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Information Asymmetry (information + asymmetry)
Selected AbstractsAccruals quality and corporate cash holdingsACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2009Pedro J. García-Teruel G31; G32 Abstract This Work Uses Panel Data For Firms Listed In The Spanish Stock Exchange Over The Period From 1995 To 2001 To Analyse The Effect Of Accounting Quality On Cash Holdings. The Results Show That Firms With Good Accruals Quality Hold Lower Cash Levels Than Firms With Poor Accruals Quality. This Finding Suggests That The Quality Of Accounting Information May Reduce The Negative Effects Of Information Asymmetries And Adverse Selection Costs, Allowing Firms To Reduce Their Level Of Corporate Cash Holdings. The Results Also Show That Cash Holdings Decrease When Firms Increase Their Use Of Bank Debt And In The Presence Of Cash Substitutes. In Contrast With This, Firms With Higher Cash Flow Hold Higher Levels Of Cash. [source] Market Segmentation and Information Asymmetry in Chinese Stock Markets: A VAR AnalysisFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 4 2003Jian Yang G15/G32 Abstract This study examines the market segmentation and information asymmetry patterns in Chinese stock markets. The recursive cointegration analysis confirms that each of six markets is not linked with other markets in the long run. Further, the result from data-determined forecast error variance decomposition clearly shows that foreign investors in the Shanghai B-share market are better informed than Chinese domestic investors in two A-share markets and foreign investors in Shenzhen and Hong Kong markets over time. The finding challenges a widespread assumption of less informed foreign investors in the literature, but suggests that foreign investors could be more informed in emerging markets. [source] Institutional Investors and Information Asymmetry: An Event Study of Self-Tender OffersFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2003Michele O'Neill G14/G20/G32 Abstract Our research compares the asymmetric information costs of firms with low levels of institutional ownership to those with high levels. We use self-tender offers as an information event. Our results show that higher institutional ownership, particularly a higher number of institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed trading. These results persist even after we control for differences in trading activity among our sample firms. [source] IAS Versus U.S. GAAP: Information Asymmetry,Based Evidence from Germany's New MarketJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003CHRISTIAN LEUZ abstract Motivated by the debate about globally uniform accounting standards, this study investigates whether firms using U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) vis-à-vis international accounting standards (IAS) exhibit differences in several proxies for information asymmetry. It exploits a unique setting in which the two sets of standards are put on a level playing field. Firms trading in Germany's New Market must choose between IAS and U.S. GAAP for financial reporting, but face the same regulatory environment otherwise. Thus, institutional factors such as listing requirements, market microstructure, and standards enforcement are held constant. In this setting, differences in the bid-ask spread and share turnover between IAS and U.S. GAAP firms are statistically insignificant and economically small. Subsequent analyses of analysts' forecast dispersion, initial public offering underpricing, and firms' standard choices corroborate these findings. Thus, at least for New Market firms, the choice between IAS and U.S. GAAP appears to be of little consequence for information asymmetry and market liquidity. These findings do not support widespread claims that U.S. GAAP produce financial statements of higher informational quality than IAS. [source] Studies on Information Asymmetry, Price Manipulation and Investor Performances,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2008Jin Yoo Abstract In this paper, we examine optimal investment strategies of informed traders in an equity market, where well informed and not so well informed traders as well as noise traders coexist. Naturally, less informed traders follow more informed counterparts because of informational advantage. On the other hand, more informed investors can take advantage of less informed investors' trust by manipulating prices. Often, by inflating or deflating the equity prices, more informed traders make greater profits than less informed traders do. Over time, less informed traders become aware of the others' strategy, thereby a long-term equilibrium is to be attained, in which the more informed mixes his sincere and cheating strategy, and the less informed mixes his trust and distrust strategy. This model can be especially useful in understanding emerging markets, where foreign investors, local institutions, and local individuals are often characterized as more informed, less informed, and noise traders, respectively. [source] Is CEO Duality Always Negative?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009An Exploration of CEO Duality, Ownership Structure in the Arab IPO Context ABSTRACT Manuscript type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper examines the relationships between initial public offering (IPO) underpricing, CEO duality, and strategic ownership in 12 Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Research Findings/Results: Using all IPOs from January 2000 until the end of July 2007, we document an average IPO underpricing of 184.1 per cent. Underpricing is higher in IPO firms that have CEO duality. However, strategic shareholders, such as corporations and other industry-related investors, are likely to play a monitoring role whereas underpricing is found to be lower in firms with both CEO duality and strategic shareholder ownership. Moreover, the negative relation between underpricing and strategic blockholding is greater for foreign strategic ownership than it is for domestic strategic ownership. Theoretical Implications: This paper examines the level and determinants of IPO underpricing in