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Human Beings (human + being)
Kinds of Human Beings Selected AbstractsThe Origination of a Human Being: A Reply to OderbergJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2009INGMAR PERSSON abstract Recently David S. Oderberg has tried to refute three arguments that have been advanced in favour of the view that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. These arguments turn on the absence of differentiation between the embryoblast and trophoblast, the possibility of monozygotic twinning, and the totipotency of the cells during the first days after fertilization. It is here contended that Oderberg fails to rebut these arguments, though it is conceded that the first two arguments are not conclusive. They do, however, make it at least as reasonable to deny this early origination as to affirm it. It should be noticed that this is all that is needed by those who have used these arguments to dispute that something with a special moral status exists right from fertilization. Nonetheless, it will be seen that the third argument could be developed to the point of giving a conclusive reason to believe that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. [source] Ethics in Twain's Connecticut Yankee1ORBIS LITERARUM, Issue 2 2006Bong Eun Kim Despite his frequent utterances in favor of Native Americans, Twain has been interpreted as generally unfavorable to them. However, Emmanuel Levinas's concept of the ,ethical encounter with the absolute other' in ,Is ontology fundamental?' illuminates Twain's affirmative ethics towards Native Americans in his novel A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (1889). The comparison of Twain's novel with the Native Alaskan Harold Napoleon's Yuuyaraq: The Way of the Human Being (1996), an autobiographical report on the extermination of Alaskan aboriginals and their culture, demonstrates that Twain's British Arthurian fantasy embodies his postcolonial indictment for the massacre of Native Americans. The Chippewa/Ojibway Anishinaabe critic Gerald Vizenor's new code ,postindian' in Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance (1994) exposes the latent postindian aspect of Twain's discourse. Levinas's ethics and the late twentieth-century Native American texts disclose the ethical prevision implied in Twain's time travelogue. Deconstructing the typological Canaan myth, Twain implies that Native Americans should have been encountered in terms of the absolute other and thus problematizes his forefathers' colonial zeal to exterminate Native Americans and assimilate Native American survivors. [source] Philosophical Issues Arising from Experimental EconomicsPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2007Zachary Ernst Human beings are highly irrational, at least if we hold to an economic standard of ,rationality'. Experimental economics studies the irrational behavior of human beings, with the aim of understanding exactly how our behavior deviates from the Homo economicus, as ,rational man' has been called. Insofar as philosophical theories depend upon rationality assumptions, experimental economics is the source of both problems and (at least potential) solutions to several philosophical issues. This article offers a programmatic and highly biased survey of some of these issues, with the hope of convincing the reader that experimental economics is well-deserving of careful study by philosophers. [source] ,A Nice Sub -Acid Feeling': Schenker, Heidegger and Elgar's First SymphonyMUSIC ANALYSIS, Issue 3 2005J. P. E. HARPER-SCOTT ABSTRACT Schenkerian analysis is a problematic tool for the analysis of early modernist music, not least because its deep-level theoretical and hermeneutic dependence on the Beethovenian heroic style is at risk of predefining the outline of a hermeneutics of other music. By bringing the Ursatz into contact with Martin Heidegger's concept of the Augenblick, it becomes possible to sever this restrictive hermeneutic link and also to open up a radically new possibility for background structures in late tonal music. Elgar's First Symphony presents two considerable challenges to an orthodox Schenkerian reading. First, it is a prolongation of two strongly outlined tonalities - one immuring, the other immured - and second, its Kopfton remains static at the end of movements and does not descend structurally until the finale, thus prolonging a single Ursatz over an entire symphony. By aligning itself with Heidegger's analysis of the nature of human Being, a Heideggerian-Schenkerian analysis of the work illuminates Elgar's ,play' with the Beethovenian symphonic tradition, and demonstrates how he successfully manipulates his gigantic early modernist tonal structure. [source] From wilderness to bewilderment: Which frontier does your type face?DESIGN MANAGEMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2003Nathan Felde In a poetic commentary that highlights contributions made by pioneers in communications thinking, Nathan Felde ponders how technology,now so pervasively able to gather information, capture what formerly was invisible, camouflage reality, and target audiences-comprises and compromises the expression of individuality in the visual world. It is a treatise cautioning all to remember that design must ennoble rather than devalue the human being. [source] JOHN DEWEY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITYEDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 1 2008Scot Danforth In this article Scot Danforth takes as his project addressing that division from the perspective of a Deweyan philosophy of the education of students with intellectual disabilities. In 1922, John Dewey authored two articles in New Republic that criticized the use of intelligence tests as both undemocratic and impractical in meeting the needs of teachers. Drawing from these two