Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Good Corporate Governance (good + corporate_governance)
Selected AbstractsA Profile of the Non-Executive Directors of Australia's Largest CompaniesAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 1 2009Dr Corinne Cortese This paper presents a profile of the non-executive directors of Australia's largest public companies. Using descriptive data, it assesses the extent to which these companies adhere to the requirements set down in the Australian Stock Exchange's ,Principles of Good Corporate Governance'. In particular, board structure and composition is evaluated, and levels of remuneration and independence among non-executive directors are assessed. The paper concludes with a discussion of perceived versus actual independence of non-executive directors and the benefits of having non-executive directors present on company boards. [source] Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: issues for AsiaCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2007Richard Welford Abstract An increasingly important aspect of CSR is the recognition that sound practices are often based on good standards of corporate governance. Good corporate governance provides the foundations of good CSR by creating value-creating relationships with all stakeholders. This article seeks to review corporate governance issues from an Asian perspective. Ownership and control of many companies in the region differ from those commonly seen in the West and there are therefore specific issues that need to be addressed in this context. It is argued that the fact that so many Asian companies are dominated by controlling shareholders (often families) means that corporate governance may have to be even stronger in the Asian region than elsewhere. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Where Corporate Governance and Financial Analysts Affect ValuationJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3 2009Ran R. Barniv We examine whether corporate governance and financial analysts affect accounting-based valuation models for B and H shares traded by foreign investors in China and Hong Kong, respectively. We expect that better corporate governance and more effective analyst activity mitigate potential adverse effects on accounting valuation models generated by country-specific problems in accounting, auditing, and legal systems. We find that valuation models perform better for companies with a greater analyst following, smaller forecast errors, relatively high public ownership and a strong board structure. Valuation models and accounting numbers have only limited explanatory power and valuation role for companies with weak governance and less effective analyst performance. The findings are robust across various market value, return, unexpected return, and other accounting valuation models. The results are consistent with less informed foreign investor clienteles searching for signals of more effective analyst activity and better corporate governance mechanisms. [source] The Influence of Corporate Governance on Corporate Performance and Value after Changing the CEO: Evidence from Taiwan,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2009Hsu-Huei Huang Abstract Can corporate performance be improved by changing the CEO? The answer to this question may vary from country to country or from firm to firm. This study proposes that, generally speaking, firms in countries with a better corporate governance environment or firms with better governing mechanisms are more likely to see improvements in performance after a change in their CEOs than those without this environment or these mechanisms. To test this corporate governance hypothesis, we compared corporate performance and value measures of 155 listed companies in Taiwan that had their CEOs replaced between 1996 and 2002. At the national level, we found that in Taiwan corporate performance did not generally improve by merely replacing the CEO. At the firm level, companies with better corporate governance in terms of ownership structure and board structure were found to have better performance and higher corporate value after changing the CEO, and they were also found to have a better net improvement in performance. [source] Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Asia's Emerging MarketsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2007Chung-Hua Shen This paper studies the impacts of corporate governance on earnings management. We use firm-level governance data, taken from Credit Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asian countries, in addition to the country-level governance data used in past studies. Our conclusion is as follows. First, firms with good corporate governance tend to conduct less earnings management. Second, there is a size effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there is a turning point for leverage effect, i.e. when the governance index is large, leverage effect exists, otherwise reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be scrutinised closely and thus finds it harder to fool the market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, firms with higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms in stronger anti-director rights countries tend to exhibit stronger earnings smoothing. This counter-intuitive result is different from Leuz et al. (2003). [source] Executive Stock Options: To Expense or Not?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2006Sanjay Deshmukh In analyzing the decision to expense stock options, we find a greater likelihood of options expensing for firms with greater transparency and a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These results provide indirect evidence that expensing is more likely in firms that practice good corporate governance. We show that firms are less likely to expense when option usage is higher and that this negative relation is stronger for firms that are smaller, have high growth, and are less profitable. We also find that the announcement period returns are not significantly different from zero. [source] Internal audit, alternative internal audit structures and the level of misappropriation of assets fraudACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2008Paul Coram M42 Abstract In recent years, the importance of good corporate governance has received significant public and regulatory attention. A crucial part of an entity's corporate governance is its internal audit function. At the same time, there has been significant public concern about the level of fraud within organizations. The purpose of this study is to assess whether organizations with an internal audit function are more likely to detect and self-report fraud than those without. In this study, we use a unique self-reported measure of misappropriation of assets fraud for the first time. The fraud data are from the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey, which reported fraud from 491 organizations in the private and public sector across Australia and New Zealand. The internal audit data are from a separate mail survey sent to the respondents of the KPMG Fraud Survey. We find that organizations with an internal audit function are more likely than those without such a function to detect and self-report fraud. Furthermore, organizations that rely solely on outsourcing for their internal audit function are less likely to detect and self-report fraud than those that undertake at least part of their internal audit function themselves. These findings suggest that internal audit adds value through improving the control and monitoring environment within organizations to detect and self-report fraud. These results also suggest that keeping the internal audit function within the organization is more effective than completely outsourcing that function. [source] The Paradox of Transparency, Short-Termism and the Institutionalisation of Australian Capital MarketsAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 4 2009Gavin Nicholson As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact,sui generis,and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being ,captured' by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter-intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short-termism. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||