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Institutional Autonomy (institutional + autonomy)
Selected AbstractsThe Transposition of EU Law: ,Post-Decisional Politics' and Institutional AutonomyEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2001Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos The transposition of European Union (EU) law into national law is a significant part of the EU policy process. However, political scientists have not devoted to it the attention that it deserves. Here, transposition is construed as part of the wider process of policy implementation. Drawing on implementation theory from the field of public policy, the article outlines three sets of factors (institutional, political, and substantive) that affect transposition. Second, the article examines the manner in which eight member states transpose EU legislation, and identifies a European style of transposition. An institutionalist approach is employed to argue that this style is not the result of a process of convergence. Rather, it stems from the capacity of institutions to adapt to novel situations by means of their own standard operating procedures and institutional repertoires. It concludes by highlighting (a) the partial nature of efforts at EU level to improve transposition, themselves impaired by the politics of the policy process and (b) some ideas regarding future research. [source] "This Has Been Quite a Year for Heads Falling": Institutional Autonomy in the Civil Rights EraHISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2004Joy Ann Williamson [source] Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed PolityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico Majone It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation-of-powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ,mixed government',a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ,estates' representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation-of-powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule-making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ,regulatory estate'. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need. [source] Enigmatic Variations: Honours Degree Assessment Regulations in the UKHIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008Mantz Yorke The debate in the UK about the continued existence of the honours degree classification led to a survey of the assessment regulations in 35 varied higher education institutions. This revealed considerable variation in the way in which honours degree classifications are determined, and also in the handling of weak performances by students. Such variability, deriving from a system in which institutional autonomy is to the fore, raises a question about equitability in the treatment of students. A brief allusion is made to the variability in assessment regulations in the US and Australia. [source] The Lambert Code: Can We Define Best Practice?HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2004Michael Shattock The article explores the proposals put forward in the Lambert Report for reforms in university governance. It compares the recommendation for a Code with the analogue Combined Code which regulates corporate governance in companies and draws a distinction between attempts, from the Cadbury Report in 1992 to the Higgs Review in 2003, to create board structures which will reduce the prospect of misgovernance, and the underlying aim of Lambert to improve university performance through governance change. It argues that analogies between university governing bodies and company boards are misleading and that university governing bodies, on their own, are almost by definition unable to fulfill the criteria of an ,effective board' laid down in the DTI Report on TransTec. It suggests that a Guide on Governance which encourages institutional self determination is a better basis for sustaining institutional autonomy, which is a key ingredient to encouraging high levels of performance, than a Government backed Code which risks reducing institutional diversity and cutting across existing legal instruments. It concludes that the proposed Code is a distraction from serious consideration of what factors encourage improved institutional performance. [source] The Institutional Autonomy of EducationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 2 2000David Blacker This paper develops a liberal contextualist account of schooling that balances institutional autonomy with public accountability under conditions of reasonable pluralism. First a conceptual obstacle is discussed: the tendency to conceive educational autonomy according to the false dilemma of instrumentalism versus non-instrumentalism. Then an alternative is advanced,the contextualist picture,that places education's institutional autonomy in its proper light. The conclusion raises and then responds to important objections to the contextualist picture. [source] CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND URBAN PROBLEM SOLVING: THE CHANGING CIVIC ROLE OF BUSINESS LEADERS IN AMERICAN CITIESJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2010ROYCE HANSON ABSTRACT:,Our concern in this article is corporate civic elite organizations and their role in social production and urban policy in the United States. Recent urban literature has suggested that the power and influence of CEO organizations has declined and that there has been some disengagement of corporate elites from civic efforts in many urban areas. Yet while these trends and their likely consequences are generally acknowledged, relatively little empirical research has been conducted on the nature and extent of the shifts in corporate civic leadership and on how these shifts have affected the civic agendas of central cities and metropolitan regions. In this study we obtain data from 19 large metropolitan areas in order to more systematically examine shifts in corporate civic leadership and their consequences. Our results suggest that the institutional autonomy, time, and personal connections to the central cities of many CEOs have diminished and that the civic organizations though which CEOs work appear to have experienced lowered capacity for sustained action. These trends suggest that while many CEOs and their firms will continue to commit their time and their firms' slack resources to civic enterprises, the problems they address will differ from those tackled in the past. We discuss the important implications these shifts have for the future of corporate civic engagement in urban problem solving and for the practice of urban governance. [source] | |||||||||||||