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Intellectual History (intellectual + history)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	87%

Selected Abstracts

FROM IDEAS TO CONCEPTS TO METAPHORS: THE GERMAN TRADITION OF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE COMPLEX FABRIC OF LANGUAGE

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2010
ELÍAS JOSÉ PALTI
ABSTRACT Recently, the diffusion of the so-called "new intellectual history" led to the dismissal of the old school of the "history of ideas" on the basis of its ahistorical nature (the view of ideas as eternal entities). This formulation is actually misleading, missing the core of the transformation produced in the field. It is not true that the history of ideas simply ignored the fact that the meaning of ideas changes over time. The issue at stake here is really not how ideas changed (the mere description of the semantic transformation they underwent historically), but rather why they do. The study of the German tradition of intellectual history serves in this essay as a basis to illustrate the meaning and significance of the recent turn from ideas as its object. In the process of trying to account for the source of contingency of conceptual formations, it will open our horizon to the complex nature of the ways by which we invest the world with meaning. That is, it will disclose the presence of different layers of symbolic reality lying beneath the surface level of "ideas," and analyze their differential nature and functions. It will also show the reasons for the ultimate failure of the "history of ideas" approach, why discourses can never achieve their vocation to constitute themselves as self-enclosed, rationally integrated systems, thereby expelling contingency from their realm. In sum, it will show why historicity is not merely something that comes to intellectual history from without (as a by-product of social history or as the result of the action of an external agent), as the history of ideas assumed, but is a constitutive dimension of it. [source]

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, INCONCEIVABILITY, AND METHODOLOGICAL HOLISM,

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2007
BRANKO MITROVI
ABSTRACT The debate between individualism and holism in the philosophy of history pertains to the nature of the entities relied on in historical explanations. The question is whether explanations of historical items (for example, events, actions, artifacts) require the assumption that the collective historical entities (for example, civilizations, cultures, and so on) used in these explanations are (sometimes) conceived of as irreducible to the actions, thoughts, and beliefs of individual human beings. In this paper I analyze two methodological problems that holist explanations face in the writing of intellectual history. The first problem derives from the fact that holist explanations in intellectual history have to rely on the claim that certain beliefs were inconceivable to some individuals because they were members of specific collectives, whereas it is unclear how historical research can justify such claims when made from the holist position. The second problem pertains to the difficulties the holist position faces when it has to account for the novel properties of artifacts studied by intellectual history. [source]

On Some Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 2 2002
Vivienne Brown
This paper argues that the notion of weak intentionalism in Mark Bevir's The Logic of the History of Ideas is incoherent. Bevir's proposal for weak intentionalism as procedural individualism relies on the argument that the object of study for historians of ideas is given by the beliefs that are expressed by individuals (whether authors or readers) since these beliefs constitute the historical meaning of the work for those individuals as historical figures. Historical meanings are thus hermeneutic meanings. In the case of insincere, unconscious, and irrational beliefs, however, the beliefs expressed by individuals are not in fact their actual beliefs, and their actual beliefs are now taken to be those expressed by the works. It thus turns out that it is not the beliefs expressed by individuals that are the object of study for historians but the works themselves, since the overriding requirement for historians of ideas is to "make sense of their material" and it is this requirement that determines whether or not the beliefs are to be construed as expressed by individuals or by the works. But once it is accepted that the beliefs that are the object of study for historians are expressed by the works and not by individuals, the original argument that such beliefs are historical hermeneutic meanings for historical figures no longer applies. The argument for weak intentionalism thus turns out to be incoherent. Bevir's argument fails to establish that the object of study for the history of ideas is external to the works, and the attempted distinction between interpreting a work and reading a text also fails. [source]

Early Modern Japanese Intellectual History: USA, France, and Germany1

THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Issue 4 2005
Herman Ooms
[source]

