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Global Justice (global + justice)
Selected AbstractsINTRODUCTION: THE LONG ROAD TO GLOBAL JUSTICE, PEACE, AND HUMANITYJOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007XUNWU CHEN [source] GLOBAL JUSTICE WITHOUT END?METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2005John Tasioulas Abstract: John Rawls argued in The Law of Peoples that we should reject any principle of international distributive justice, whether in ideal theory or nonideal theory. Instead, he advocated a duty of assistance on the part of well-ordered societies toward burdened societies. I argue that Rawls is correct that we should endorse a principle with a target and cut-off point rather than a principle of international distributive justice. But the target and cut-off point he favors is too undemanding, because it can be met by assisting a burdened society to become a decent people. Instead, only a society that respects the right to an adequate standard of living, and not simply a right to subsistence, can be an acceptable target. Rawls is prevented from drawing this conclusion by a failure to disentangle issues of intervention and assistance, a failure bound up with his flawed, intervention-driven account of human rights in defining a decent people. [source] GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE SPECTER OF LEVIATHAN1PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM, Issue 1 2007MICHAEL PENDLEBURYArticle first published online: 22 FEB 200 First page of article [source] GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN RIGHTSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 221 2005Dale Dorsey To a great extent, recent discussion of global obligations has been couched in the language of human rights. I argue that this is a mistake. If, as many theorists have supposed, a normative theory applicable to obligations of global justice must also respect the needs of justice internal to recipient nations, any such theory cannot take human rights as an important moral notion. Human rights are inapplicable for the domestic justice of poor nations, and thus cannot form a plausible basis for international justice. Instead, I propose an alternative basis, a form of welfarist maximizing consequentialism. My alternative is superior to rights-based theories in dealing with the special problems of justice found in poor nations. [source] Transnational Women's Collectivities and Global JusticeJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2008Hye-ryoung Kang First page of article [source] Taxation and Global Justice: Closing the Gap between Theory and PracticeJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2008Gillian Brock First page of article [source] Why the Capability Approach is JustifiedJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2007SANDRINE BERGES abstract Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach has in the past twenty years become an increasingly popular and influential approach to issues in global justice. Its main tenet is that when assessing quality of life or asking what kind of policies will be more conducive to human development, we should look not to resources or preference satisfaction, but to what people are able to be and to do. This should then be measured against a more or less narrow conception of what any human being should be able to be and do, i.e. which functions are essentially human. To have a capability is to be able to function in that way. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that despite its many attractions, the capability approach did not present a sufficiently strong challenge to Rawlsian resourcism. In this paper, I address Pogge's criticisms of the capability approach, and I argue that from the point of view of Nussbaum's Aristotelian version of the approach, his objections are not successful. [source] Philosophy of Education and the Gigantic Affront of UniversalismJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2009PENNY ENSLIN Universalism in philosophy, argue Penny Enslin and Mary Tjiattas, tends to be regarded as an affront to particular affiliations, an act of injustice by misrecognition. While agreeing with criticisms of some expressions of universalism, they take the view that anti-universalism has become an orthodoxy that deflects attention from pressing issues of global injustice in education. In different ways, recent reformulations of universalism accommodate particularity and claims for recognition. Defending a qualified universalism, they argue, through a discussion of the Education for All campaign, that the present focus on recognition should be widened to address redistribution and representation as elements of global justice in education. In her response to Enslin and Tjiattas, Sharon Todd expresses sympathy for their aspiration towards a ,qualified universalism', but she seeks to go beyond the dichotomy of universalism versus anti-universalism by way of a discussion of aspects of the work of Judith Butler. Butler's emphasis on cultural translation offers a way, it is claimed, to think about the universal that transcends the oppositional relation between culture and commitment to universals. In the light of this she advocates an approach that involves neither universalism nor anti-universalism but ,critique of universality'. Thus, the task of translation, on Butler's account, prevents universality from being a standard or home-base from which we can judge the world and turns it instead into an ongoing struggle for intelligibility. In their rejoinder, Enslin and Tjiattas reject any charge that their own account has fallen into a simple dichotomisation of universalism and anti-universalism, and reaffirm their commitment to a form of universalism in which (a) partial or contextual considerations count in ethical deliberations, and (b) values and principles are subject to reflexive renegotiation in democratic deliberations, which provides the means of their justification and the source of their legitimacy. This yields, they claim, a non-standard form of contractualism that is both culturally sensitive and open-ended. They suggest in conclusion that the debate between themselves and Todd raises questions