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International Crises (international + crisis)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision Making

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2007
Min Ye
In the past decade, the application of the Poliheuristic (PH) theory to foreign policy decisions of various types, by numerous leaders, and in association with different research methods, has demonstrated its theoretical merit in integrating the divided rational choice and psychological/cognitive approaches. This article argues for a complementary relationship between PH and formal theory. On the one hand, PH can provide a framework in which abstract formal models can be connected with specific domestic as well as international circumstances. On the other hand, formal theory sharpens the rational analysis used in the second conceptual stage of PH. In this study, I formulate a revised Rubinstein bargaining model with war as an outside option and apply it to Chinese crisis decision making during the Second and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. In sum, this study makes three contributions to the literature on international crises and foreign policy analysis. First, it gives formal explanations on how PH can contribute to the game-theoretic approach in foreign policy analysis. Second, it presents what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) called a "domestic politics version" of the canonical Rubinstein bargaining game, connecting international interactions with individual participants' domestic politics. Finally, it provides a way to test abstract game-theoretic models in particular domestic and international contexts of foreign policy making. [source]

Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001
Etel Solingen
This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation. [source]

Presidential Policymaking in Crisis Situations: 9/11 and Its Aftermath

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 3 2003
William Crotty
This paper compares the decision-making approaches of two presidents, John F. Kennedy and George W. Bush, in relation to unanticipated international crises. One, President Kennedy, employed a broad body of expert opinion and entertained a wide range of options in meeting the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963. The actions taken avoided a potential worldwide nuclear war. The other, George W. Bush, consulted only a few, like-minded colleagues and appears to have decided early on that a war directed against Iraq and Saddam Hussein was a necessity. The administration's justifications for the war were difficult to prove and the administration chose an essentially bilateral (as against a multi-lateral) approach. The Iraq War was won fairly easily, although its long-range consequences remain unclear. The two styles of decision-making present polarized approaches to international crisis situation management. [source]

Constraint Respecters, Constraint Challengers, and Crisis Decision Making in Democracies: A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus Reagan

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2005
Jonathan W. Keller
Models linking domestic political constraints (audience costs, pressures for the diversionary use of force, democratic norms and institutions) to foreign policy behavior generally assume that leaders simply recognize and submit to constraints in their domestic environments,a strong structural argument. In contrast, research on political leadership and decision making suggests that leaders vary systematically in their orientations toward constraints: "constraint respecters" tend to internalize potential constraints, while "constraint challengers" are more likely to view them as obstacles to be overcome. This article develops an integrative theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates these insights and applies them to the domain of crisis decision making. After identifying leaders' expected orientations toward constraints via at-a-distance methods, the plausibility of hypotheses derived from this framework is examined through case studies that explore the decision-making processes employed by President Kennedy (a "constraint respecter") and President Reagan (a "constraint challenger") during international crises. The results suggest that there is important variation in how leaders perceive and respond to domestic constraints, and that leadership style is one,though not the only,important source of this variation. [source]

Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2010
Philip Arena
Diversionary approaches rarely explain why leaders use force in response to economic turmoil rather than addressing the problem directly. Those few studies that do address this often assume leaders can either respond with foreign policy or economic policy, but not both. I develop a formal model in which governments may employ macroeconomic policy tools, enter into an international crisis, or both. The results indicate that the relationship between economic conditions and the decision to use force may be either positive or negative. I discuss the implications with respect to recent empirical studies of the link between economic conditions and international conflict. [source]

Global Order, US Hegemony and Military Integration: The Canadian-American Defense Relationship

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, Issue 4 2008
Bruno Charbonneau
This article argues that the contemporary IR literature on global order and American hegemony has limitations. First, the critical discourse on hegemony fails to adequately examine the deeply embedded nature of regularized practices that are often a key component of the acceptance of certain state and social behaviours as natural. Second, much of the (neo)Gramscian literature has given primacy to the economic aspects of hegemonic order at the expense of examining global military/security relations. Lastly, much of the literature on global order and hegemony has failed to fully immerse itself within a detailed research program. This article presents an historical sociology of Canada-US defense relations so as to argue that the integrated nature of this relationship is key to understanding Canada's role in American hegemony, and how authoritative narratives and practices of "military integration" become instrumental and persuasive in establishing a "commonsensical" worldview. The effects of such integration are especially clear in times of perceived international crisis. Our historical analysis covers Canada's role during the Cuban missile crisis, Operation Apollo after 9/11, and the current war in Afghanistan. [source]