, since nonrivalry precludes competitive pricing of infrastructure. However, there exist agent specific prices for the infrastructural service, a price for the infrastructural stock, a rate of interest, and a subsidy for the representative household that can sustain the optimal path as a dynamic Lindahl equilibrium. The rates of return from physical and infrastructural capital equal the rate of interest. Investment programs are socially optimum. The government's budget is balanced. [source]

Reliability and competitive electricity markets

THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2007
Paul Joskow
We derive the optimal prices and investment program for an electric power system when there are price-insensitive retail consumers served by load serving entities that can choose any level of rationing contingent on real-time prices. We then examine the assumptions required for competitive electricity markets to achieve this optimal price and investment program and the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. We analyze the interrelationships between regulator-imposed wholesale market price caps and generating capacity obligations. The implications of potential network collapses for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices yield generation investments consistent with these reserve requirements are examined. [source]

The Institutional Trap in the Czech Rental Sector: Nested Circuits of Power, Space, and Inequality

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 4 2005
Stefan Buzar
Abstract: An "institutional trap" is a sequence of misplaced regulatory steps that have increased the costs of institutional transformation to the level at which inefficient structures can remain stable, despite changes in the external economic environment. This is a common occurrence in Central and Eastern Europe because of the path-dependent nature of the postsocialist transformation process. This article examines the organizational and territorial transformations of housing, utility, and social welfare policies in the Czech Republic through a comparative analysis of institutional power geometries and household expenditures at the national scale. The results indicate that the Czech Republic is facing an institutional trap in the restructuring of its rent control and social welfare policies. The trap operates within three nested circuits: the power geometries of postsocialist reforms, the geographies of housing prices and social welfare, and the consumption patterns of disadvantaged households. The lock-in created by the trap can be resolved only through carefully targeted and synchronized social support and housing investment programs, parallel to rent liberalization. This article argues for comprehensive, rather than partial, solutions to the institutional trap and emphasizes the need for a deeper understanding of the relationships among institutions, space, and inequality. [source]