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Import Tariffs (import + tariff)
Selected AbstractsCountervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import TariffsTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Yu-Ter Wang Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports. [source] The Choice of Optimal Protection under Oligopoly: Import Tariff v. Production SubsidyTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2002Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu Economists researching the area of optimal protection have tended to analyse the ranking of alternative policy tools in the presence of perfect competition, either when the government in an importing country achieves a non-economic target, or when there is a market distortion. Assuming international oligopolistic competition, I reconsider the choice of optimal policy instruments, i.e. an import tariff and a production subsidy. I show that the choice of optimal policy instruments depends on the relative number of home firms and foreign ones and on the magnitude of international cost differences. JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F13. [source] Employment Risk and Optimal Trade PoliciesTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2001E. Kwan Choi This paper considers trade policies and welfare in a Harris,Todaro model with risk-averse workers. Workers are assumed to have identical and homothetic preferences, but their incomes differ, depending on whether and where they are employed. When workers are equally valued, maximizing social utility is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a rural worker. An optimal policy consists of a production subsidy on the exportable and an import tariff. This model explains the widespread use of import tariffs on manufactured goods along with production subsidies on the export sectors in many LDCs. JEL Classification Numbers: F13, D8. [source] Can Russia be Competitive in Agriculture?EUROCHOICES, Issue 3 2003William M. Liefert Summary Can Russia be competitive inAgriculture? Russian agriculture currently is not internationally cost competitive. Since the mid-1990s Russia has imported large volumes of meat, while the grain trade has fluctuated in most years between small net imports and exports. Russia has, however, exported large quantities of key agricultural inputs, including 80 per cent of fertilizer output, mainly to EU countries. Research indicates that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain compared to meat, but also a comparative advantage in producing agricultural inputs compared to agricultural outputs. The expected real appreciation of the Russian rouble vis-à-vis Western currencies should further damage Russia's cost competitiveness in meat and grain, but this should be offset by modest productivity growth. An expected rise in consumer income, deriving from relatively high annual GDP growth of about 4,5 per cent, should also stimulate demand for meat imports. In spring 2003, Russia imposed tariff rate quotas on its imports of beef and pork, and a pure quota on imports of poultry. For other agricultural commodities, Russia is pushing in its WTO accession negotiations for allowable agricultural import tariffs that are higher than current levels. Taking these changes together, it is likely that Russia will continue as a big meat importer for about the next ten years,with tariff rate quotas probably determining the level of meat imports,and will become a moderate grain exporter. L'agriculture russepourrait-elle être compétitive ? Actuellement, l'agriculture russe n'est pas compétitive. La Russie a importé de gros volumes de viande depuis le milieu des années 90, tandis que la balance des échanges de céréales oscillait entre les faibles excédents et les faibles déficits. Cependant, la Russie est grande exportatrice d'agro-fournitures dont, en particulier, 80% de sa production d'engrais, principalement vers l'Europe. On montre ici que l'avantage comparatif de la Russie se situe dans les céréales plutôt que dans la viande et, surtout, dans les agro-fournitures plutôt que dans les denrées agricoles. La remontée, à laquelle il faut s'attendre, du rouble vis à vis des devises occidentales, devrait encore diminuer la compétitivité de la Russie en matière de viandes et de céréales, ce qui devrait être compensé par des gains de productivité même faibles. La hausse attendue des revenus des consommateurs, engenderée par une croissance élevée du revenu national, de l'ordre de 4 à 5% par an, devrait aussi stimuler la demande de viande importée. Au printemps 2003, la Russie s'est dotée d'un système de droits sur ses importations hors quotas de viande de bæuf et de pore, ainsi que d'un quota d'importation pour les produits avicoles. En ce qui conceme les autres produits agricoles, dans le cadre des négociations relatives à son entrée dans l'OMC, la Russie s'efforce d'obtenir l'autorisation d'augmenter les taxes à l'importation par rapport à leur niveau actuel. Au total done, à un horizon de l'ordre de dix ans, il est probable que la Russie reste un gros importateur de viandes - le niveau des taxes sur le hors quotas déterminant les niveaux d'importation -, et un modeste exportateur de céréales. Kann