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Income Tax Rate (income + tax_rate)
Selected AbstractsAN APPROXIMATION FOR THE OPTIMAL LINEAR INCOME TAX RATEAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2009JOHN CREEDY This paper derives a convenient method of calculating an approximation to the optimal tax rate in a linear income tax structure. Individuals are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas preferences and the wage rate distribution is lognormal. First, the optimal tax rate is shown, for a general form of social welfare function, to be the smallest root of a quadratic equation involving a welfare-weighted average wage rate. Second, an approximation to this average is derived for an isoelastic social welfare function. This average depends on the degree of inequality aversion of the welfare function and the coefficient on consumption in individuals' utility functions. Calculations show that the method performs well in comparison with standard simulation methods of computing the optimal tax rate. [source] Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2003Paul Klein This article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. We find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment. First, capital income tax rates are very high (65% on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment). Second, labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around 31% under full commitment). Finally, labor income taxes are quite volatile, whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero. [source] Expansionary Fiscal Shocks and the US Trade Deficit,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2005Christopher J. Erceg In this paper, we use a dynamic general equilibrium model of an open economy to assess the quantitative effects of fiscal shocks on the trade balance in the United States. We examine the effects of two alternative fiscal shocks: a rise in government consumption, and a reduction in the labour income tax rate. Our salient finding is that a fiscal deficit has a relatively small effect on the US trade balance, irrespective of whether the source is a spending increase or tax cut. In our benchmark calibration, we find that a rise in the fiscal deficit of 1 percentage point of gross domestic product (GDP) induces the trade balance to deteriorate by 0.2 percentage point of GDP or less. Noticeably larger effects are only likely to be elicited under implausibly high values of the short-run trade price elasticity, or of the share of liquidity-constrained households in the economy. From a policy perspective, our analysis suggests that even reducing the current US fiscal deficit (of 3% of GDP) to zero would be unlikely to narrow the burgeoning US trade deficit significantly. [source] Evaluation of Policy Options to Encourage Welfare to WorkTHE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Hielke Buddelmeyer This article compares five alternative policy options with the January 2006 tax and social security system. Each option is designed to cost a similar amount of approximately $5 billion per year to the government at the observed level of labour supply. The five options include reducing the lowest income tax rate, increasing the tax-free threshold, increasing the low income tax offset, decreasing all taper rates on own and partner's incomes for a number of allowances, and introducing an earned income tax credit. The criteria for comparison are the labour supply responses, the expected budgetary cost to the government after taking into account labour supply responses, the number of winners and losers from the policy change, the effects on the distribution of effective marginal tax rates, and the effects on the number of jobless households. From the results, it is clear that the option to reduce taper rates is dominated by the other options on all criteria. The other four options each have their advantages and disadvantages; no option scores best on all criteria. [source] THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTSAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2010JOHN CREEDY This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects. [source] TAXES, GROWTH AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT TICK-CURVE EFFECTAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2010CREINA DAY This paper examines the dynamic and long run effects of a shift from income taxes to consumption taxes in a growing small open economy. We introduce a government sector that maintains a balanced budget and expenditure at a constant proportion of domestic income to a small open economy Swan-Solow model. Our framework provides a previously unidentified dynamic effect that is robust to endogenising the savings rate. Lowering the income tax rate promotes economic growth and has a tick-curve effect on the current account balance, characterised by instantaneous deterioration, a period of recovery and gradual convergence to an improved position in the long run. [source] Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2003Paul Klein This article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. We find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment. First, capital income tax rates are very high (65% on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment). Second, labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around 31% under full commitment). Finally, labor income taxes are quite volatile, whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero. [source] Die deutsche Steuerbelastung im internationalen Vergleich: Warum Deutschland (k)eine Steuerreform brauchtPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 1 2001Frank Hettich This paper attacks the widespread view that the latest (corporate) income tax reform in Germany was urgently needed to reduce the tax burden on the German economy. In the run-up to this tax reform, the public debate focused on nominal income tax rates and hence neglected the determination of the tax base. Empirical results on effective tax burdens in OECD countries show that a reform of German (corporate) capital taxation cannot be justified on the grounds of the tax burden. The international comparison of effective average tax rates shows that the corporate tax burden in Germany steadily declined from 1980 and was in 1996 lower than in most other industrialised countries. However, we argue that not only the actual tax burden but also the complexity of a tax system determines its international competitiveness. A German tax reform was , and still is , necessary due to the lasting complexity of the tax system and the relatively high tax burden on labour. [source] |