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German System (german + system)
Selected AbstractsCorporate Governance in Germany and the German Corporate Governance CodeCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2005Gerhard Cromme The term "corporate governance", and all that it implies, is now in everyday use in Germany. This is due to the enormous changes Germany has experienced in recent years, in international business, international finance and in German industrial structures. This contribution deals with recent changes in the German system of corporate governance. After a short historical review, the major elements of the international context that form the background for changes in Germany are discussed. This is followed by an explanation of the German Corporate Governance Code and its role, concluding with a prospectus for further possible developments and a summary of key points. [source] Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentrationECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 31 2000Jeremy Edwards The German system of corporate governance is often thought to be effective at addressing problems arising in large firms. In addition to the usual emphasis on the role of German banks, it is increasingly recognized that the German system also involves a high concentration of the ownership of large firms. We analyse the relative significance of these two features of the German system and conclude that high ownership concentration is more important. Although banks may influence corporate governance via their control of proxy votes, positions on supervisory boards, and provision of loan finance, in practice they do not play a role in the governance of large German firms which is distinct from that of other types of large shareholders. Any case for the superiority of German corporate governance of large firms must therefore be based on high ownership concentration rather than a special role of banks, and must consider the costs of ownership concentration as well as the benefits. [source] Electoral behaviour in a two-vote system: Incentives for ticket splitting in German Bundestag electionsEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002Franz Urban Pappi The ballot structure of German Bundestag elections allows two votes: one for a constituency candidate and the second for a party list. About one-fifth of the voters usually split their ticket. Several hypotheses are derived about incentives for ticket splitting and tested with survey data from a 1998 pre-election poll. We argue that an explanation of split tickets in the German system has to take into account both party rankings and coalition preferences. One of the most important incentives is a preference or top ranking of a minor party like the FDP or Greens, if it is combined with a preference for a coalition with either the CDU/CSU or SPD. Contrary to this finding, the hypothesis of threshold insurance voting of CDU/CSU or SPD supporters choosing the party list of their prospective minor coalition partner is rejected for the 1998 election. [source] German welfare organizations and the process of European integrationNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 3 2003Chris Lange The process of European integration affects an increasing number of areas of life. The influence of the European single market on the social sector, including organizations providing human services, can no longer be denied. This article looks at the activities of the European Commission toward these organizations and argues that European regulations are relevant to the German system of social service delivery due to the introduction of market-like features in the national context. Within this context, German welfare organizations have discovered an important field of interest representation and lobbying. [source] Anreizkompatibilität als zentrales Element eines neu gestalteten GesundheitsmarktesPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2004Thomas Gries Frequently, administrative rules defined by the government or private health (doctor) associations dominate the allocation mechanisms of the health system. These administrative rules along with asymmetric information often cause moral hazard problems leading to vast inefficiencies in the ,Physician-Patient-Market". Therefore, the discussion of efficient health systems should focus on the problem of compatible incentives within the allocation system of the health sector. Even more, without incentive consistency instruments recently suggested to cure the inefficiency of the German system like ,Managed Care", ,Disease Management" or ,Diagnosis Related Groups" will not be able to improve the efficiency of the health system. Introducing these instruments without a full incentive , compatible allocation system covering all segments of the health system will just shift the problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard to another sub-market of the system, the ,Health Insurance,Patient-Market". Therefore, the intention of the paper is to identify the major elements of a suitable incentive , compatible allocation scheme for the health market. Further, we propose an independent evaluation and information institution as a major tool to cure the problem of asymmetric information in the health market. [source] Die Übertragung westdeutscher Institutionen auf die ostdeutsche Wirklichkeit , Ein erfolgversprechendes Zusammenspiel?PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2001Kommunale Finanzausgleichssysteme im sozioökonomischen Kontext In spite of its long history, reform of financial equalization at local government level has not brought the necessary improvements in efficiency. Therefore, it is surprising that the criticized West German system was transferred almost unchanged to the East German Laender in the course of reunification. Obviously the politicians were in conflict between testing new promising alternatives and preserving the calculable institutional structure. Therefore, this paper compares the financial equalization law of two Laender (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Saxony) in order to research its suitability under different socio-economic conditions. In the analysis we can clearly show the impact of socio-economic characteristics on the carrying ability of institutions, so any transferability of local financial equalization systems has to be rejected. [source] "Adversarial legalism" in the German system of industrial relations?REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2009Britta Rehder Abstract The US has a distinctive legal style, which Robert Kagan has called "adversarial legalism." It is marked by a pattern of political decisionmaking and conflict resolution in which the courtrooms and the law are systematically exploited as political arenas for making and implementing political settlements and policy outlines. In this article it is argued that a "German way" of adversarial legalism is about to emerge in the German industrial relations system. Economic liberalization, the fragmentation and decentralization of lawmaking authority in the political sphere, and the common-law-like nature of German labor law have contributed to the appearance of a judicialized pattern of governance. Nonetheless, Germany is not converging on the "American way of law" and major differences are expected to persist in the years to come. [source] Helping parents, protecting children: ideas from GermanyCHILDREN & SOCIETY, Issue 5 2000Karen Baistow This paper focuses on the help-seeking process in the field of child welfare and, with a view to identifying some of the key conditions which facilitate the process, it examines the ways in which the German system responds to parental requests for help. It is based on recent comparative studies between English users of child welfare and protection services and a similar group in Germany and on discussions with German and English social workers. It is suggested we can usefully learn from the preventative services available in Germany under the Children and Young Persons Help Act (1990) which make both help seeking and help giving more straightforward. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | |||||||||||||