articles and a variety of Dewey's other works, Danforth puts forward a Deweyan educational theory of intellectual disability. This theory is perhaps encapsulated in Dewey's observation that "The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has."1 [source] SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIVED EXPERIENCEEDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 2 2006James D. Marshall In this essay, James D. Marshall aims to present Beauvoir, not as a mere entry in the history of French philosophy, nor as an under-laborer to Jean-Paul Sartre, but as someone who has important philosophical insights to contribute to ongoing debates on the human condition, including those concerned with education. Central to these debates are issues such as what does it mean to be an individual human being and what characterizes the relations between individuals and others and between individuals and society. Marshall argues that Beauvoir can participate in such philosophical and educational debates, for philosophy of education has major interests in such questions as who or what is this "person" whom we profess to be educating, what kind of person or outcome of education is desirable, and in what kind of society should these individuals take part? [source] Poverty, health and development in dermatologyINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DERMATOLOGY, Issue 2007Aldo Morrone MD The WHO Constitution states that "The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political, economic or social condition." The right to health means that governments must generate conditions in which everyone can be as healthy as possible. Such conditions range from ensuring availability of health services, healthy and safe working conditions, adequate housing and nutritious food. In this report the author analyzes the relationship among health, dermatology and development and tries to find out what the scientific world, including dermatologists, could do for the improvement of health systems. [source] Suffering related to health care: A study of breast cancer patients' experiencesINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NURSING PRACTICE, Issue 6 2004Maria Arman RNM PhD A previous study indicated that patient narratives include experiences of suffering caused or increased by health-care encounters. The aim of this study was to interpret and understand the meaning of patients' experiences of suffering related to health care from an ethical, existential and ontological standpoint. Sixteen women with breast cancer in Sweden and Finland took part in qualitative interviews analysed with a hermeneutic, interpretive approach. The outcome showed that suffering related to health care is a complex phenomenon and constitutes an ethical challenge to health-care personnel. The women's experiences of suffering related to health care tended to be of similar seriousness as their experiences of suffering in relation to having cancer. In an ethical, existential and ontological sense, suffering related to health care is basically a matter of neglect and uncaring where the patient's existential suffering is not seen and she is not viewed as a whole human being. [source] State Project Europe: The Transformation of the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare LifeINTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2010Sonja Buckel Giorgio Agamben refers to a basic problem in the constitution of the modern nation state: the state as a nation implies that "bare life" becomes the foundation of sovereignty. With the loss of their citizenship, refugees lose not only all their rights, but more fundamentally the "right to have rights" (Arendt). This dilemma of modern statehood does not vanish under conditions of European integration; it is rather re-scaled. Applying a state-theoretical approach to the European border regime, we will concentrate on the two main techniques by which the EU produces "bare life": the "camp" and the invisible "police state." It will become apparent that the institutionalization of "the right of every human being to belong to mankind" is still lacking. Yet, in contrast to Agamben, we do not trace this constellation back to the collapse of the concept of human rights, but to hegemonies and power relations. [source] Panel on Salvation: the Catholic PerspectiveINTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MISSION, Issue 382-383 2007Teresa Francesca Rossi In the reflection about salvation, mission and healing, the aspect of revelation has not been so much emphasized in the last years. However, it seems to me that revelation, rather than just eschatology, might be the key concept in understanding healing and reconciliation. The signs and wonders that confirm the preaching of the gospel of salvation are necessary in order to give the preacher and the faithful a shape, a frame to human knowledge of God and salvation, though in the "fleshy" knowledge of the human being. Without the shape or frame of a divine sign there can be neither prophecy nor preaching, because prophecy and preaching concern the Word of God. Signs and wonders confirm preaching but only by deepening a cognitive dimension. When we day, "God will heal you," we are announcing the good news of healing, while at the same time we are budding some new conditions to know God. We are at the heart of revelation. At the same time, when we deal with healing, we are not only dealing with the dimension of knowing God and operating signs and wonder, we are also dealing with a dimension of prophecy inasmuch as no prophecy is allowed unless there is a capability of speaking "in the name of", and "on behalf of", which implies a real, though imperfect, knowledge of God, such as we receive not only in revelation but also in signs and wonders. So, healing, this starting point, this unexplored way, this unprecedented path to the