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Innovation Incentives (innovation + incentive)
Selected AbstractsTwo-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing StructuresJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2009Andrei Hagiu This paper provides a new modeling framework to analyze two-sided platforms connecting producers and consumers. In contrast to the existing literature, indirect network effects are determined endogenously, through consumers' taste for variety and producer competition. Three new aspects of platform pricing structures are derived.,First, the optimal platform pricing structure shifts towards extracting more rents from producers relative to consumers when consumers have stronger demand for variety, since producers become less substitutable. With platform competition, consumer preferences for variety, producer market power, and producer economies of scale in multihoming also make platforms' price-cutting strategies on the consumer side less effective. This second effect on equilibrium pricing structures goes in the opposite direction relative to the first one.,Third, variable fees charged to producers can serve to trade off producer innovation incentives against the need to reduce a platform holdup problem. [source] Innovation, Entrepreneurship und DemographiePERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2008Dietmar Harhoff A number of high-technology industries have established themselves in Germany only slowly over the last decades. Innovation policy has tried to support the startup of high technology enterprises, e.g., by improvements for certain types of finance, incentives for founders and the reform of technology commercialization at universities. However, these measures have been counteracted by the German tax system which affects innovation adversely in some parts. Moreover, the emerging shifts in the age structure of the German population could affect innovation incentives and entrepreneurship negatively. Another important demographic aspect is the dominance of men in science and technology. Stronger participation by women in male-dominated scientific and technical professions could compensate partially for the effects of changes in the age structure. [source] Unionisation structures and innovation incentives*THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 494 2004Justus Haucap This paper examines how different unionisation structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation: (1) ,decentralisation' where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2) ,coordination' where one industry union sets individual wages for all firms and (3) ,centralisation' where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all firms. While firms' investment incentives are largest under ,centralisation', investment incentives are non-monotone in the degree of centralisation: ,decentralisation' carries higher investment incentives than ,coordination'. Labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non-discrimination rules. [source] PATENT DAMAGES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010MATTHEW D. HENRY We analyze price competition between a spatially differentiated product patentee and an imitator anticipating probabilistic future patent damages. We compare the performance of three damage regimes. The ,reasonable royalty' regime, which yields symmetric equilibrium pricing, maximizes static welfare and yields the highest innovation incentives when patent enforcement is nearly certain. The ,lost profits' regime, which may deter infringement, yields the highest innovation incentives when patent enforcement is less-than-certain and products are sufficiently valuable. The ,unjust enrichment' regime yields low static efficiency and low innovation incentives. We offer new insights into the ,hypothetical negotiation' that courts use to construct reasonable royalties. [source] | ||||||||||