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Implementation Problems (implementation + problem)
Selected AbstractsCapital Asset Pricing Model and the Risk Appetite Index: Theoretical Differences, Empirical Similarities and Implementation Problems,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 2 2009Marcello Pericoli We perform a thorough analysis of the Risk Appetite Index (RAI), a measure of changes in risk aversion proposed by Kumar and Persaud (2002). Building on Misina's study (2003), we first argue that the theoretical assumptions granting that the RAI correctly distinguishes between changes in risk and changes in risk aversion are very restrictive. Then, by comparing the RAI with a measure of risk aversion obtained from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), we find that the estimates are surprisingly similar. We prove that if the variance of returns is sufficiently smaller than the variance of asset riskiness, then RAI and CAPM provide essentially the same information about risk aversion. We also show, however, that RAI and CAPM suffer from exactly the same implementation problems , the main one being the difficulty in measuring ex-ante returns. At high and medium frequencies, the standard method of measuring ex-ante with ex-post returns may generate negative risk aversion and other inconsistencies. Hence, future research is needed to address this problem. [source] The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)ECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2002Ilya Segal The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees's (1971) first-order analysis of standard mechanism design problems. We use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold-up and risk-sharing models. In particular, we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts, such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts (where only one agent sends a message). [source] SHOULD YOU ARM YOUR FUTURE VICTIMS?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2006JEAN-PAUL AZAM A model is presented where the ruler may arm the producers, in order to convince them that he will not expropriate them ex post. This sets an upper limit on the tax rate, not higher than their probability of losing their income, should a war occur. The relevance of this analysis is illustrated by discussing various case studies, involving post-conflict situations. Some variants of the model are presented for highlighting some implementation problems, related to asymmetric information or to positive initial endowments of weapons or non-produced wealth, which may lead to war in equilibrium. [source] Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Risk Appetite Index: Theoretical Differences, Empirical Similarities and Implementation Problems,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 2 2009Marcello Pericoli We perform a thorough analysis of the Risk Appetite Index (RAI), a measure of changes in risk aversion proposed by Kumar and Persaud (2002). Building on Misina's study (2003), we first argue that the theoretical assumptions granting that the RAI correctly distinguishes between changes in risk and changes in risk aversion are very restrictive. Then, by comparing the RAI with a measure of risk aversion obtained from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), we find that the estimates are surprisingly similar. We prove that if the variance of returns is sufficiently smaller than the variance of asset riskiness, then RAI and CAPM provide essentially the same information about risk aversion. We also show, however, that RAI and CAPM suffer from exactly the same implementation problems , the main one being the difficulty in measuring ex-ante returns. At high and medium frequencies, the standard method of measuring ex-ante with ex-post returns may generate negative risk aversion and other inconsistencies. Hence, future research is needed to address this problem. [source] Obstacles to desegregating public housing: Lessons learned from implementing eight consent decreesJOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2003Susan J. Popkin Between 1992 and 1996 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) settled a number of legal cases involving housing authorities and agreed to take remedial action as part of court-enforced consent decrees entered into with plaintiffs. These housing authorities faced significant obstacles that impaired their ability to comply swiftly and fully with all of the elements in the desegregation consent decrees. The obstacles fell into two broad categories: contextual obstacles (racial composition of waiting lists and resident populations, lack of affordable rental housing, and inadequate public transportation), and capacity and coordination obstacles (conflict among implementing agencies and ineffective monitoring by HUD). Findings presented here highlight the sizable potential delay between the time a legal remedy is imposed and when plaintiffs in public housing segregation disputes realize any benefits. They also reinforce the argument that implementation problems will be legion when policies impose a significant scope of required changes on a large number of actors who must collaborate, yet are not uniformly capable or sympathetic to the goals being promoted. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] Strongly autonomous interconnections and stabilization of 2D behaviors,ASIAN JOURNAL OF CONTROL, Issue 2 2010Diego Napp Abstract In this paper we study linear discrete two-dimensional systems in the behavioral context where control is viewed as interconnection. Within this framework the natural concept of regular interconnection has been introduced by J.C.Willems. Here we investigate regular interconnections that yield finite dimensional behaviors using tools previously developed to analyze almost implementation problems. We prove that when a finite dimensional (sub-) behavior can be achieved from a given behavior by regular interconnection then the controllable part of the original behavior is rectifiable, moreover, in this case all the other sub-behaviors are almost regularly implementable. We apply these results to characterize all stabilizable behaviors. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley and Sons Asia Pte Ltd and Chinese Automatic Control Society [source] | ||||||||||