understanding of the economy of sulfation, continues revelation because it leads to new knowledge. Inasmuch ad heading does not belong to the economy of final salvation but to the economy of a "restored flesh", it is closer to revelation than to resurrection. It is the seal of redemption. [source] The Origination of a Human Being: A Reply to OderbergJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2009INGMAR PERSSON abstract Recently David S. Oderberg has tried to refute three arguments that have been advanced in favour of the view that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. These arguments turn on the absence of differentiation between the embryoblast and trophoblast, the possibility of monozygotic twinning, and the totipotency of the cells during the first days after fertilization. It is here contended that Oderberg fails to rebut these arguments, though it is conceded that the first two arguments are not conclusive. They do, however, make it at least as reasonable to deny this early origination as to affirm it. It should be noticed that this is all that is needed by those who have used these arguments to dispute that something with a special moral status exists right from fertilization. Nonetheless, it will be seen that the third argument could be developed to the point of giving a conclusive reason to believe that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. [source] Why the Capability Approach is JustifiedJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2007SANDRINE BERGES abstract Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach has in the past twenty years become an increasingly popular and influential approach to issues in global justice. Its main tenet is that when assessing quality of life or asking what kind of policies will be more conducive to human development, we should look not to resources or preference satisfaction, but to what people are able to be and to do. This should then be measured against a more or less narrow conception of what any human being should be able to be and do, i.e. which functions are essentially human. To have a capability is to be able to function in that way. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that despite its many attractions, the capability approach did not present a sufficiently strong challenge to Rawlsian resourcism. In this paper, I address Pogge's criticisms of the capability approach, and I argue that from the point of view of Nussbaum's Aristotelian version of the approach, his objections are not successful. [source] On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument from MercyJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2002Sarah Bachelard In the euthanasia debate, the argument from mercy holds that if someone is in unbearable pain and is hopelessly ill or injured, then mercy dictates that inflicting death may be morally justified. One common way of setting the stage for the argument from mercy is to draw parallels between human and animal suffering, and to suggest that insofar as we are prepared to relieve an animal's suffering by putting it out of its misery we should likewise be prepared to offer the same relief to human beings. In this paper, I will argue that the use of parallels between human and animal suffering in the argument from mercy relies upon truncated views of how the concept of a human being enters our moral thought and responsiveness. In particular, the focus on the nature and extent of the empirical similarities between human beings and animals obscures the significance for our moral lives of the kind of human fellowship which is not reducible to the shared possession of empirical capacities. I will suggest that although a critical examination of the blindspots in these arguments does not license the conclusion that euthanasia for mercy's sake is never morally permissible, it does limit the power of arguments such as those provided by Rachels and Singer to justify it. I will further suggest that examination of these blindspots helps to deepen our understanding of what is at stake in the question of euthanasia in ways that tend otherwise to remain obscured. [source] Biomarkers as biological indicators of xenobiotic exposureJOURNAL OF APPLIED TOXICOLOGY, Issue 4 2001Fernando Gil Abstract The presence of a xenobiotic in the environment always represents a risk for living organisms. However, to talk about impregnation there is a need to detect toxicity in the organism, and the concept of intoxication is related to specific organ alterations and clinical symptoms. Moreover, the relationship between the toxic levels within the organism and the toxic response is rather complex and has a difficult forecast because it depends on several factors, namely toxicokinetic and genetic factors. One of the methods to quantify the interaction with xenobiotics and its potential impact on living organisms, including the human being, is monitoring by the use of the so-called biomarkers. They can provide measures of the exposure, toxic effect and individual susceptibility to environmental chemical compounds and may be very useful to assess and control the risk of long-term outcomes associated with exposure to xenobiotic (i.e. heavy metals, halogenated hydrocarbons, pesticides). Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Creation of EqualsJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009STEPHEN BURWOOD Karl Jaspers argued that academics must be prepared to accept, perhaps even to welcome, the fact that most students ,will learn next to nothing' from a university education. In this paper I shall argue that, while Jaspers' model is unpersuasive as an ideal and inaccurate as a description, there is an uncomfortable truth lurking behind his forthright but gloomy conclusion; viz., that university teaching pays little direct attention to the needs of the student in the wider world (i.e. to the needs of the student qua employee or qua citizen or even qua rounded human being) and pays even less attention, or perhaps none at all, to the needs and expectations of third parties such as employers. In terms of the political context universities now find themselves in, this is an uncomfortable and embarrassing truth for faculty to admit, for it appears to epitomise a self-regarding and inward looking academy. Yet, despite this, perhaps it is a truth that academics should be prepared to accept, even to welcome. At least, in starting any serious discussion on the nature of a university education, it should be a truth we are prepared to admit. [source] Measurement and decision making at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960sJOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, Issue 2 2010Floris Heukelom This article explores the emergence of Clyde Coombs' mathematical psychology and Ward Edwards' behavioral decision research at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows why and how the mathematical psychological focus on the mathematics of measurement neatly complemented the experimental work on rational human decision making of the behavioral decision researchers. Both understood measurement as the rational decision of a human being between two or more stimuli, or values, and viewed the experimental measurement of actual human decision behavior as a key objective of psychology. For both "measurement theory in psychology [was] behavior theory." © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] A tale of the land, the insider, the outsider and human rights (an exploration of some problems and possibilities in the relationship between the English common law property concept, human rights law, and discourses of exclusion and inclusion)LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2003Anna Grear This paper examines the interplay between discourses of exclusion and inclusion in the relationship between land law and human rights. It explores the common law conception of property in land and its relationship with the conceptual structure of property before suggesting that the particular form the conception takes in the English common law is problematic as a discourse of exclusion in the light of inclusive human rights considerations. However, further submerged exclusions in law are also explored, suggesting a problematic ideological continuity between land law and human rights law, notwithstanding identifiable surface tensions between them as contrasting discourses. Once the continuity of hidden exclusions is identified, the paper explores the theoretical unity between the deep structure of property as ,propriety' and human rights as ,what is due', and suggests their mutual potential for embracing more inclusive concerns. Finally, two modest proposals for future theoretical reform are offered: the need for a more anthropologically adequate and inclusive construct of the human being as legal actor, and the need for a more differentiated, context-sensitive formulation of the common law1 property conception, one capable of reconciling conceptually necessary elements of excludability with inclusive human rights impulses. [source] Theories of Practical ReasonMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2002Eric Wiland Leading theories of practical reason can be grouped into one of four families: psychologism, realism, compatibilism, and Aristotelianism. Although there are many differences among the theories within each family, I ignore these in order to ask which family is most likely to deliver a satisfactory philosophical account of reasons for action. I articulate three requirements we should expect any adequate theory of practical reason to meet: it should account for (1) how reasons explain action, (2) how reasons justify action, and (3) how an agent can act for the reason that justifies her action. Only the Aristotelian theory, however, can meet all three requirements. It avoids the problems that plague the other theories by grounding reasons neither in psychological states nor in facts totally independent of the agent in question, but in the nature of the kind of creature the agent is. Our explanations of action need descend to the biographical only when explaining why a human being does not act in ways characteristic of her kind. The Aristotelian view of practical reason, then, appears to be the most promising program for future work. [source] ,We Pray by His Mouth': Karl Barth, Erving Goffman, and a Theology of InvocationMODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 1 2001Matthew Boulton Rereading the opening question of the Westminster Catechism, "What is the chief end of man?", I contend in this essay that the act of invocation , giving God thanks, praise, and petitions , is the act in and through which human being itself is founded, constituted and achieved. I take important cues from Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics and The Christian Life, and from sociologist Erving Goffman's work on the shifting "footings" involved in everyday interactions. I argue for an account of the human being as a being-with-God, human acting as acting-with-God, and human salvation as a restoration to the genuine human partner's work , indeed, the true leitourgia, of thanks, praise and petition to God. [source] The nature of touch therapy related to Ki: Practitioners' perspectiveNURSING & HEALTH SCIENCES, Issue 2 2003Sung Ok Chang PhD Abstract Touch therapy related to Ki, a type of healing touch, has been regarded as one of the distinct therapeutic modalities in traditional oriental medicine. The present study attempted to develop a substantive theory about helping patients using touch therapy related to Ki, by exploring the views of practitioners who are using this therapeutic modality within the context of the Korean society. A