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Hold-up Problem (hold-up + problem)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 2 2001
Faruk Gul
We study a two-person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining. We show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small, then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus. Hence, bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold-up problem even when the agent who makes the relation-specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible. We consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two-sided investment. [source]

Half a Century of Public Software Institutions: Open Source as a Solution to Hold-Up Problem

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2010
MICHAEL SCHWARZ
We argue that the intrinsic inefficiency of proprietary software has historically created a space for alternative institutions that provide software as a public good. We discuss several sources of such inefficiency, focusing on one that has not been described in the literature: the underinvestment due to fear of hold-up. An inefficient hold-up occurs when a user of software must make complementary investments, when the return on such investments depends on future cooperation of the software vendor, and when contracting about a future relationship with the software vendor is not feasible. We also consider how the nature of the production function of software makes software cheaper to develop when the code is open to the end users. Our framework explains why open source dominates certain sectors of the software industry (e.g., programming languages), while being almost non existent in some other sectors (e.g., computer games). We then use our discussion of efficiency to examine the history of institutions for provision of public software from the early collaborative projects of the 1950s to the modern "open source" software institutions. We look at how such institutions have created a sustainable coalition for provision of software as a public good by organizing diverse individual incentives, both altruistic and profit-seeking, providing open source products of tremendous commercial importance, which have come to dominate certain segments of the software industry. [source]

Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

A Monitoring Role for Deviations from Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Resolution

FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 5 2003
By Dina Naples Layish
Firms that have successfully reorganized under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws of the United States frequently award shares of common stock in the reorganized firm to pre-bankruptcy shareholders, even though pre-bankruptcy creditors' claims are not fully satisfied. Using a sample of large publicly traded firms, these deviations from absolute priority (DAPR) are found to be positively related to the severity of agency costs within a financially distressed firm. US bankruptcy laws may exacerbate these agency costs by granting exclusivity to management during the reorganization period. Firms in which outside shareholders are more concentrated have a lower occurrence of DAPR indicating that blockholders provide an effective monitoring mechanism for controlling managerial behavior during reorganization. On the other hand, firms without this monitoring mechanism have a higher probability of DAPR indicating that creditors attempt to control managerial behavior by providing them with some sort of financial compensation via their equity holding in the firm. Finally, the evidence indicates that DAPR can be used to mitigate the hold-up problem resulting from voting rights granted to both junior and senior claimants of the firm by US bankruptcy laws. [source]

Dynamic Prevention in Short-Term Insurance Contracts

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 2 2008
M. Martin Boyer
This article looks at the dynamic properties of insurance contracts when insurers have a better technology at preventing catastrophic losses than the insured. When the prevention technology is irreversible and its benefits last for all future periods although its cost is borne in the period in which it is made, a hold-up problem occurs because the insured can change insurer after his initial insurer has invested in prevention. Investment in prevention is then delayed compared to the first best outcome. When the audit cost must be incurred by the insured when he wants to change insurer, the incumbent insurer has an informational advantage so that he can keep his client over the entire investment horizon, even though long-term contracts are not possible. This does not avoid the delay in investment, however. [source]

The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Specific Investments,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 514 2006
Anke S. Kessler
Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. Becker (1964) argues that employers will only invest in specific training, not general training, when labour markets are competitive. The article reconsiders Becker's theory. Using essentially his framework, we show that there exists an incentive complementarity between employer-sponsored general and specific training: the possibility to provide specific training leads the employer to invest in general human capital. Conversely, the latter reduces the hold-up problem that arises with firm-specific training. We also consider the desirability of institutionalised training programmes and the virtues of breach penalties, and discuss some empirical facts that could be explained by the theory. [source]

Ownership, incentives, and the hold-up problem

THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2006
Tim Baldenius
Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems. This ignores the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. I develop a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and "empire benefits." Owners of a vertically integrated firm will then provide division managers with low-powered incentives to induce them to bargain more cooperatively, resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with nonintegration. Vertical integration therefore mitigates hold-up problems even without profit sharing. [source]

Credit Risk Assessment and Relationship Lending: An Empirical Analysis of German Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises,

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2007
Patrick Behr
We estimate a logit scoring model for the prediction of the probability of default by German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) using a unique data set on SME loans in Germany. Our scoring model helps SMEs to gain knowledge about their default risk, which can be used to approximate their risk adequate cost of debt. This knowledge is likely to lead to a detection of hold-up problems that German SMEs might be confronted with in their bank relationships. Furthermore, it allows them to monitor their bank's pricing behavior and it reduces information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Finally, it can influence their future financing decisions toward capital market-based financing. [source]