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Household Welfare (household + welfare)
Selected AbstractsCREDIT CRUNCH AND HOUSEHOLD WELFARE, THE CASE OF THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2008SUNG JIN KANG We examine how the credit crunch in Korea in the late 1990s affected household behaviour and welfare. Using 1996,1998 household panel data, we estimate a consumption Euler equation, augmented by endogenous credit constraints. Korean households coped with the negative shocks of the 1997 credit crunch by reducing consumption of luxury items while maintaining food, education and health related expenditures. Our results show that, in 1997,1998, during the crisis, the probability of facing credit constraints and the resulting expected welfare loss from the binding constraints increased significantly, suggesting the gravity of the credit crunch at the household level. [source] The Experience of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the CaribbeanDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 5 2006Sudhanshu Handa This article discusses the experience of six conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America, a model of social safety-nets which has grown to dominate the social protection sector in the region during the past decade. While they have been generally successful in terms of achieving their core objective, it is still not clear whether these programmes constitute the most cost-efficient or sustainable solution to the development bottleneck they seek to address. Furthermore, the almost exclusive focus on the human capital accumulation of children leads to missed opportunties in terms of impact on household welfare and the broader rural development context. [source] Agricultural diversification and integrated pest management in BangladeshAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004Chowdhury Mahmoud IPM; Bangladesh; Vegetable production; Off-farm employment Abstract We study factors associated with a shift toward diversified, high-valued vegetable crops and the incentives associated with the use of IPM methods for vegetable producers in Bangladesh. The primary objective is to measure how IPM technologies affect the crop and technology choices of low-income rice farmers. A three-season household optimisation model is used to study crop and technology choice under price and yield uncertainty. The model is parameterised using data from vegetable farms and experimental IPM trials conducted in Bangladesh. Simulation results show that access to IPM technology and IPM availability combined with access to credit increase household welfare and lead to higher rates of vegetable adoption. Off-farm employment opportunities work against vegetable cultivation and IPM use by risk-averse farmers. Implications for policy and extension efforts are highlighted. [source] The impact of farm credit in PakistanAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2003Shahidur R. Khandker Agricultural credit; Rural financial institutions; Impact of credit on income and productivity; Cost-effectiveness of credit delivery system Abstract Both informal and formal loans matter in agriculture. However, formal lenders provide many more production loans than informal lenders, often at a cost (mostly loan default cost) higher than what they can recover. For example, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP), providing about 90% of formal loans in rural areas, incurs high loan default costs. Yet, like other governments, the Government of Pakistan supports the formal scheme on the grounds that lending to agriculture is a high risk activity because of covariate risk. Hence, such policies are often based on a market failure argument. As farm credit schemes are subsidised, policy makers must know if these schemes are worth supporting. Using a recent large household survey data from rural Pakistan (Rural Financial Market Studies or RFMS), we have attempted to estimate the effectiveness of the ADBP as a credit delivery institution. A two-stage method that takes the endogeneity of borrowing into account is used to estimate credit impact. Results reveal that ADBP contributes to household welfare and that its impact is higher for smallholders than for large holders. Nevertheless, large holders receive the bulk of ADBP finance. The ADBP is, thus, not a cost-effective institution in delivering rural finance. Its cost-effectiveness can be improved by reducing its loan default cost and partially by targeting smallholders in agriculture where credit yields better results. [source] |