grounded theory approach was applied during the collection and analyses of data. The core category, main categories and trajectory of helping patients during the use of touch therapy related to Ki was delineated. Helping patients while using touch therapy related to Ki was found to be a dynamic process with each participant actively engaged in increasing the activating, potential power of the human being. These findings have value in understanding the embedded meaning of the healing process through touch therapy within the context of Ki. [source] Human nature: a foundation for palliative careNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2008Beverly J. B. Whelton PhD MSN RN Abstract, The Aristotelian-Thomist philosopher holds that human intellectual knowledge is possible because of the order in the world and natural human capacities. It is the position of this paper that there is a shared human form or nature that unites all humanity as members of the same kind. Moral treatment is due to every human being because they are human, and is not based upon expression of abilities. Humans have substantial dynamic existence in the world, an existence which overflows in expressive relationships. As both patient and health professional are human, human nature forms the natural foundation of health care. This paper looks towards human nature for moral guidance. The therapeutic relationship is seen as a part of the interpersonal moral space formed by human relationality, which tends towards community , in this case, the healthcare system. The therapeutic relationship is also a source of moral responsibility, as illness makes the patient vulnerable, while knowledge and nursing capacities generate in the nurse a duty to care. Nursing theory serves to connect philosophical reflection and nursing practice. Imogene King's conceptual system and theory of Goal Attainment is the theory that follows from the perspective of human person being presented. This synthesis of philosophy and theory is developed with the goal of shedding light on healthcare decisions in palliative care. The article concludes with the acknowledgement that the complexity of contextualized individual decisions requires the insight and discipline of the moral practitioner, and provides some thoughts on how education, development, and refinement transform an individual into a nurse. [source] Time, human being and mental health care: an introduction to Gilles DeleuzeNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2005Marc Roberts RMN DiPHE BA(Hons) PGCE PGCRM MA PhD(c) Abstract, The French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, is emerging as one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th century, having published widely on philosophy, literature, language, psychoanalysis, art, politics, and cinema. However, because of the ,experimental' nature of certain works, combined with the manner in which he draws upon a variety of sources from various disciplines, his work can seem difficult, obscure, and even ,willfully obstructive'. In an attempt to resist such impressions, this paper will seek to provide an accessible introduction to Deleuze's work, and to begin to discuss how it can be employed to provide a significant critique and reconceptualization of the theoretical foundations and therapeutic practices of psychiatry, psychotherapy, and mental health nursing. In order to do this, the paper will focus upon Deleuze's masterwork, and the cornerstone to his philosophy as a whole, Difference and Repetition; in particular, it will discuss how his innovative and challenging account of time can be employed to provide a conception of human life as a ,continuity', rather than as a series of distinct ,moments' or ,events'. As well as discussing the manner in which his work can provide us with an understanding of how life is different and significant for each human being, this paper will also highlight the potential importance of Deleuze's work for logotherapy, for the recent ,turn' to ,narrative' as a psychotherapeutic approach and for contemporary mental health care's growing interest in ,social constructionism'. As such, this paper also seeks to stimulate further discussion and research into the importance and the relevance of Deleuze's work for the theory and practice of psychiatry, psychotherapy, and mental health nursing. [source] Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian DualityPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 2 2009Andrea Christofidou The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories. [source] After Freud: Phantasy and Imagination in the Philosophy of ReligionPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 1 2008Beverley Clack Philosophers of religion have tended to focus on Freud's dismissal of religion as an illusion, thus characterising his account as primarily hostile. Those who wish to engage with psychoanalytic ideas in order to understand religion in a more positive way have tended to look to later psychoanalysts for more sympathetic sources. This paper suggests that other aspects of Freud's own writings might, surprisingly, provide such tools. In particular, a more subtle understanding of the relationship between illusion and reality emerges in his theory, that itself offers a useful way of understanding the meaning and significance of religion for the human animal. By exploring these sources a view of religion emerges which connects it closely with the processes of imagination and creativity. Under this view, religion is more than just a set of hypotheses to be proved or disproved. In religion, we have access to the most deeply rooted wishes and anxieties of the human heart, and thus its investigation enables a deeper understanding of what it is to be a human being. [source] Descartes's Passions of the SoulPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2006Lisa