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Incentive Mechanisms (incentive + mechanism)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	40%

Selected Abstracts

Intellectual Property Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and Access to Medicines: The Case of Latin America

THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 5 2006
Rosa Castro Bernieri
The link between intellectual property protection and access to medicines has been studied from different perspectives. After signing the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, most developing and least developed countries agreed to protect pharmaceutical products under the patent system. Beyond the criticisms of this system as an incentive mechanism to encourage private investment in research and development, it is widely acknowledged that a balance must exist between its benefits and costs. The patent system interaction with public health policies is twofold: providing incentives to develop new medicines, on the one hand, and increasing the prices of medicines, on the other. The TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration and the subsequent Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration all recognized this important trade-off. Different effects prevail in each interest group or country and negotiations of international intellectual property right (IPR) standards reflect this conflict. Nevertheless, the post-TRIPS scenario is full of new bilateral and regional agreements. The old bilateral investment treaties (BITS) are evolving towards new forms of all-encompassing arrangements that include intellectual property and liberalization of trade and services, apart from the classical rules for investment protection. This trend imposes a new landscape in IPR protection: one in which the above-described balance might be inclining towards one side. This article analyzes some legal, political and economic features of this new generation of BITS in Latin America. [source]

Capital Investment and Earnings: International Evidence

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2009
Ahmet Can Inci
ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: We examine the nature of the dynamic linkage (causality) between earnings and capital investment using firm-level data from around the world to see whether the legal environment, including corporate governance and monitoring mechanisms, and financial development are important in the profitability of capital investment. Research Findings/Insights: Using firms in 40 countries over the period 1988,2004, we find that the causality from earnings to capital investment is positive and strong in almost all countries, irrespective of the type of legal system and the degree of financial development. However, the causality from capital investment to earnings is generally negative for firms in civil law and financially undeveloped countries, while the causality is generally positive in common law and financially developed countries. Therefore, our international cross-country study enables us to find that the legal system and financial development are factors in the determination of the profitability of capital investment. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings imply that internal financing is a significant constraint for capital investment, which provides support for the pecking order theory even for financially developed markets and for the free cash flow theory. Common law and financially developed countries tend to provide better shareholder protection with more efficient corporate governance and better investment decisions. Practitioner/Policy Implications: To encourage managers to make capital investments in value-increasing projects, it is important to further improve a legal environment that includes corporate governance, monitoring, and incentive mechanisms. Financial development that includes effective financial regulatory agencies should be sought. [source]

Groundwater Banking in Aquifers that Interact With Surface Water: Aquifer Response Functions and Double-Entry Accounting,

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION, Issue 6 2009
Bryce A. Contor
Contor, Bryce A., 2009. Groundwater Banking in Aquifers That Interact With Surface Water: Aquifer Response Functions and Double-Entry Accounting. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 45(6):1465-1474. Abstract:, Increasing worldwide demands for water call for mechanisms to facilitate storage of seasonal supplies and mechanisms to facilitate reallocation of water. Markets are economically efficient reallocation and incentive mechanisms when market conditions prevail, but special hydrologic and administrative conditions of water use and allocation interfere with required market conditions. Water banking in general can bring market forces to bear on water storage and reallocation, improving economic efficiency and therefore the welfare of society as a whole. Groundwater banking can utilize advantages of aquifers as storage vessels with vast capacity, low construction cost, and protection of stored water. For groundwater banking in aquifers that interact with surface water, an accounting system is needed that addresses the depletion of stored volumes of water as water migrates to surface water. Constructing such a system requires integration of hydrologic, economic, and legal principles with principles of financial accounting. Simple mass-balance accounting, even with allowances for depletion, is not adequate in these aquifers. Aquifer response functions are mathematical descriptions of the impact that aquifer pumping or recharge events have upon hydraulically connected surface water bodies. Double-entry accounting is a financial accounting methodology for tracking asset inventories and ownership claims upon assets. The powerful innovation of linking aquifer response functions with double-entry accounting technologies allows application of groundwater banking to aquifers where deposits can be depleted by migration to hydraulically connected surface water. It honors the hydrologic realities of groundwater/surface water interaction, the legal requirements of prior appropriation water law, and the economic requirements for equitable and efficient allocation of resources. [source]

Socio-economic changes and sacred groves in South India: Protecting a community-based resource management institution

NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM, Issue 2 2004
M.G. Chandrakanth
Abstract The sacred groves along the forest belts of south India, which were traditionally managed by village communities, are gradually disappearing. This study conducts an analysis of how this community-based resource management institution has evolved over time and what socio-economic factors have caused its gradual disintegration. Commercial agriculture, changing demographics and weak property-rights systems are found to be some of the enabling factors. While the grass-roots enthusiasm to save the sacred groves is still alive, government action is needed to strengthen the traditional village organizations, which are still perhaps in the best position to manage local resources. Several economic and financial incentive mechanisms at the local level that might lead to more efficient and equitable resource use outcomes are suggested. [source]

Institutional design and the closure of public facilities in transition economies

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 3 2002
William Jack
As part of the reforms of their systems for financing and delivering health care, many transition economies, particularly in central and eastern Europe, have adopted national insurance funds that are institutionally separate from ministries of health. Most of these countries have also grappled with the problem of restructuring the delivery system, especially the need to reduce hospital capacity. Although improving the performance of medical care providers through a shift from passive budgeting to explicitly incentive mechanisms is important, why this change in financial relations between the government and providers could not be implemented simply by reforming the role of health ministries is not obvious. This paper presents an explicit rationale for the separation of powers between the regulator (the ministry of health) and the financing body (the insurance fund), based on the inability of a single agency to commit to closing hospitals. JEL classification: L51, P20, P35, I18. [source]