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Interbank Market (interbank + market)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Discipline and Liquidity in the Interbank Market

JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2-3 2008
THOMAS B. KING
market discipline; federal funds; liquidity; bank risk Using 20 years of panel data, I demonstrate that high-risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity. The economic importance of this effect was relatively small until the mid-1990s, when regulatory and institutional changes began to impose more of the costs of bank failure on uninsured creditors. Subsequently, interbank-market price discipline roughly doubled, and risk-based rationing effects increased by a factor of six. In imposing this discipline, lenders seem to care most about credit risk at borrowing institutions. [source]

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing

JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 6 2008
XAVIER FREIXAS
banking; rationing; monetary policy This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect), and second, it shows that banks' liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect). [source]

What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy, Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?

ECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 2 2007
Marcella Lucchetta
This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour. [source]

Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

ECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 3 2002
Paola Brighi
In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits. (J.E.L.: E52, G21). [source]

Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve's New Discount Window

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2003
Craig Furfine
Standing facilities are designed to place an upper bound on the rates at which financial institutions lend to one another overnight, reducing the volatility of the overnight interest rate, typically the rate targeted by central banks. However, improper design of the facility might decrease a bank's incentive to participate actively in the interbank market. Thus, the mere availability of central-bank-provided credit may lead to its use being greater than what would be expected based on the characteristics of the interbank market. By contrast, however, banks may perceive a stigma from using such facilities, and thus borrow less than what one might expect, thereby reducing the facilities' effectiveness at reducing interest rate volatility. We develop a model demonstrating these two alternative implications of a standing facility. Empirical predictions of the model are then tested using data from the Federal Reserve's new primary credit facility and the US federal funds market. A comparison of data from before and after recent changes to the discount window suggests continued reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve. [source]

Transparency in the interbank market and the volume of bank intermediated loans

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2006
Udo Broll
G21 In the present paper we study the equilibrium interaction through which the interbank market is related to the public lending and borrowing market. It turns out that this interaction is affected by the transparency in the interbank market. Interbank market transparency is modeled by means of more informative signals about future interbank rates. We find that more transparency might increase or decrease the volume of bank intermediated loans in the public market. In particular, the impact of more transparency on the volume of loans depends on the curvature of the marginal cost function of the banking firm. Furthermore, we find that expected profits of the bank are higher when the interbank market is more transparent. [source]