Shapiro While Descartes's Passions of the Soul has been taken to hold a place in the history to human physiology, until recently philosophers have neglected the work. In this research summary, I set Descartes's last published work in context and then sketch out its philosophical significance. From it, we gain further insight into Descartes's solution to the Mind,Body Problem , that is, to the problem of the ontological status of the mind,body union in a human being, to the nature of body,mind causation, and to the way body-caused thoughts represent the world. In addition, the work contains Descartes's developed ethics, in his account of virtue and of the passion of générosité in particular. Through his taxonomy of the passions and the account of their regulation, we also learn more about his moral psychology. [source] Ethical Individualism and the Natural LawRATIO, Issue 1 2000Phillip Goggans "Generic qualities" are qualities typical of a kind because of the nature of that kind. It is commonly thought that generic qualities are morally irrelevant. For instance, the fact that human beings have a natural tendency to be thus-and-such is not relevant to moral acts involving a particular human being; what matters, rather, are the qualities of that individual. I argue that generic qualities are relevant in certain instances. First, we need to believe that this is so in order to be morally competent. Second, there is no other way to account for the rationality of the universal response to Oedipus the King. [source] EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD, HUMAN NATURE, AND RATIONAL ENSOULMENTTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 2 2006JOHN R. MEYER This essay briefly describes a few of the problems associated with using personhood language to defend the right to life of the pre-implantation embryo. Arguing that an immaterial soul explains the personal identity of an embryo is problematic for many people because there is no apparent spiritual activity in the unborn. While some scholars argue that the embryo has the potential to act as an adult person and thus should be protected from harm, others contend that potentiality alone is insufficient reason to ascribe special moral worth to the embryo in utero. For Thomas Aquinas, the soul is not only the life-principle that organizes the human body, but it is also that by which the human being thinks and wills. By making suitable corrections to Aristotle's hylomorphic depiction of the soul,body relation, I suggest that a rational soul must be present from the moment of conception and that it is at the service of the (embryonic) person. What is of critical importance here is to accept that a human being is present from the moment of conception, something the vast majority of embryologists maintain, notwithstanding the inveiglement of those who state that the pre-implantation blastocyst is simply a disorganized clump of cells. [source] Psychotherapy in the aesthetic attitudeTHE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2010John Beebe Abstract:, Drawing upon the writings of Jungian analyst Joseph Henderson on unconscious attitudes toward culture that patients and analysts may bring to therapy, the author defines the aesthetic attitude as one of the basic ways that cultural experience is instinctively accessed and processed so that it can become part of an individual's self experience. In analytic treatment, the aesthetic attitude emerges as part of what Jung called the transcendent function to create new symbolic possibilities for the growth of consciousness. It can provide creative opportunities for new adaptation where individuation has become stuck in unconscious complexes, both personal and cultural. In contrast to formulations that have compared depth psychotherapy to religious ritual, philosophic discourse, and renewal of socialization, this paper focuses upon the considerations of beauty that make psychotherapy also an art. In psychotherapeutic work, the aesthetic attitude confronts both analyst and patient with the problem of taste, affects how the treatment is shaped and ,framed', and can grant a dimension of grace to the analyst's mirroring of the struggles that attend the patient's effort to be a more smoothly functioning human being. The patient may learn to extend the same grace to the analyst's fumbling attempts to be helpful. The author suggests that the aesthetic attitude is thus a help in the resolution of both countertransference and transference en route to psychological healing. Translations of Abstract S'appuyant sur les écrits de l'analyste jungien Joseph Henderson sur les attitudes inconscientes vis-à-vis la culture que patient et analyste apportent en thérapie, l'auteur définit l'attitude esthétique comme l'un des moyens élémentaires d'appréhension par la conscience de l'expérience culturelle, celle-ci devenant une part consciente de l'expérience propre d'un individu. Dans le traitement analytique, l'attitude esthétique émerge comme une partie de ce que Jung a nommé la fonction transcendante, apte à créer de nouvelles possibilités symboliques d'accroissement de la conscience. Elle peut offrir des possibilités créatrices d'adaptation nouvelle, là où l'individuation s'est enlisée dans les complexes inconscients, à la fois personnels et culturels. S'érigeant contre les formulations qui ont comparé la psychologie des profondeurs au rituel religieux, au discours philosophique et au renouveau de la socialisation, l'auteur met l'accent sur une prise en compte de la beauté qui fait de la psychothérapie également un art. Dans le travail psychothérapeutique, l'attitude esthétique confronte l'analyste et le patient au problème du goût, influe sur la forme et le cadre de l'analyse et peut conférer une dimension de grâce à la façon dont l'analyste renvoie en miroir au patient ses combats et ses efforts pour devenir