about whether the analytical and continental traditions can concede one another's place in the philosophy of education. [source] Global Inequality and International InstitutionsMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1-2 2001Andrew Hurrell This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice. [source] Learning about obligation, compassion, and global justice: The place of contemplative pedagogyNEW DIRECTIONS FOR TEACHING & LEARNING, Issue 118 2009David KahaneArticle first published online: 15 JUN 200 Contemplative techniques like meditation can help students to go beyond a merely cognitive understanding of their responsibilities as global citizens, and to find an authentic motivation to serve. [source] The Ecumenical Assembly for Justice, Peace and the Integrity of CreationTHE ECUMENICAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Heino Falcke The Vancouver assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1983, in part through the efforts of Heino Falcke and the delegates from the GDR, called on the WCC "to engage member churches in a conciliar process of mutual commitment to justice, peace and the integrity of creation". In the GDR, the high point of this conciliar process was an Ecumenical Assembly of Churches and Christians which met in three sessions in 1988 and 1989, and which, not least because of the involvement of peace, environmental and human rights groups, made unprecedented demands for the reform of the GDR and influenced the citizens' movements and political parties formed at the time of the peaceful revolution of autumn 1989. As envisaged at the Vancouver assembly, the conciliar process was intended to link the issue of peace, a priority at that time for many WCC members in the northern hemisphere, with that of global justice, an overriding concern for churches in the South. In the course of preparations for the Ecumenical Assembly in the GDR, however, the discourse of justice was applied to GDR society itself, something that was reflected in the 10,000 proposals from parishes, groups and individuals for the assembly, and in the "testimonies of concern" with which the assembly opened its first session in February 1988. In this article,1which comes from a conference in Dresden in April 1999 to mark the 10th anniversary of the final session of the Ecumenical Assembly, Falcke reflects on how the assembly changed from being a Christian, church gathering to becoming an emerging opposition within civil society. [source] GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE LIMITS OF HUMAN RIGHTSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 221 2005Dale Dorsey To a great extent, recent discussion of global obligations has been couched in the language of human rights. I argue that this is a mistake. If, as many theorists have supposed, a normative theory applicable to obligations of global justice must also respect the needs of justice internal to recipient nations, any such theory cannot take human rights as an important moral notion. Human rights are inapplicable for the domestic justice of poor nations, and thus cannot form a plausible basis for international justice. Instead, I propose an alternative basis, a form of welfarist maximizing consequentialism. My alternative is superior to rights-based theories in dealing with the special problems of justice found in poor nations. [source] THE DEATH OF BIOETHICS (AS WE ONCE KNEW IT)BIOETHICS, Issue 5 2010RUTH MACKLIN ABSTRACT Fast forward 50 years into the future. A look back at what occurred in the field of bioethics since 2010 reveals that a conference in 2050 commemorated the death of bioethics. In a steady progression over the years, the field became increasingly fragmented and bureaucratized. Disagreement and dissension were rife, and this once flourishing, multidisciplinary field began to splinter in multiple ways. Prominent journals folded, one by one, and were replaced with specialized publications dealing with genethics, reproethics, nanoethics, and necroethics. Mainstream bioethics organizations also collapsed, giving way to new associations along disciplinary and sub-disciplinary lines. Physicians established their own journals, and specialty groups broke away from more general associations of medical ethics. Lawyers also split into three separate factions, and philosophers rejected all but the most rigorous, analytic articles into their newly established journal. Matters finally came to a head with global warming, the world-wide spread of malaria and dengue, and the cost of medical treatments out of reach for almost everyone. The result was the need to develop plans for strict rationing of medical care. At the same time, recognition emerged of the importance of the right to health and the need for global justice in health. By 2060, a spark of hope was ignited, opening the door to the resuscitation of bioethics and involvement of the global community. [source] POVERTY AND INEQUALITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE IAB: IAB PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSBIOETHICS, Issue 5-6 2005FLORENCIA LUNA ABSTRACT This paper focuses on poverty and inequality in the world today. First, it points out how this topic is a main concern for the IAB. Second, it proposes ,new' theoretical tools in order to analyze global justice and our obligations towards the needy. I present John Rawls's denial that the egalitarian principle can be applied to the global sphere, his proposed weak duty of assistance, and his consideration of endemic poverty as essentially homegrown. In opposition, I focus on Thomas Pogge as representative of a cosmopolitan view who also holds a critical position towards the international systems which allow and cause poverty. I endorse the general normative proposal that defends every human being as an ultimate unit of moral concern, as well as the strategy of moving away from the charity model of bilateral aid to the realm of rights and duties. These ideas should redesign and broaden the normative and practical roles of institutions, and should also help provide a new approach on bioethical issues such as drug patenting or the imbalance in global research and neglected diseases. [source] | |||||||||||||