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Greater Incentive (greater + incentive)
Selected AbstractsPublic Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies' Responses to Operation Iraqi FreedomFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 2 2006STEVE CHAN A central logic of the democratic peace theory claims that public opinion acts as a powerful restraint against war. Democratic officials, unlike their autocratic counterparts, are wary of going to war because they expect to pay an electoral penalty for fighting even successful wars. Several democracies, however, recently joined Operation Iraqi Freedom despite substantial and even overwhelming domestic opposition. We argue that electoral institutions can heighten or lessen the impact of public opinion on democratic officials' concerns for their reelection prospects, thus pointing to an important dimension of variation that has been overlooked in the democratic peace literature. However, contrary to conventional attributions of a greater incentive motivating the parties and candidates in predominantly two-party systems with majority/plurality decision rules to respond to national public opinion, we suggest mitigating factors that tend to reduce such responsiveness. Conversely, we point out that multiparty competition in proportional representation systems can reduce electoral disproportionality without sacrificing responsiveness to public opinion. The pertinent electoral institutions therefore present varying opportunities (or, conversely, constraints) for democratic officials to override their constituents' sentiments when they are so inclined. [source] How New Product Introductions Affect Sales Management Strategy: The Impact of Type of "Newness" of the New ProductTHE JOURNAL OF PRODUCT INNOVATION MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2003Kamel Micheal How do firms adjust sales management strategy for new product launch? Does sales management strategy change more radically for different types of new products such as new-to-the-world products versus product revisions? Because firms introducing a new product rely considerably on their sales force in the product launch effort, the types and degree of changes made in managing the selling effort are important issues. Past studies have demonstrated that firms make substantial adjustments in their sales management strategy when they introduce a new product. This study expands on previous investigations by examining whether sales management strategy changes are conditioned by the type of newness of the new product to the market and to the firm. Australian sales managers were asked to respond to a mail questionnaire concerning pre- and post-new product launch sales management activities. Three groups of firms were compared: (1) those with new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm products (i.e., new-to-the-world products); (2) those with products new to the firm but not new to the market; and (3) those with products that are revisions to the firm and not new to the market. The study finds that firms do not make the most adjustments for products with the greatest degree of market newness,the new-to-the-world types of products,except in the sales management strategy categories of compensation and supervision. In the other sales management strategy categories defined for study,organization, training, quotas and goals, and sales support as well as for all categories in the aggregate,sales management strategy changes were greatest in incidence, as measured both by the percent of firms making changes and the average number of changes per firm, when the new product was new to the firm but not new to the market. These results suggest that, because different types of new products face different competitive environments, there may be greater incentive for a not-new-to-the-market new-to-the-firm product to make changes in sales strategy. Uncertainties about market size and customer location with new-to-the-world products may limit the understanding of what changes to make in the strategy categories of quotas and territories. Similarly, uncertainties about product use and customer acceptance of new-to-the-world products may limit the development of training and sales support materials by these firms. Instead, these firms may rely more on compensation and supervision to direct sales efforts for new-to-the-world products. However, observing the market experience and performance of the first-to-market product can benefit firms launching a not-new-to-market and new-to-the-firm product, allowing them to rely more on strategy changes in training, sales support materials, organizational adjustments such as redeployments, and quotas. [source] Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly and Productive EfficiencyAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2002Akira Nishimori In general, the introduction of competition into the public sector seems to lead to higher cost-efficiency in service production. However, there are examples of substantial cost increases in some areas. In this paper, using a mixed oligopoly model, we investigate the effects of deregulation on the cost-reducing incentives of a public firm. Our results show that a firm that is a public monopoly has greater incentive to conduct cost-reducing investment than a public firm within mixed oligopoly market. [source] Migration of nurses: is there any other option?INTERNATIONAL NURSING REVIEW, Issue 1 2007G. Thupayagale-Tshweneagae msn Background:, Migration of nurses has taken center stage as a human resource issue in global discussion. Migration of nurses is associated with shortage of manpower, HIV/AIDS and the expanded roles of nurses. Purpose:, To examine reasons behind migration and to argue that there are greater incentives for migrating than staying. Results:, There are greater incentives for migrating than staying. Conclusion:, Migration will remain an option until governments put in place professional mechanisms and incentives that will counteract various push factors. [source] Not Afraid to Blame: The Neglected Role of Blame Attribution in Medical Consumerism and Some Implications for Health PolicyTHE MILBANK QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2002Marsha Rosenthal Starting roughly a quarter century ago, american medicine began a dramatic transformation from a system dominated by clinicians' decision making and professional norms to one in which medical care is expected to reflect the preferences and choices of individual consumers. This growing aspiration toward "medical consumerism" began during the 1970s with a set of popular social movements devoted to giving patients more control over their own treatment and a more informed choice of their physicians (Rodwin 1994). Although the seeds of consumerism were only haphazardly sown and incompletely germinated (Hibbard and Weeks 1987), by the end of the decade they had grown into a noticeable presence in the health care system (Haug and Lavin 1981). During the 1980s, these shifts in popular attitudes were reinforced by public policies and private practices intended to give consumers greater incentives to learn more about their medical choices and to exercise these choices in a cost-conscious manner (Arnould, Rich, and White 1993). [source] European Sugar Policy Reform and Agricultural InnovationCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008Koen Dillen In July 2006, the European Union's (EU) Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar underwent the first radical reform since its establishment in 1968. In this article, we study the incentives for adoption of new technologies before and after the policy reform. We build a stochastic partial equilibrium model and use it to analyze the effect of the policy reform on the adoption incentives of genetically modified herbicide tolerant sugar beet. Our findings show that the adoption incentives of high-cost sugar beet farmers are significantly reduced under the new CMO. Medium-cost producers, in contrast, have greater incentives to adopt new technologies, while low-cost producers are largely left unaffected. The reduced adoption incentives of high-cost farmers lead to lower flexibility and competitiveness of these farmers and therefore coincides with the goals of the reform to crowd out high-cost producers and increase competitiveness of the European sugar market. En juillet 2006, l'Organisation commune du marché (OCM) du sucre a subi sa première réforme radicale depuis sa mise en place par l'UE en 1968. Dans la présente étude, nous avons examiné les incitatifs offerts pour l'adoption de nouvelles technologies, avant et après la réforme. Nous avons élaboré un modèle stochastique d'équilibre partiel et l'avons utilisé pour analyser les répercussions de la réforme sur les incitatifs offerts pour l'adoption de variétés de betteraves sucrières génétiquement modifiées résistantes aux herbicides. Selon nos résultats, les incitatifs offerts aux producteurs de betterave sucrière ayant des coûts marginaux élevés ont significativement diminué depuis la réforme de l'OCM du sucre. Par contre, les incitatifs offerts aux producteurs ayant des coûts marginaux moyens se sont accrus, tandis que ceux offerts aux producteurs ayant de faibles coûts marginaux n'ont pas changé. La diminution des incitatifs offerts aux producteurs ayant des coûts marginaux élevés entraîne une diminution de la souplesse et de la capacité concurrentielle de ces producteurs et, par conséquent, coïncide avec les objectifs de la réforme qui visent àévincer les producteurs ayant des coûts marginaux élevés et à accroître la capacité concurrentielle du marché européen du sucre. [source] | |||||||||||||