un être humain au fonctionnement plus flexible. De même, le patient peut-il concéder la même grâce aux tentatives maladroites de l'analyste pour se rendre utile. L'auteur suggère que l'attitude esthétique constitue donc une aide à la résolution du transfert et du contre-transfert,,en route,vers la guérison psychologique. Am Beispiel der Schriften des jungianischen Analytikers Joseph Henderson über unbewußte kulturelle Haltungen, die Patienten wie Analytiker in die Behandlung einbringen, definiert der Autor die ästhetische Haltung als einen der elementaren Wege, auf dem instinktiv Zugang zur kulturellen Erfahrung gewonnen und vorangetrieben wird, so daß diese zum bewußten Bestandteil der Erfahrungswelt eines Individuums werden kann. Innerhalb der analytischen Behandlung erscheint die ästhetische Haltung als Teil dessen, was Jung die Transzendente Funktion nennt, um neue symbolische Möglichkeiten für das Wachstum des Bewußtseins entstehen zu lassen. Sie kann kreative Möglichkeiten für Neuadaptionen da schaffen, wo die Individuation in einem unbewußten Komplex steckengeblieben ist und dies sowohl auf personeller wie auch auf kultureller Ebene. Im Kontrast zu Ausführungen in denen Tiefenpsychologie mit religiösen Ritualen, philosophischen Diskursen und Erneuerung der Sozialisation verglichen wurde fokussiert sich der Autor auf die Betrachtungen der Schönheit, welche Psychotherapie zugleich zu einer Kunst werden lassen. In der psychotherapeutischen Arbeit konfrontiert die ästhetische Haltung den Analytiker wie den Patienten mit dem Problem des Geschmacks der beeinflußt, wie die Behandlung geformt und ,gerahmt' wird, und der eine Dimension der Anmut zum Spiegeln des Analytikers hinzufügt, dem Spiegeln des Ringens, welches die Anstrengungen des Patienten, ein glattes funktionierendes menschliches Wesen zu sein, begleitet. Der Patient kann lernen, die gleiche Anmut den tastenden Versuchen des Analytikers hilfreich zu sein, entgegen zu bringen. Der Autor unterstellt, daß die ästhetische Haltung eine Hilfe darstellen kann bei der Auflösung sowohl der Gegenübertragung als auch der Übertragung auf dem Weg zu seelischer Heilung. Attingendo agli scritti dell'analista junghiano Joseph Henderson sugli atteggiamenti inconsci nei confronti della cultura che pazienti e analisti possono portare in terapia, l'autore definisce l'atteggiamento estetico come uno dei modi basici con cui si accede istintivamente all'esperienza culturale così che questa possa diventare parte conscia dell'esperienza di un individuo del sé. Nella terapia analitica l'atteggiamento estetico. Emerge come parte di ciò che Jung chiamo funzione trascendente per creare nuove forme simboliche per lo sviluppo della consapevolezza. Può fornire opportunità creative per un nuovo adattamento quando l'individuazione è rimasta bloccata in complessi inconsci, sia personali che culturali. In contrasto con le affermazioni che hanno comparato la psicoterapia del profondo al rituale religioso, al discorso filosofico e al rinnovamento della socializzazione, l'autore si concentra sulla considerazione della bellezza che fa della psicoterapia anche un'arte. Nel lavoro psicoterapeutico, l'atteggiamento estetico mette a confronto sia l'analista che il paziente con il problema del gusto, influenza il modo in cui il trattamento prende forma e ,si struttura', e può aggiungere una dimensione di gentilezza al rispecchiamento dell'analista delle lotte che accompagnano lo sforzo del paziente di divenire un essere umano più morbido. Il paziente può imparare ad estendere la stessa gentilezza ai goffi tentativi dell'analista di essere di aiuto. L'autore pensa che nel percorso di guarigione l'atteggiamento estetico può quindi essere di aiuto alla risoluzione del transfert e del controtransfert. Estudiando los trabajos del analista Jungiano Joseph Henderson sobre las actitudes inconscientes hacia la cultura que pacientes y analistas aportan a la terapia, el autor define la actitud estética como una de las formas básicas en las cuales la experiencia cultural es instintivamente alcanzada y procesada para ser parte consciente de la experiencia individual del self. En el tratamiento analítico, la actitud estética surge como parte de lo que Jung llamó la función trascendente, ella crea nuevas posibilidades simbólicas para el desarrollo de la consciencia. Ella puede proporcionar oportunidades creativas para una nueva adaptación donde la individuación se ha detenido en complejos inconscientes, tanto personales como culturales. Contrastando con formulaciones que han comparado la psicoterapia profunda con el ritual religioso, el discurso filosófico, y la renovación de la socialización, el autor se enfoca en aquellas consideraciones sobre la belleza que hacen de la psicoterapia un arte. En el trabajo psicoterapéutico, la actitud estética confronta tanto al analista como al paciente con el problema del gusto, afecta en cómo el tratamiento es establece y se ,encuadra', pudiendo otorgar una dimensión de gracia al espejo del analista en las luchas que asisten al esfuerzo del paciente para convertirse en un ser humano más armónico. Al paciente aprender a ver esta misma gracia en los esfuerzos del analista por ser útil. El autor sugiere que la actitud estética es, por lo tanto, una ayuda en la resolución de la contratransferencia y de la transferencia en el camino de la cura psicológica. [source] The self, the psyche and the world: a phenomenological interpretationTHE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2009Roger Brooke Abstract:, This paper takes as its starting point Jung's definition of the self as the totality of the psyche. However, because the term psyche remains conceptually unclear the concept of the self as totality, origin and goal, even centre, remains vague. With reference to Heidegger's analysis of human being as,Dasein, as well as Jung's writings, it is argued that Jung's concept