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Governance Implications (governance + implication)
Selected AbstractsGlobal and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in Regulatory PolicymakingEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2006David Lazer In particular, it identifies three modes of interdependence: competitive, coordinative, and informational. In the competitive mode the essential structure of interdependence is for countries to attempt to have distinctive policies that provide some advantage over other countries, but where the equilibrium set of policies is suboptimal for all. In the coordinative mode, there is an advantage for all countries to adopt the same policy, but exactly which policy is adopted may have significant distributional consequences. Lastly, in the informational mode, the choices and experiences of countries produce informational externalities, pointing the way for other countries to policy decisions. This article examines the logic underpinning each of these modes of interdependence, and draws out the governance implications of each mode. [source] Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009Yilei Zhang This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem. [source] Transnational Competence in an Emergent EpochINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 2 2002Peter H. Koehn The article elaborates a framework for understanding the relevance of transnational competence to the dynamics that mark the transformations of our time. Nongovernmental stakeholders interacting through dense civil-society networks that permeate domestic-foreign frontiers bear increasing responsibility for the course of events. Based on linked interests, interorganizational knowledge generation and aggregation, partnerships, and interpersonal/intercultural interactions, they are deeply involved in addressing the many challenges posed by an ever more interdependent world. Transnational competence lubricates transterritorial networks and projects. Here, the authors extend earlier work that posited a worldwide skill revolution both by developing explicit dimensions of transnational competence and by introducing a behavioral component. The new framework provides analytical groundwork for explaining why some people, groups, and networks are more effective than others in forging meaningful transnational solidarities, negotiating and benefiting from the intensifying experience of globalization, and waging successful transnational campaigns. The article also probes how the spread of transnational competence is being facilitated by global migration and transmigration trends. The final section explores the governance implications of expanding transnational competency for the emergent epoch. [source] Private Equity Involvement and Earnings QualityJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 5-6 2009Christof Beuselinck Abstract:, This paper examines the relation between private equity (PE) investors' involvement and their portfolio firms' earnings quality. We operationalize earnings quality through comparative analyses of conditional loss recognition timeliness. For a sample of unlisted Belgian firms, we find that PE involvement increases a firm's willingness to recognize losses more timely as compared to industry, size and life-cycle matched non-PE backed firms. Further, we document more powerful earnings quality effects for firms backed by independent and captive PE-investors as compared to firms backed by government-related PE-investors. Finally, we find no systematic variation in earnings quality across different levels of PE ownership. Our results are robust to the inclusion of various controls and remain unaffected when we consider the endogeneity of PE investments and compare pre- and post PE investment years. The current results provide novel evidence towards the understanding of PE investors' governance implications for portfolio firms' earnings quality. [source] |