the MENA region. It provides evidence on the role played by foreign strategic owners in reducing agency conflicts and information asymmetries within an environment where firms may be affected by the cultural issues related to political ties and family involvement. Practical Implications: Our results contribute to the existing debate on the appropriate regulations for an effective and stable financial system in Arab countries. They offer policy-makers additional evidence on the positive impact of market openness to foreign shareholders. [source] The Underpricing of Insurance IPOsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2009Qiming Wang The previous literature documents that insurance initial public offerings (IPOs) are less underpriced than those of noninsurance firms. This difference is usually attributed to lower information asymmetry for regulated firms. However, we find that once one controls for the file price adjustment insurance IPOs, both stock and mutual, are no less underpriced than other noninsurance offerings suggesting the book-building process resolves any such information asymmetries. We also find that mutual IPOs appear more underpriced than stock insurance IPOs, but this difference is related to the differences in pre-issue managerial ownership. [source] The Two Faces of Analyst CoverageFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2005John A. Doukas We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts' self-selection bias. [source] Transparency of Central Bank PreferencesGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2009Volker Hahn Central bank objectives; transparency Abstract. In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important. [source] Small,Scale Entrepreneurship and Access to Capital in Peripheral Locations: An Empirical AnalysisGROWTH AND CHANGE, Issue 2 2002Daniel Felsenstein This paper presents an analysis of a public assistance program for small,scale entrepreneurship in peripheral areas. Public assistance compensates for market inefficiencies where the decision rules of financial institutions discriminate against otherwise viable small firms in capital markets. Lending institutions perceive high risk in providing debt capital when little information is present. Using empirical data from Israel, the determinants of this risk are estimated and the role of location in creating this information asymmetry is stressed. These results empirically establish that (1) location matters in determining the risk profile of the firm, (2) locationally targeted programs can reduce the information asymmetries that make peripheral firms unattractive to lenders, and (3) these programs can also generate positive welfare effects. Finally, there is speculation on the potential role of ICT (information and communications technology) in increasing the visibility of small firms in remote locations and creating a more symmetrical flow of information. [source] Disclosure of reserve quantum in the extractive industriesACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1-2 2001Malik Mirza We explore why some firms in the extractive industries disclose mineral reserve quantum in their annual reports and others do not. We propose that the firms' reserve disclosure policies are a function of the extent of information asymmetries, as well as information production, litigation and proprietary costs. More specifically, we propose that a firm's decisions to disclose reserves in the annual report are a function of the stage of the firm's operations, use of project financing, and the cost of measuring reserves. Empirical tests are confirmatory. [source] Membership Matters: On the Value of Being Embedded in Customer NetworksJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 6 2010Øystein D. Fjeldstad abstract Learning about customers and their contexts is vital to firm strategy. We examine how firms can learn by participating in their customers' networks. Specifically, we explain how a bank can increase the value that it creates for customers by being embedded in the networks in which the customers are embedded. We argue that knowledge pertinent to a particular customer is available in the network of affiliated, inter-related customers, and that being structurally embedded in this network can help banks overcome information asymmetries. We use hierarchical linear modelling to test the argument that a bank's structural embeddedness in its customers' network positively affects the bank's ability to offer favourable credit terms. We find that not only does such structural embeddedness affect credit terms, but it also moderates the effects of previously examined relational embeddedness on credit terms. [source] Credit Risk Assessment and Relationship Lending: An Empirical Analysis of German Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2007Patrick Behr We estimate a logit scoring model for the prediction of the probability of default by German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) using a unique data set on SME loans in Germany. Our scoring model helps SMEs to gain knowledge about their default risk, which can be used to approximate their risk adequate cost of debt. This knowledge is likely to lead to a detection of hold-up problems that German SMEs might be confronted with in their bank relationships. Furthermore, it allows them to monitor their bank's pricing behavior and it reduces information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Finally, it can influence their future financing decisions toward capital market-based financing. [source] ICT Innovation and Economic Performance: The Role of Financial IntermediationKYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 4 2002Aerdt Houben This article considers the relationship between finance and the contribution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to macroeconomic performance. The general characteristics of ICT firms, especially their often ,high risk, high return' nature, suggest equity finance is more appropriate than debt finance. Also, the prevalence of information asymmetries tends to favour internal finance and venture capital with management participation. For a group of countries, we