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In-work Benefits (in-work + benefit)
Selected AbstractsComparing in-work benefits and the reward to work for families with children in the US and the UKFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2001Mike Brewer Abstract The income transfer systems for low-income families in the US and the UK try both to reduce poverty and to encourage work. In-work benefits are a key part of both countries' strategies through the earned income tax credit and the working families' tax credit (and predecessors) respectively. But tax credits are only one part of the whole tax and welfare system. In-work benefits, taxes and welfare benefits combine in both countries to provide good financial incentives for lone parents to do minimum-wage work, but poorer incentives to increase earnings further. But direct comparisons of budget constraints hide important points of detail. First, not enough is known about what determines take-up of in-work benefits. Second, the considerable differences in assessment and payment mechanisms and frequency between EITC and WFTC mean that low-income families in the US and the UK may respond very differently to apparently similar financial incentives. [source] Welfare reform in European countries: a microsimulation analysis,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 516 2007Herwig Immervoll This article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in-work benefits in the 15 (pre-enlargement) countries of the European Union. We use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins, and the EUROMOD microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates. We quantify the equity-efficiency trade-off for a range of elasticity parameters. In most countries, because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase-out rates, increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme. In contrast, the in-work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases. [source] Comparing in-work benefits and the reward to work for families with children in the US and the UKFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2001Mike Brewer Abstract The income transfer systems for low-income families in the US and the UK try both to reduce poverty and to encourage work. In-work benefits are a key part of both countries' strategies through the earned income tax credit and the working families' tax credit (and predecessors) respectively. But tax credits are only one part of the whole tax and welfare system. In-work benefits, taxes and welfare benefits combine in both countries to provide good financial incentives for lone parents to do minimum-wage work, but poorer incentives to increase earnings further. But direct comparisons of budget constraints hide important points of detail. First, not enough is known about what determines take-up of in-work benefits. Second, the considerable differences in assessment and payment mechanisms and frequency between EITC and WFTC mean that low-income families in the US and the UK may respond very differently to apparently similar financial incentives. [source] Welfare reform in European countries: a microsimulation analysis,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 516 2007Herwig Immervoll This article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in-work benefits in the 15 (pre-enlargement) countries of the European Union. We use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins, and the EUROMOD microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates. We quantify the equity-efficiency trade-off for a range of elasticity parameters. In most countries, because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase-out rates, increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme. In contrast, the in-work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases. [source] | ||||||||||