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Illegal Behavior (illegal + behavior)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

A sequential attribute sampling inspection game for item facilities

NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 6 2001
Morton Canty
Abstract The routine inspection of facilities storing large numbers of identical items is modeled as a two-person, sequential game. Timely detection of illegal activity is parameterized in terms of a critical time to detection, and equilibria are derived which provide inspection strategies. Necessary conditions for deterrence of illegal behavior are discussed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 496,505, 2001 [source]

Illegal but ethical: an inquiry into the roots of illegal corporate behaviour in Russia

BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 3 2000
Gavriel Meirovich
This paper examines the perceptions of Russian executives toward the relationship between legal and ethical conduct. The focus is on questions of tax evasion attitudes and corporate illegal behavior. Forty Russian managers and entrepreneurs from a variety of organizations were interviewed. Their actions are aimed at gaining corporate income and profit from operations through hiding corporate activity from state and local authorities in a context where these authorities levy excessive taxes and other types of payment from businesses. Tax evasion methods are presented and analyzed along with other varieties of illegal corporate behavior. The research results show that executives believe business could not perform in a completely legal way under Russia's existing conditions. Illegal performance is thus viewed as legitimate and ethical. [source]

The added risk of opioid problem use among treatment-seeking youth with marijuana and/or alcohol problem use

ADDICTION, Issue 4 2010
Geetha A. Subramaniam
Abstract Objectives To determine the added risk of opioid problem use (OPU) in youth with marijuana/alcohol problem use (MAPU). Methods A total of 475 youth (ages 14,21 years) with OPU + MAPU were compared to a weighted sample of 475 youth with MAPU only (i.e. no OPU) before and after propensity score matching on gender, age, race, level of care and weekly use of marijuana/alcohol. Youth were recruited from 88 drug treatment sites participating in eight Center for Substance Abuse Treatment-funded grants. At treatment intake, participants were administered the Global Appraisal of Individual Need to elicit information on demographic, social, substance, mental health, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), physical and legal characteristics. Odds ratios with confidence intervals were calculated. Results The added risk of OPU among MAPU youth was associated with greater comorbidity; higher rates of psychiatric symptoms and trauma/victimization; greater needle use and sex-related HIV risk behaviours; and greater physical distress. The OPU + MAPU group was less likely to be African American or other race and more likely to be aged 15,17 years, Caucasian; report weekly drug use at home and among peers; engage in illegal behaviors and be confined longer; have greater substance abuse severity and polydrug use; and use mental health and substance abuse treatment services. Conclusions These findings expand upon the existing literature and highlight the substantial incremental risk of OPU on multiple comorbid areas among treatment-seeking youth. Further evaluation is needed to assess their outcomes following standard drug treatment and to evaluate specialized interventions for this subgroup of severely impaired youth. [source]

Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2008
ERIC LANGLAIS
This paper extends Malik's analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' avoidance efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of sanctions, it is always socially efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there may exist overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to fewer arrests of offenders while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes. [source]