analyse correlations between financial structure and the ICT contribution to economic growth. Our results support the view that a market,oriented financial system and a well,developed venture capital market are key factors stimulating the emergence of the so,called ,New Economy'. This helps explain the considerable gap in productivity growth between the United States and Europe in the second half of the 1990s. [source] CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decisionMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2006Joseph F. Brazel Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short-term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity-based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity-based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity-based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] From policy lessons to policy actions: motivation to take evaluation seriouslyPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 4 2004Gustavo Gordillo The purpose of this article is to analyse the institutional aspects of creating effective systems for monitoring and evaluations (M&E) in government-led rural development efforts in developing countries. We argue that the ultimate challenge of creating effective M&E systems for public policy is not only related to the supply of information and the delivery of new knowledge to policy makers, but more importantly to their demand for lessons learnt about the effects of earlier policies. The challenge, then, is for governments to construct institutional arrangements that support the transformation of policy lessons into policy actions. This article shows that the likelihood of this transformation is closely related to the capacity of institutions to deliver mechanisms for downward accountability and processes for organisational learning. We add to earlier work in this area by considering the conditions under which such a transformation process is more or less likely, given the severe power and information asymmetries that characterise the institutional context of many developing countries' national governments. We use the tools of institutional analysis to examine the incentive structures of the actors involved in two concrete field settings, and assess to what extent these actors are likely to take evaluations seriously. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War SettlementsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2010Michaela Mattes Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil-war-torn societies. [source] The empirics of microfinance: what do we know?THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 517 2007Niels Hermes Microfinance has received a lot of attention recently, both from policy makers as well as in academic circles. Two of the main topics that have been hotly debated are explaining joint liability group lending and its implications for reducing information asymmetries, and the trade-off between the financial sustainability and outreach of microfinance programmes. This Feature contains three novel empirical contributions providing new insights with respect to why and how joint liability group lending works. It also contains the first large-scale systematic analysis of the trade-off between financial performance and outreach of microfinance institutions. [source] Regional unemployment and its persistence in transition countries1THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 2 2006Fabian Bornhorst transition; regional unemployment; mobility Abstract We look at the differences in regional unemployment rates in six major transition countries and their persistence over time. We analyse the role various adjustment mechanisms play. While movement out of the labour force seems to be one consequence in many regions with high relative unemployment, there are also signs of emerging wage flexibility. Employment creation, by contrast, has not picked up in regions of high unemployment. Labour mobility also remains very limited in size although it appears to respond to basic economic incentives. Policies addressing housing market imperfections and information asymmetries are necessary to increase worker mobility and to integrate better national labour markets. [source] Information and Control in Ventures and AlliancesTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2005WOUTER DESSEIN ABSTRACT This paper develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence of objectives, and applies it to financial contracting between an investor and a privately informed entrepreneur. We show that formal investor control is (i) increasing in the information asymmetries ex ante, (ii) increasing in the uncertainty surrounding the venture ex post, (iii) decreasing in the entrepreneur's resources, and (iv) increasing in the entrepreneur's incentive conflict. In contrast, real investor control,that is, actual investor interference,is decreasing in information asymmetries. Control rights are further such that control shifts to the investor in bad states of nature. [source] DO TRACKING STOCKS REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2005AN ANALYSIS OF LIQUIDITY AND ADVERSE SELECTION Abstract A firm's announcement that it intends to restructure based on tracking stock is usually associated with a positive stock price reaction, at least in the short run. Typically, this reaction is attributed to expected reductions in a diversification discount, through reduced agency costs or information asymmetries. We reinvestigate this latter hypothesis by focusing on the liquidity provided by market makers before and after a firm issues a tracking stock. Our results suggest that such restructurings are not effective at reducing information asymmetries. Rather, firms that issue tracking stocks exhibit less liquidity and greater adverse selection than comparable control firms. [source] A Content Analysis of Risk Management Disclosures in Canadian Annual ReportsCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Issue 2 2005Kaouthar Lajili Abstract This research paper examines risk information disclosures in Canadian annual reports to provide insights into the current risk disclosure