of psyche is not a synonym for mind but is the world in which we live psychologically. An understanding of the psyche as existentially situated requires us to rethink some features of the self. For instance, the self as origin is thus not a pre-existential integrate of pure potentiality but the original gathering of existence in which, and out of which, personal identity is constituted. The ego emerges out of the self as the development and ownership of aspects of an existence that is already situated and gathered. Relations between the ego and the self are about what is known, or admitted, and its relation with what is already being lived within the gathering that is existence. The self as psyche, origin, and centre are discussed, as well as the meaning of interiority. Epistemological assumptions of object relations theory are critically discussed. The paper also includes critical discussions of recent papers on the self. Translations of Abstract Cet article prend pour point de départ la définition par Jung du soi comme totalité de la psyché. Cependant, du fait du manque de clarté conceptuelle du terme « psyché», le concept de soi comme totalité, origine et but, voire comme centre, demeure vague. En référence à l'analyse de Heidegger de l'être humain comme,Dasein,ainsi qu'aux écrits de Jung, j'émets l'hypothèse que le concept de psyché n'est pas synonyme d'esprit pour Jung, mais du monde dans lequel nous vivons psychologiquement. Une compréhension existentielle de la psyché suppose que nous repensions certaines des caractéristiques du soi. Ainsi par exemple, le soi comme origine n'est pas un amalgame pré-existentiel de potentialités pures mais il est formé par l'existence dans laquelle et à partir de laquelle se constitue l'identité personnelle. Le moi émerge du soi comme le développement et l'appropriation d'aspects d'une existence déjà posée et assimilée. Les relations moi-soi portent sur du connu ou de l'admis, en lien avec ce qui se vit au sein de cet agrégat qu'est l'existence. Les notions de transformation, d'intégration et d'intériorité sont examinées. L'article comporte des discussions critiques d'articles récents sur le soi. Dieser Aufsatz geht von Jungs Definition des Selbst als Totalität des Seelischen aus. Da jedoch der Terminus Seele konzeptuell unklar bleibt, bleibt auch das Konzept des Selbst als Totalität, Ursprung und Ziel, ausgleichendes Zentrum vage. Mit Bezug auf Heideggers Analyse des Menschlichen als,Dasein,wie auch auf Jungs Schriften wird argumentiert, daß Jungs Entwurf des Seelischen kein Synonym für Geist darstellt, sondern die Welt, in der wir psychologisch leben, meint. Ein Verständnis der Seele als existentielle Situation verlangt von uns ein Neubedenken einiger Eigenschaften des Selbst. Zum Beispiel bedeutet das Selbst als Ursprung nicht ein vorexistentielles Vorhandensein reiner Potentialität, sondern die originäre Erfassung des Existierenden in dem und aus dem heraus sich persönliche Identität bildet. Das Ego entspringt aus dem Selbst als Entwicklungsprodukt und Träger von Aspekten einer Existenz, die schon vorfindlich und erfaßt ist. Beziehungen zwischen dem Ego und dem Selbst beinhalten Gewußtes oder Zugelassenes und dessen Relation zu demjenigen, was schon gelebt wird in dem Angehäuften was die Existenz darstellt. Transformation, Integration und Innerlichkeit werden diskutiert. Der Text beinhaltet kritische Würdigungen neuerer Veröffentlichungen über das Selbst. Questo scritto inizia con la definizione junghiana del sé come totalità della psiche. Tuttavia, poiché il termine psiche è concettualmente non chiaro, il concetto del sé come totalità, origine e meta, persino centro, resta vago. Riferendomi all'analisi di Heidegger dell'essere umano come ,Dasein' e anche agli scritti junghiani, sostengo che il concetto junghiano di psiche non è un sinonimo do mente, ma è il mondo in cui noi viviamo psicologicamente. Intendere la psiche come situata esistenzialmente richiede di ripensare alcuni aspetti del sé. Ad esempio, il sé come origine non è una integrazione pre-esistente di pure potenzialità, ma è l'insieme originario dell'esistenza nel quale, e fuori dal quale si costruisce l'identità personale. L'Io emerge dal sé come sviluppo e possesso di aspetti di una esistenza che è già situata e raccolta. Le relazioni tra l'io e il sè. Riguardano ciò che è conosciuto, o possibile, e la sua relazione con ciò che è già vivente all'interno dell'insieme di ciò che è esistente. Vengono discusse le trasformazioni, le integrazioni e l'interiorità. Questo scritto include anche discussioni critiche di recenti lavori sul sé. Este trabajo toma como punto de partida la definición de Jung del Ser (Self) como la totalidad de la psique. Sin embargo, porque el término psique queda conceptualmente poco claro el concepto del Self como totalidad, el origen y objetivo, aún central, queda vago. Con referencia al análisis del Ser Humano de Heidegger como Dasein, se discute el concepto de Jung de psique como no sinónimo de mente en los escritos de Jung sino como el mundo en el cual vivimos psicológicamente. Una comprensión de la psique como existencialmente ubicada nos requiere de volver a pensar algunas características del Self. Por ejemplo el Self como origen no es un pre-existente constituido de pura potencialidad sino la conjunción original de la existencia en la cual, y fuera de la cual, está constituida la identidad personal. El ego surge fuera del Self como el desarrollo y propiedad de aspectos de una existencia situada y conjugada. Las relaciones entre el ego y el Self están acerca de lo que es conocido, o es admitido, y su relación con lo que ya se ha vivido dentro de la conjugación que es la existencia. Se reflexiona sobre la transformación, la integración, y interioridad. El trabajo incluye discusiones críticas de escritos recientes sobre el Self. 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