Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Incentive Pay (incentive + pay)
Selected AbstractsMeasurement Error and Incentive PayLABOUR, Issue 1 2005Eero Lauri Oskari Lehto Each agent produces an individual contribution which jointly form a total output. Agents' efforts are unobservable and the principal cannot observe individual outputs without an error. Neither the observed individual output of an agent nor the observed total output of the whole team are then sufficient statistics for the actual individual output in the sense of Blackwell. We show that the mixed contract of the pure piece-rate contract and of the pure team contract then dominates the pure contracts from the principal's point of view. [source] The decline of incentive pay in British manufacturingINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 4 2010James Arrowsmith ABSTRACT Motivation theories and the strategic pay literature envisage that the management of employees can be well-served by financial incentives and other forms of pay flexibility. Traditionally, UK manufacturing has made extensive use of variable payments systems (VPS), notably piece-work and bonuses, but these have declined at the same time as managerial control over pay-setting has increased. Evidence from six case studies suggests that a focus on pay is only part of the picture. Increased competition and change makes the design of VPS more complex, and new forms of work organisation become the focus of performance. In this context, firms have (i) abandoned individual incentive pay and (ii) aggregated VPS in support of broader objectives. [source] The effects of objective feedback on performance when individuals receive fixed and individual incentive payPERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT QUARTERLY, Issue 3-4 2008Douglas A. Johnson We examined whether objective feedback would enhance performance when individuals were paid monetary incentives. A two-by-two factorial design was used, with 123 college students assigned to incentive pay without feedback, incentive pay with feedback, fixed pay without feedback, or fixed pay with feedback. Participants attended six sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer. Two-factor ANCOVAs were used to determine whether the number of checks completed correctly and time spent working differed. The number of checks completed correctly during a pretest was used as the covariate to control for keyboard proficiency. Incentives increased the number of checks completed correctly by 34 percent (p<.001, standardized effect size=.91); however, feedback had no effect (p=1.00). The incentives increased the time spent working by 31 percent (p<.001, standardized effect size=1.13); however, again feedback had no effect (p=1.00). Although speculative, the results imply that feedback per se, absent evaluation, is unlikely to increase performance even when correlated with performance-contingent rewards. [source] Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive payTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007Roman Inderst We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions. [source] Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great BritainBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2010David Marsden Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the ,beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduce the cost of its operation. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||