environment, its characteristics, and the analytical usefulness of the information disclosed to the firm's stakeholders. Following a content analysis, the authors describe and then analyze in greater detail the subject matter of risk disclosures of TSE 300 Canadian companies by summarizing and classifying disclosed risk-related information. Results show a high degree of risk disclosure intensity reflecting both mandatory and voluntary risk management disclosures. However, the analytical power of such disclosures, as captured by the risk assessment analysis, appears to lack uniformity, clarity, and quantification, thus potentially limiting their usefulness. The authors conclude that more formalized and comprehensive risk disclosures might be desirable in the future to effectively reduce information asymmetries between management and stakeholders. Résumé La présente étude analyse les divulgations d'informations sur le risque dans les rapports annuels canadiens. Elle se propose de jeter une lumière sur l'environnement actuel de divulgation des risques, ses caractéristiques, et l'utilité analytique des informations divulguées pour les acteurs de l'industrie canadienne. Grâce à la méthode de l'analyse du contenu, les auteurs décrivent puis analysent de fa,on plus détaillée le contenu actuel des divulgations d'informations sur le risque des entreprises du TSE 300. Ils y parviennent en synthétisant et en catégorisant les informations divulguées. Les résultats montrent que les divulgations se font à une fréquence assez élevée, consécutive aux divulgations obligatoires et volontaires de gestion des risques. Cependant, vu la manière dont l'analyse d'évaluation des risques divulgue ces informations, leur pouvoir analytique semble manquer d'homogénéité, de clarté, et de quantification, ce qui limite potentiellement leur utilité. Les auteurs concluent qu'à l'avenir, les divulgations de risques gagneraient à être plus formalisées et plus complètes. Ceci permettrait de réduire l'asymétrie des informations entre les gestionnaires des risques et les investisseurs. [source] FROM DISCRETE-TIME MODELS TO CONTINUOUS-TIME, ASYNCHRONOUS MODELING OF FINANCIAL MARKETSCOMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, Issue 2 2007Katalin Boer Most agent-based simulation models of financial markets are discrete-time in nature. In this paper, we investigate to what degree such models are extensible to continuous-time, asynchronous modeling of financial markets. We study the behavior of a learning market maker in a market with information asymmetry, and investigate the difference caused in the market dynamics between the discrete-time simulation and continuous-time, asynchronous simulation. We show that the characteristics of the market prices are different in the two cases, and observe that additional information is being revealed in the continuous-time, asynchronous models, which can be acted upon by the agents in such models. Because most financial markets are continuous and asynchronous in nature, our results indicate that explicit consideration of this fundamental characteristic of financial markets cannot be ignored in their agent-based modeling. [source] Financing Constraints, Ownership Control, and Cross-Border M&As: Evidence from Nine East Asian EconomiesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2009Yenn-Ru Chen ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study distinguishes between the effects of financial constraint determinants on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and domestic M&As for all takeover bids announced in nine East Asian economies from 1998 to 2005. Research Findings/Insights: The results of logistic regressions verify that the extent of stock market and governance developments improves corporate financing conditions and subsequently encourages cross-border M&As in East Asia. The results also indicate that, except for ownership control variables, the firm-specific factors of financing constraints reduce the occurrence of cross-border M&As relative to domestic M&As. Although family- and state-controlled firms have better access to external financing, they are reluctant to risk diluting their management control and thus prefer domestic M&As to cross-border deals. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study enhances the empirical studies of the relation between financing constraints and corporate investments based on the market imperfection hypothesis of corporate finance theories. In addition, this study also addresses the interaction between the market imperfection hypothesis and agency theory in explaining the effects of special ownership control on cross-border M&As relative to domestic deals. Furthermore, by examining the research questions across nine East Asian economies, this study provides an understanding of how such a relation applies to firms in countries where information asymmetry is high. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings indicate the importance of corporate governance and verify the effects of unique organizational structures on major corporate decisions. Specifically, family-controlled firms are often free of the financing constraints inherent in investment decisions. Thus, it is necessary to consider such organizational uniqueness when explaining the financing behavior of cross-border M&As conducted by Asian firms. [source] The Change in Corporate Transparency of Korean Firms After the Asian Financial Crisis: an analysis using analysts' forecast dataCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Jinho Chang Using analysts' forecast error and forecast dispersion of firms covered by the I/B/E/S database, this study examines the change in information asymmetry of Korean firms around the financial crisis of 1997. Results show that the information asymmetry of Korean firms is lower after the financial crisis than before, implying that corporate transparency did, in effect, improve with the change in business environment. In addition, this study finds that chaebol firms have higher information asymmetry than non-chaebol firm, and also that the corporate transparency improvement of chaebol firms is not higher than that of non-chaebol