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I Finish (i + finish)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences75%

Selected Abstracts

REPRESSION OF COMPETITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

EVOLUTION, Issue 4 2003
Steven A. Frank
Abstract Repression of competition within groups joins kin selection as the second major force in the history of life shaping the evolution of cooperation. When opportunities for competition against neighbors are limited within groups, individuals can increase their own success only by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of their group. Thus, characters that repress competition within groups promote cooperation and enhance group success. Leigh first expressed this idea in the context of fair meiosis, in which each chromosome has an equal chance of transmission via gametes. Randomized success means that each part of the genome can increase its own success only by enhancing the total number of progeny and thus increasing the success of the group. Alexander used this insight about repression of competition in fair meiosis to develop his theories for the evolution of human sociality. Alexander argued that human social structures spread when they repress competition within groups and promote successful group-against-group competition. Buss introduced a new example with his suggestion that metazoan success depended on repression of competition between cellular lineages. Maynard Smith synthesized different lines of thought on repression of competition. In this paper, I develop simple mathematical models to illustrate the main processes by which repression of competition evolves. With the concepts made clear, I then explain the history of the idea. I finish by summarizing many new developments in this subject and the most promising lines for future study. [source]

Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2003
Neil Levy
Abstract: A number of writers have tackled the task of characterizing the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy. I suggest that these attempts have indeed captured the most important divergences between the two styles but have left the explanation of the differences mysterious. I argue that analytic philosophy is usefully seen as philosophy conducted within a paradigm, in Kuhn's sense of the word, whereas Continental philosophy assumes much less in the way of shared presuppositions, problems, methods and approaches. This important opposition accounts for all those features that have rightly been held to constitute the difference between the two traditions. I finish with some reflections on the relative superiority of each tradition and by highlighting the characteristic deficiencies of each. [source]

Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2004
JONATHAN SUTTON
I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mental-ism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument. [source]

The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical

PHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 6 2007
Francesco Guala
Ontological debates have always been prominent in the philosophy of social science. Philosophers have typically conceived of such debates as pre-scientific attempts to reform social scientific practice, rather than as post-scientific reflections on a firm body of scientific knowledge. Two celebrated contemporary research programs in social ontology , collective intentionality and evolutionary game theory , also follow this approach. In this paper I illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations. I finish by reviewing some work that combines empirical evidence with theoretical reflection, and suggest that it constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science. [source]