The metacommunity concept: a framework for multi-scale community ecology

ECOLOGY LETTERS, Issue 7 2004
M. A. Leibold
Abstract The metacommunity concept is an important way to think about linkages between different spatial scales in ecology. Here we review current understanding about this concept. We first investigate issues related to its definition as a set of local communities that are linked by dispersal of multiple potentially interacting species. We then identify four paradigms for metacommunities: the patch-dynamic view, the species-sorting view, the mass effects view and the neutral view, that each emphasizes different processes of potential importance in metacommunities. These have somewhat distinct intellectual histories and we discuss elements related to their potential future synthesis. We then use this framework to discuss why the concept is useful in modifying existing ecological thinking and illustrate this with a number of both theoretical and empirical examples. As ecologists strive to understand increasingly complex mechanisms and strive to work across multiple scales of spatio-temporal organization, concepts like the metacommunity can provide important insights that frequently contrast with those that would be obtained with more conventional approaches based on local communities alone. [source]

Gender, memory and Jewish identity: reading a family history from medieval southern Italy

EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE, Issue 3 2005
Patricia Skinner
This article combines recent work on memory in the early and central Middle Ages to read the Scroll of Ahimaaz, a well-known eleventh-century Jewish text from southern Italy. It suggests that previous readings of the text have been shaped by the dominant tradition of intellectual history within Jewish studies, and that Ahimaaz's work has been overlooked for the information it contains about gender and family history. It concludes that whilst the primarily Jewish identity of Ahimaaz and his family is reinforced by the text, they were at the same time as much a product of the southern Italian environment in which they lived. [source]

THE USES OF WALTER: WALTER BENJAMIN AND THE COUNTERFACTUAL IMAGINATION

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2010
BENJAMIN ALDES WURGAFT
ABSTRACT Many authors, both scholarly and otherwise, have asked what might have happened had Walter Benjamin survived his 1940 attempt to escape Nazi-occupied Europe. This essay examines several implicitly or explicitly "counterfactual" thought experiments regarding Benjamin's "survival," including Hannah Arendt's influential "Walter Benjamin: 1892,1940," and asks why our attachment to Benjamin's story has prompted so much counterfactual inquiry. It also explores the larger question of why few intellectual historians ask explicitly counterfactual questions in their work. While counterfactuals have proven invaluable for scholars in diplomatic, military, and economic history, those writing about the history of ideas often seem less concerned with chains of events and contingency than some of their colleagues are,or they attend to contingency in a selective fashion. Thus this essay attends to the ambivalence about the category of contingency that runs through much work in intellectual history. Returning to the case of Walter Benjamin, this essay explores his own tendency to pose "what if?" questions, and then concludes with an attempt to ask a serious counterfactual question about his story. The effort to ask this question reveals one methodological advantage of counterfactual inquiry: the effort to ask such questions often serves as an excellent guide to the prejudices and interests of the historian asking them. By engaging in counterfactual thought experiments, intellectual historians could restore an awareness of sheer contingency to the stories we tell about the major texts and debates of intellectual history. [source]

FROM IDEAS TO CONCEPTS TO METAPHORS: THE GERMAN TRADITION OF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE COMPLEX FABRIC OF LANGUAGE

SUBJECTIVITY AS A NON-TEXTUAL STANDARD OF INTERPRETATION IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2010
JARI KAUKUA
ABSTRACT Contemporary caution against anachronism in intellectual history, and the currently momentous theoretical emphasis on subjectivity in the philosophy of mind, are two prevailing conditions that set puzzling constraints for studies in the history of philosophical psychology. The former urges against assuming ideas, motives, and concepts that are alien to the historical intellectual setting under study, and combined with the latter suggests caution in relying on our intuitions regarding subjectivity due to the historically contingent characterizations it has attained in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the face of these conditions, our paper raises a question of what we call non-textual (as opposed to contextual) standards of interpretation of historical texts, and proceeds to explore subjectivity as such a standard. Non-textual standards are defined as (heuristic) postulations of features of the world or our experience of it that we must suppose to be immune to historical variation in order to understand a historical text. Although the postulation of such standards is often so obvious that the fact of our doing so is not noticed at all, we argue that the problems in certain special cases, such as that of subjectivity, force us to pay attention to the methodological questions involved. Taking into account both recent methodological discussion and the problems inherent in two de facto denials of the relevance of subjectivity for historical theories, we argue that there are good grounds for the adoption of subjectivity as a nontextual standard for historical work in philosophical psychology. [source]

