			Home About us Contact

Informational Rents (informational + rent)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2005
Michel Cavagnac
We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner,manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade-off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity-lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant-strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low-cost manager and output control for a high-cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private Information

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2004
Iñaki Aguirre
In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those obtained by introducing distributional considerations. In particular we show that under constant marginal cost the full information policy is not implementable and that the optimal regulatory policy results in informational rents. The social value of private information and the firm's informational rents are both increasing functions of the cost of the public funds. [source]

Regulated Firms with Transboundary Pollution: Does International Competition Improve Efficiency?

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2003
Isabelle Péchoux
We consider a model of strategic trade and environmental policies with transboundary pollution. A regulated monopoly produces in each country and emits pollution. Under complete information, opening borders leads to a reallocation of the production from the large country to the small one. Total production increases, leading to an increase in the total level of pollution. The creation of a common market sometimes leads to a deterioration of total welfare. Under asymmetric information, the international competition generated by the common market decreases the informational rents of the firms, thereby reinforcing the potential gain to open markets to international competition. [source]

Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 1 2000
Guido Friebel
The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992,93. [source]

Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D Under Incomplete Information

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2004
Isabelle Brocas
A regulator offers a cooperation contract to two firms to develop a research project. The contract provides incentives to encourage skill-sharing and coordinate subsequent efforts. Innovators must get informational rents to disclose their privately known skills, which results in distorting R&D efforts with respect to the first-best level. When efforts are strategic complements, both efforts are distorted downwards. By contrast, when efforts are strategic substitutes, the effort of the firm with most valuable skills is distorted downwards (to decrease rents) and the effort of the other firm is distorted upwards (to compensate the previous efficiency loss). [source]