firms in the post-crisis period despite the reforms particularly targeted to chaebol firms after the financial crisis. [source] Corporate Governance and Equity Liquidity: analysis of S&P transparency and disclosure rankingsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2007Wei-Peng Chen This paper sets out to investigate the effects of disclosure, and other corporate governance mechanisms, on equity liquidity, arguing that those companies adopting poor information transparency and disclosure practices will experience serious information asymmetry. Since poor corporate governance leads to greater information asymmetry, liquidity providers will incur relatively higher adverse information risks and will therefore offer higher information asymmetry components in their effective bid-ask spreads. The Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) rankings of the individual stocks on the S&P 500 index are employed to examine whether firms with greater T&D rankings have lower information asymmetry components and lower stock spreads. Our results reveal that the economic costs of equity liquidity, i.e. the effective spread and the quoted half-spread, are greater for those companies with poor information transparency and disclosure practices. [source] Communication via responsibility reporting and its effect on firm value in FinlandCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010Hannu Schadewitz Abstract n this paper, we first analyzed the responsibility reporting literature with an emphasis on the linkage between responsibility reporting and a firm's performance and valuation. Based on the literature review, we developed a research question: How does communication via responsibility reporting affect firm value? We analyzed the market valuation of listed Finnish firms through a conventional valuation model combined with responsibility reporting. The starting point for our valuation was the Ohlson model. We expanded upon the conventional valuation by studying whether communication via responsibility reporting is related to firm valuation. Our research question is linked to the broader academic question of whether earnings worth as an information source has been erased over the last few years. In addition, we contribute to the literature that tries to understand the link between corporate social responsibility and firm performance/share performance. Specifically, we focused on responsibility reporting according to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and especially on whether the existence of these reports provides a further explanation for firm value. Our sample was a population type that covered all listed Finnish firms that have adopted GRI. No other responsibility reporting practice was used by listed firms in their responsibility reporting communication during the years 2002,2005. The other necessary information for valuation models was obtained from Thomson Financial Services (commercial database). The applied model supported the conclusion that communication via GRI responsibility reporting is an important explanatory factor for a firm's market value. The result indicates that responsibility reporting is a part of a firm's communication tools in order to decrease information asymmetry between managers and investors. In other words, GRI responsibility reporting is called for in order to produce a more precise market valuation of a firm. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Analysing Perceived Downside Risk: the Component Value-at-Risk FrameworkEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2004Winfried G. Hallerbach G3; G32; G1; G14 Abstract Multinational companies face increasing risks arising from external risk factors, e.g. exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices, which they have learned to hedge using derivatives. However, despite increasing disclosure requirements, a firm's net risk profile may not be transparent to shareholders. We develop the ,Component Value-at-Risk (VaR)' framework for companies to identify the multi-dimensional downside risk profile as perceived by shareholders. This framework allows for decomposing downside risk into components that are attributable to each of the underlying risk factors. The firm can compare this perceived VaR, including its composition and dynamics, to an internal VaR based on net exposures as it is known to the company. Any differences may lead to surprises at times of earnings announcements and thus constitute a litigation threat to the firm. It may reduce this information asymmetry through targeted communication efforts. [source] Information Asymmetry Determinants of Sarbanes-Oxley Wealth EffectsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Aigbe Akhigbe We investigate the roles of information asymmetry and governance in the wealth effects associated with passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for a sample of 1,158 firms. For events suggesting adoption of stringent reform legislation, we find more (less) favorable abnormal returns (ARs) for firms with high (low) information asymmetry and for firms with weak (strong) governance. More favorable effects could result from expected improvements for firms with high information asymmetry or weak governance. Firms with positive ARs experience information asymmetry reductions post-SOX, indicating the market was able to discern the firms that would most benefit from the legislation's passage. [source] The Underpricing of Insurance IPOsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2009Qiming Wang The previous literature documents that insurance initial public offerings (IPOs) are less underpriced than those of noninsurance firms. This difference is usually attributed to lower information asymmetry for regulated firms. However, we find that once one controls for the file price adjustment insurance IPOs, both stock and mutual, are no less underpriced than other noninsurance offerings suggesting the book-building process resolves any such information asymmetries. We also find that mutual IPOs appear more underpriced than stock insurance IPOs, but this difference is related to the differences in pre-issue managerial ownership. [source] |