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Homogeneous Product (homogeneous + product)
Selected AbstractsSALES TECHNOLOGY AND PRICE LEADERSHIP,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2008DEBABRATA DATTA Two firms sell a homogeneous product to two buyers who differ significantly in their valuation of the good and are allowed to charge (possibly) multiple two-part tariffs. Firms decide upon optimal prices and the choice of sales technologies which help acquire revenues from nonlinear prices. There is a subgame-perfect equilibrium where firms choose different sales technologies and the firm with an advanced sales technology emerges to be a price leader, charging a two-part tariff and selling only to the low-valuation buyers. Consequently, the firm with the less advanced sales technology follows, charges only a fixed fee and serves the high-valuation buyers and always earns strictly higher profits than its leader. Social surplus may deteriorate with competition. [source] Free entry and social efficiency under vertical oligopolyTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2007Arghya Ghosh We analyze a successive vertical oligopoly model that incorporates vertical relationships between industries and demonstrate that free entry in an industry that produces a homogeneous product can lead to a socially insufficient number of firms. This is in contrast with the proevious findings that, under Cournot oligopoloy with fixed set-up costs, level of entry in the free-entry equilibrium is socially excessive. It has often been argued that this result can provide a justification for apparently anticompetitive entry regulations. Our finding yields an important policy implication that such a justification is not necessarily valid when vertical relationships ar taken into account. [source] Divisionalisation and Cournot Competition Yield Bertrand OutcomesAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2001Lasheng Yuan Bertrand and Cournot model are the main frameworks in the analysis of oligopolistic competition. The outcomes from them are however different. Using a simultaneous-move two-stage game, this article shows that, in a homogeneous product market with fairly general demand, the Bertrand outcomes can be achieved by a combination of divisionalisation and ensuing Cournot competition. This finding can be viewed as an extension to or complements of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), who show that Cournot outcomes can be achieved by quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition. [source] Process Cheese: Scientific and Technological Aspects,A ReviewCOMPREHENSIVE REVIEWS IN FOOD SCIENCE AND FOOD SAFETY, Issue 2 2008Rohit Kapoor ABSTRACT:, Process cheese is produced by blending natural cheese in the presence of emulsifying salts and other dairy and nondairy ingredients followed by heating and continuous mixing to form a homogeneous product with an extended shelf life. Extensive research on the important physicochemical and functional properties associated with process cheese and the various physicochemical, technological, and microbiological factors that influence these properties has resulted in process cheese being one of the most versatile dairy products with numerous end-use applications. The present review is an attempt to cover the scientific and technological aspects of process cheese and highlight and critique some of the important research findings associated with them. The 1st objective of this article is to extensively describe the physicochemical properties and microstructure, as well as the functional properties, of process cheese and highlight the various analytical techniques used to evaluate these properties. The 2nd objective is to describe the formulation parameters, ingredients, and various processing conditions that influence the functional properties of process cheese. This review is primarily targeted at process cheese manufacturers as well as students in the field of dairy and food science who may want to learn more about the scientific and technological aspects of process cheese. The review is limited to the relevant research associated with process cheeses as defined by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and does not cover imitation and substitute cheeses. [source] | ||||||||||