Institutional Incentives (institutional + incentive)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Individual characteristics, institutional incentives and electoral abstention in Western Europe

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 5 2002
Eva Anduiza Perea
This article examines the interaction between individual characteristics and institutional incentives in non,voting, with a special focus on the interaction between these two types of explanatory variables. The analysis of survey and contextual data for parliamentary elections in 15 Western European countries shows that the effect of individual resources and motivations on abstention is not constant across different countries. Conversely, the effect of institutional incentives (compulsory voting, voting facilities, electoral thresholds of representation and preference expression) on non,voting depends on the elector's level of resources and motivations. One of the four institutional incentives considered has even opposite effects for citizens with different individual characteristics. The analysis also shows that when analysing interactions it is fundamental to distinguish between magnitudes and consequences of the effects of explanatory variables. This has important implications for the interpretation of the results of logistic regression analysis. [source]


Evolution of the Minangkabau's shifting cultivation in the West Sumatra highland OF Indonesia and its strategic implications for dynamic farming systems

LAND DEGRADATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Issue 1 2005
A. Dendi
Abstract This paper explores the evolution of the shifting cultivation of the Minangkabau, the biggest matrilineal society in Indonesia, and examines factors underlying the instability and vulnerability of farmers' livelihoods and the degradation of their resource base using an extended factor analysis technique, in order to understand how development strategies might be modified towards a more dynamic farming system. The study distinguished three main phases of the farming system's changes and found that these changes highly corresponded with the emerging market and institutional incentives. Furthermore, the factor analysis generated a six-factor model suggesting strategic interventions to foster the improvement of farmers' livelihoods and environment in future. In addition, consistent with the results of these factors analysis, we argue that, provided land tenure is conducive, there are substantial possibilities for policies and interventions that focus first on agricultural diversification and then on organization building, to assist in dealing with farmers' vulnerability and environmental degradation in the uplands. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Social funds and decentralisation: optimal institutional design

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 4 2006
Jean-Paul Faguet
Abstract Most of the 60+ developing countries that have established social funds (SFs) are decentralising their governments as well. But the question of how to tailor SFs,originally a highly centralised model,for a decentralising context has received relatively little attention in the literature. We first examine evidence on the ability of SFs to adapt to a decentralised context. We then lay out the implications of decentralisation for SF institutional design step-by-step through the project cycle. The topic is doubly important because social funds can increase their effectiveness, and the sustainability of their investments, by reorganising internal processes to take advantage of the political and civic institutions that decentralisation creates. Local government has an informational advantage in local needs and characteristics (time and place), whereas SFs have access to better technology and knowledge of sectoral best practice. The key is to create institutional incentives that best combine these relative advantages. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]