Home About us Contact | |||
International Coordination (international + coordination)
Selected AbstractsThe Insecure Social Protection of Migrant Workers From the MaghrebINTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 2 2000Abdellah Boudahrain Is it possible to speak of just and equitable social protection for the active populations of poor countries which suffer from development problems and are dominated by an international order in which only the law of the strongest prevails, especially when those populations emigrate to seek work in order to live or merely to survive? Universal standards that are supposed to ensure some measure of international coordination of national legislation and practice in social security between developed countries and the so-called developing countries suffer from this somewhat original form of inequality. The adaptation of such standards at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels only reflects the discrimination and selfish interests of States and of the rich and powerful, and indeed of broad sectors of their civil society who reject others simply because of their different culture and traditions. The debate is more involved than at first it may seem. By accepting others as being like oneself one can imagine a better world in which, when people move freely - including migrant workers and their families - they enjoy effective protection through social security. A study of the situation of Maghreb migrants employed and residing in western Europe and the Gulf States has much to teach us in this respect, especially in determining whether any form of solidarity is plausible or achievable in some not too distant future. [source] Migration and welfare: a very simple modelJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 7 2007Roberto Cellini Abstract The paper presents a very simple model of migration, relying on three widely accepted points: first, labour productivity and wages in a country depend on the present average human capital; second, agents maximise their utility, so that migration decisions depend on the wage gap across economies; third, the larger the personal human capital, the higher the propensity is to migrate (ceteris paribus). The model shows that migration through its external effects always lowers the welfare in the sending country, while the effects on the receiving country can be positive or negative. As a consequence, selfish developed economies could desire a larger migration than the optimal level for a benevolent World Planner. This calls for international coordination concerning the regulation of migration flows. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] International institutions in a global economyOXONOMICS, Issue 1 2006Paul Volcker Global economic integration has increased tremendously. But the political instinct to think globally has eroded. This is a particular problem in the context of the world economy's worrying dependence on American spending and Chinese saving and volatile exchange rates. We need heightened international coordination on currencies and, in the long run, perhaps a global currency. [source] Inflation Targeting, Exchange Rate Volatility and International Policy CoordinationTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2002Fernando Alexandre In a linear rational expectations two,country model, using an aggregate demand, aggregate supply framework, we analyse the effects of the adoption of an inflation,targeting regime on exchange rate volatility and the possible scope for policy coordination. This analysis is conducted using optimized interest rate policy rules within a calibrated model. Rules for interest rates that respond either to exchange rates or to portfolio shocks give improved performance and permit gains from international coordination. Optimized Taylor rules perform relatively well. [source] TASTE FOR VARIETY AND OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITY IN AN OPEN ECONOMYBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2009Javier Coto-Martínez D43; F12 ABSTRACT We extend the Benassy,taste for variety' model to an open economy setting. With the Benassy effect, the market equilibrium is inefficient, openness reduces the varieties provided in the unconstrained optimum and there are potential gains from international coordination. [source] |