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, INCONCEIVABILITY, AND METHODOLOGICAL HOLISM,

The "Return of the Subject" As a Historico-Intellectual Problem

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2004
Elías Palti
abstract Recently, a call for the "return of the subject" has gained increasing influence. The power of this call is intimately linked to the assumption that there is a necessary connection between "the subject" and politics (and ultimately, history). Without a subject, it is alleged, there can be no agency, and therefore no emancipatory projects,and, thus, no history. This paper discusses the precise epistemological foundations for this claim. It shows that the idea of a necessary link between "the subject" and agency, and therefore between the subject and politics (and history) is only one among many different ones that appeared in the course of the four centuries that modernity spans. It has precise historico-intellectual premises, ones that cannot be traced back in time before the end of the nineteenth century. Failing to observe the historicity of the notion of the subject, and projecting it as a kind of universal category, results, as we shall see, in serious incongruence and anachronisms. The essay outlines a definite view of intellectual history aimed at recovering the radically contingent nature of conceptual formations, which, it alleges, is the still-valid core of Foucault's archeological project. Regardless of the inconsistencies in his own archeological endeavors, his archeological approach intended to establish in intellectual history a principle of temporal irreversibility immanent in it. Following his lead, the essay attempts to discern the different meanings the category of the subject has historically acquired, referring them back to the broader epistemic reconfigurations that have occurred in Western thought. This reveals a richness of meanings in this category that are obliterated under the general label of the "modern subject"; at the same time, it illuminates some of the methodological problems that mar current debates on the topic. [source]

Family Matters: The Influence of Applied Linguistics and Composition Studies on Second Language Writing Studies,Past, Present, and Future

MODERN LANGUAGE JOURNAL, Issue 1 2004
Tony Silva
This intellectual history of the disciplinary roots of second language (L2) writing research and pedagogy in English examines the influences of its feeder disciplines, composition studies and applied linguistics, and their parent disciplines, rhetoric and linguistics. After a brief history of L2 writing's two grandparent disciplines (rhetoric and linguistics) and its two parent disciplines (composition studies and applied linguistics), the article focuses on the effect of the two parent disciplines' conflicting identities. Whereas L2 writing benefits from its invigorating position at the confluence of these two intellectual streams, it has also been pulled in different incompatible directions resulting from differences, and even similarities, between applied linguistics' and composition studies' inquiry paradigms and traditions, their intellectual identities, and the material disciplinary manifestations of their organizations, conferences, and publications. A brief history of L2 writing pedagogy and research demonstrates the push and pull of the conflicting influences of its feeder disciplines. [source]

Anthropology in the 20th Century and Beyond

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Issue 2 2002
Ward H. Goodenough
This article reviews the growth of knowledge in the four fields of anthropology. It is not an intellectual history but, rather, focuses on what I consider to have been the important developments in substantive knowledge. [Keywords: U.S. anthropology, four fields, 20th century, substantive knowledge] [source]

Utopianism Parodied in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four.

ORBIS LITERARUM, Issue 5 2010
An Intertextual Reading of the, Goldstein Treatise'
The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism, attributed to Big Brother's arch-enemy, Emmanuel Goldstein, is the book-in-book in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. Along with the appendix, it provides the reader with a theoretical and philosophical framework that complements the narrative. First I point out the importance of Goldstein's tract on an intratextual level; then my focus shifts towards its intertextuality with influential works of European intellectual history, such as Malthus's An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), Marx's and Engels's Communist Manifesto (1848), Spengler's Decline of the West (1918) and Burnham's Managerial Revolution (1941). Bringing into focus the myriad of perspectives that result from the intra-, inter- and extratextual layers in the text, the article shows that the treatise is the ultimate example of Orwell's distinctive fusion of realism and satire. [source]

Fair Labelling in Criminal Law

THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
James Chalmers
,Fair labelling' has become common currency in criminal law scholarship over recent decades, but the principle's scope and justification has never been analysed in detail. Basic questions remain unanswered, such as the intended audience for these labels and whether they assume the same importance in respect of both offences and defences. This article traces the intellectual history of the principle and examines its possible justifications in respect of offence labelling, noting that labelling is important in two distinct senses: that of description, and that of differentiation. It goes on to sketch out some considerations which are of importance in the principle's application, before concluding with a discussion of its applicability to defences. [source]