Russland auf dem Agrarsektorwettbewerbsfähig sein? Die russische Landwirtschaft ist hinsichtlich der Kosten momentan nicht international wettbewerbsfähig. Seit Mitte der 1990er importiert Russland große Mengen an Fleisch, während der Getreidehandel in den meisten Jahren zwischen geringen Nettoimporten und -exporten schwankte. Russland hat jedoch große Mengen an wichtigen landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen, unter anderem 80% seiner Düngerproduktion, hauptsächlich in EU-Länder exportiert. Forschungsergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Russland in der Produktion von Getreide verglichen mit Fleisch einen komparativen Vorteil besitzt; dies trifft jedoch ebenfalls auf die Produktion von landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen verglichen mit landwirtschaftlichen Endprodukten zu. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die erwartete reale Aufwertung des russischen Rubel gegenüber den westlichen Währungen eine zusätzliche Verschlechterung der russischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hinsichtlich der Kosten im Bereich Fleisch und Getreide nach sich zieht; dies sollte sich jedoch durch ein moderates Produktivitätswachstum ausgleichen. Der erwartete Anstieg der Verbrauchereinkommen, der sich aus dem relativ hohen jährlichen Bruttoin-landsproduktzuwachs von ca. 4,5 Prozent ableitet, sollte sich ebenfalls stimulierend auf die Nachfrage nach Fleischimporten auswirken. Im Frühjahr 2003 führte Russland Zolltarifkontingente für seine Schweine- und Rindfleischimporte ein und belegte seine Geflügelfleischimporte mit einem Importkontingent. Im Hinblick auf weitere Agrarerzeugnisse drängt Russland in den WTO-Beitrittsverhandlungen darauf, höhere Einfuhrzölle als die gegenwärtig geltenden zuzulassen. In Anbetracht all dieser Veränderungen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Russland auch für die kommenden zehn Jahre große Mengen an Fleisch importieren,wobei möglicherweise Zolltarifkontingente die Menge bestimmen werden,und sich zu einem mäßigen Getreideexporteur entwickeln wird. [source] BILATERALISM AND FREE TRADE,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2006Sanjeev Goyal We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free-trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free-trade agreements. A profile of free-trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements. [source] BORDER BARRIERS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE IMPACT OF THEIR ELIMINATION: EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIATHE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 2 2010Kuo-I CHANG F13; F14; Q17 We investigate the impact of the elimination of import tariffs and nontariff policy barriers (NTPBs) on agricultural trade in a notional East Asian Free Trade Agreement using a Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)-based computable general equilibrium model. The investigation is divided into two parts. We first measure the NTPBs by employing a widely used method derived from the literature on border effects. Then, by adding into the GTAP database our estimates on the NTPBs, which the original GTAP database by its nature does incorporate, we compute the impact of the entire elimination of policy barriers (the complete reduction of import tariffs and NTPBs) on GDP. The result shows that there are remarkable differences between the effect of abolition of import tariffs and that of entire elimination of all import barriers. [source] Can Comparative Advantage Explain the Growth of us Trade?,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 520 2007Alejandro Cuñat We present a dynamic comparative advantage model in which moderate reductions in import tariffs can generate sizable increases in trade volumes over time. A fall in tariffs has two effects. First, for given factor endowments, it raises the degree of specialisation, leading to a larger volume of trade in the short run. Second, it raises the factor price of each country's abundant factor, leading to diverging paths of relative factor endowments and a rising degree of specialisation. A simulation exercise shows that a fall in tariffs produces a disproportional increase in the trade share of output as in the data. [source] Countervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import TariffsTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Yu-Ter Wang Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports. [source] Employment Risk and Optimal Trade PoliciesTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2001E. Kwan Choi This paper considers trade policies and welfare in a Harris,Todaro model with risk-averse workers. Workers are assumed to have identical and homothetic preferences, but their incomes differ, depending on whether and where they are employed. When workers are equally valued, maximizing social utility is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a rural worker. An optimal policy consists of a production subsidy on the exportable and an import tariff. This model explains the widespread use of import tariffs on manufactured goods along with production subsidies on the export sectors in many LDCs. JEL Classification Numbers: F13, D8. [source] |