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Going Public (going + public)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	83%

Selected Abstracts

Going Public: Teaching Students to Speak Out in Public Contexts

ENGLISH IN EDUCATION, Issue 2 2000
Judith Baxter
Abstract Many students find speaking in large group, whole class or ,public' contexts intimidating. Over the last 30 years, a model of collaborative talk in small groups has been favoured within English teaching in British education but, with the new generation of GCSE syllabuses, students are required to speak effectively to larger audiences. This article explores what constitutes an effective ,public' speaker at GCSE level, and suggests various teaching strategies as starting points. [source]

Going Public: An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Bound Israeli IPOs

FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 3 2010
Iftekhar Hasan
Between 1985,2003, more than 120 Israeli companies went public in the U.S., bringing the accumulated number of U.S. bound, Israeli initial public offerings (IPOs) to a figure greater than all other foreign countries combined. In this study, we compare the short and long run performance of Israeli IPOs to that of similar international and U.S. IPOs. Holding all else equal, we find that Israeli IPOs are significantly less underpriced than their local and foreign counterparts. As we examine the characteristics of Israeli issuers, we find that they differ than those of other foreign and local issuers in some important dimensions that compensate investors for information asymmetry and risk. First, compared to their home market capitalization size, U.S. bound Israeli IPOs, are significantly larger than the IPOs conducted by their foreign counterparts. Second, Israeli issuers tend to perform better than other foreign and U.S. local IPOs during our entire period of observation. Third, to a large extent, the Israeli firms in our sample have products, licensing or franchising relationships or venture capital funds with strong roots in the U.S. prior to the IPO. And fourth, the relevant investor community of Israeli IPOs, at least at the early stages, is small and overwhelmingly American. Our findings are consistent with prior studies documenting that firms raising capital outside of their domicile country are typically a select group of high quality firms in need of external financing that cannot be sufficiently provided in their home market. [source]

Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2000
Armando Gomes
This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controlling shareholders can implicitly commit not to expropriate them. Stock prices of such companies are significantly higher and firms are more likely go public because of this reputation effect. Moreover, insiders divest shares gradually over time, at a rate that is negatively related to the degree of moral hazard. [source]

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

FINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 4 2006
James C. Brau
G14; G24; G32; G34 Abstract We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre- and post-bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long-term abnormal returns. [source]

Making Financial Goals and Reporting Policies Serve

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2004
Corporate Strategy: The Case of Progressive Insurance
The main. nancial goal of Progressive Insurance, the third largest underwriter of auto insurance in the U.S., has remained the same since the late 1960s. Expressed in three words, "96 and grow," the goal tells the company's managers to pursue all growth opportunities while maintaining a "combined ratio" no higher than 96, or what amounts to a minimum 4% spread between revenues (premiums) and costs (including expected losses). Thanks in part to the clarity of mission provided by this goal, the company has produced an average 15% rate of growth in revenues and earnings, along with a remarkably stable 15% return for its shareholders, since going public in 1971. Progressive's simplicity and clarity of mission is also partly responsible for another of the company's distinctive policies: product pricing that, while disciplined, is aggressive and highly decentralized. Having invested some $500 million per year developing statistical models for pricing individual customer risks and acquisition costs, the company was among the. rst in its industry to underwrite "non-standard" risks. And aided by sophisticated pricing models, each of Progressive's 100 or so local product managers are charged with adapting those models to come up with premiums for their own regions. To go along with its strategic and organizational innovations, Progressive also has an innovative disclosure policy. Apart from SEC reports, the company's communications seldom mention earnings or earnings per share, and the company has never provided earnings guidance. With the passage of Reg. FD in late 2000, the company brie. y considered offering guidance. But in the spring of 2001, the board decided instead to provide monthly releases of its realized combined ratio. Since adoption of this new disclosure policy, Progressive has seen a 50% drop in the volatility of its stock price. [source]

The Role of the Underlying Real Asset Market in REIT IPOs

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2005
Jay C. Hartzell
A leading explanation for IPO cycles is time-varying supply and demand for the underlying assets of the firms that are considering going public. We test this hypothesis using REIT IPOs, taking advantage of the relative transparency of the underlying real asset markets. We document links between REIT IPO activity and both the conditions of the underlying real estate market and the price of REITs. We find no significant relation between the heat of the IPO market and post-IPO operating performance, implying homogeneous firm quality across IPO cycles. Finally, we show that lagged IPO proceeds are related to future increases in investment and in capacity utilization. [source]