Good Provision (good + provision)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Kinds of Good Provision

  • public good provision


  • Selected Abstracts


    Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2007
    PAUL PECORINO
    We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large. [source]


    Ambiguity and Public Good Provision in Large Societies

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2005
    RALPH W. BAILEY
    In this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibrium is shown to exist and be unique. We examine how provision of the public good changes as the size of the population increases. We show that when there is uncertainty, there may be less free-riding in large societies. [source]


    Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2003
    ichi Itaya
    The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb,Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor. [source]


    Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision,

    THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 534 2009
    Paul Pecorino
    In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for consumption also increases. This raises the marginal utility of income and increases the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good. [source]


    The ED strategy: how species-level surrogates indicate general biodiversity patterns through an ,environmental diversity' perspective

    JOURNAL OF BIOGEOGRAPHY, Issue 8 2004
    D. P. Faith
    Abstract Biodiversity assessment requires that we use surrogate information in practice to indicate more general biodiversity patterns. ,ED' refers to a surrogates framework that can link species data and environmental information based on a robust relationship of compositional dissimilarities to ordinations that indicate underlying environmental variation. In an example analysis of species and environmental data from Panama, the environmental and spatial variables that correlate with an hybrid multi-dimensional scaling ordination were able to explain 83% of the variation in the corresponding Bray Curtis dissimilarities. The assumptions of ED also provide the rationale for its use of p-median optimization criteria to measure biodiversity patterns among sites in a region. M.B. Ara˙jo, P.J. Densham & P.H. Williams (2004, Journal of Biogeography31, 1) have re-named ED as ,AD' in their evaluation of the surrogacy value of ED based on European species data. Because lessons from previous work on ED options consequently may have been neglected, we use a corroboration framework to investigate the evidence and ,background knowledge' presented in their evaluations of ED. Investigations focus on the possibility that their weak corroboration of ED surrogacy (non-significance of target species recovery relative to a null model) may be a consequence of Ara˙jo et al.'s use of particular evidence and randomizations. We illustrate how their use of discrete ED, and not the recommended continuous ED, may have produced unnecessarily poor species recovery values. Further, possible poor optimization of their MDS ordinations, due to small numbers of simulations and/or low resolution of stress values appears to have provided a possible poor basis for ED application and, consequently, may have unnecessarily favoured non-corroboration results. Consideration of Ara˙jo et al.'s randomizations suggests that acknowledged sampling biases in the European data have not only artefactually promoted the non-significance of ED recovery values, but also artefactually elevated the significance of competing species surrogates recovery values. We conclude that little credence should be given to the comparisons of ED and species-based complementarity sets presented in M.B. Ara˙jo, P.J. Densham & P.H. Williams (2004, Journal of Biogeography31, 1), unless the factors outlined here can be analysed for their effects on results. We discuss the lessons concerning surrogates evaluation emerging from our investigations, calling for better provision in such studies of the background information that can allow (i) critical examination of evidence (both at the initial corroboration and re-evaluation stages), and (ii) greater synthesis of lessons about the pitfalls of different forms of evidence in different contexts. [source]


    Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods

    GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2000
    Richard Cornes
    In the pure public good model, the Nash equilibrium associated with one initial income distribution may Pareto dominate the equilibrium associated with another distribution of the same aggregate income. We explore this possibility and examine its implications for Pareto-improving policy intervention by undertaking a comparative static analysis of Pareto-improving tax-financed increases in pure public good provision. Under some circumstances, a government can engineer policies that raise public good provision while increasing the well-being of contributors and non-contributors. Crucial factors promoting this outcome involve a large number of non-contributors, a high marginal valuation for the public good by non-contributors and a large aggregate response of contributors to changes in their income. [source]


    Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2007
    PAUL PECORINO
    We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large. [source]


    Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2002
    Jean Hindriks
    It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision. [source]


    Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision,

    THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 534 2009
    Paul Pecorino
    In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for consumption also increases. This raises the marginal utility of income and increases the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good. [source]