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GDP Growth (gdp + growth)
Kinds of GDP Growth Selected AbstractsMonetary Policy and Forecasts for Real GDP Growth: An Empirical Investigation for the Federal Republic of GermanyGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2001Gebhardt Kirschgässner Using quarterly data for the Federal Republic of Germany, we generate four-quarter-ahead forecasts for real GDP growth. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, other monetary indicators like real M1 or short-run interest rates clearly outperform forecasts which are based on interest rate spreads. This holds for within as well as for ex-post predictions. The same holds for the development after 1992. Moreover, it is shown that simple forecasts based on M1 or on short-run interest rates outperform the common biannual GNP forecasts of the group of German economic research institutes. [source] National Adoption of International Accounting Standards: An Institutional PerspectiveCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2010William Judge ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Effective corporate governance requires accurate and reliable financial information. Historically, each nation has developed and pursued its own financial standards; however, as financial markets consolidate into a global market, there is a need for a common set of financial standards. As a result, there is a movement towards harmonization of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) throughout the global economy. While there has been considerable research on the effects of IFRS adoption, there has been relatively little systematic study as to the antecedents of IFRS adoption. Consequently, this study seeks to understand why some economies have quickly embraced IFRS standards while others partially adopt IFRS and still others continue to resist. Research Findings/Results: After controlling for market capitalization and GDP growth, we find that foreign aid, import penetration, and level of education achieved within a national economy are all predictive of the degree to which IFRS standards are adopted across 132 developing, transitional and developed economies. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We found that all three forms of isomorphic pressures (i.e., coercive, mimetic, and normative) are predictive of IFRS adoption. Consequently, institutional theory with its emphasis on legitimacy-seeking by social actors was relatively well supported by our data. This suggests that the IFRS adoption process is driven more by social legitimization pressures, than it is by economic logic. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policy makers, our findings suggest that the institutional pressures within an economy are the key drivers of IFRS adoption. Consequently, policy makers should seek to influence institutional pressures that thwart and/or enhance adoption of IFRS. For executives of multinational firms, our findings provide insights that can help to explain and predict future IFRS adoption within economies where their foreign subsidiaries operate. This ability could be useful for creating competitive advantages for foreign subsidiaries where IFRS adoption was resisted, or avoiding competitive disadvantages for foreign subsidiaries unfamiliar with IFRS standards. [source] The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets?DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 2 2006W. Bruce Traill A series of articles, many of them published in this journal, have charted the rapid spread of supermarkets in developing and middle-income countries and forecast its continuation. In this article, the level of supermarket penetration (share of the retail food market) is modelled quantitatively on a cross-section of 42 countries for which data could be obtained, representing all stages of development. GDP per capita, income distribution, urbanisation, female labour force participation and openness to inward foreign investment are all significant explanators. Projections to 2015 suggest significant but not explosive further penetration; increased openness and GDP growth are the most significant factors. [source] How sustainable is the Japanese recovery?ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, Issue 4 2004Article first published online: 14 OCT 200 For nearly two years the Japanese economy has grown significantly faster than commentators expected, raising the question of whether the country has finally broken out of its long economic malaise. This article by Simon Knapp examines recent developments to see whether this recovery is sustainable. It argues that over the last year the recovery has broadened out beyond merely the export sector, although there are good reasons to believe that growth as measured by GDP has been overstated and that many serious structural problems remain. Business investment has surged on the back of rising profitability and an improved labour market has helped lift consumer confidence. At the same time the paper recognises the importance of China's boom in stimulating the Japanese economy over the last two years, and estimates that this factor may have boosted the level of GDP by between 1 to 2%. With Chinese growth now moderating to more sustainable levels, export growth will slow over the next year or so. However, domestic demand should now be strong enough, in the absence of major external shocks, to generate GDP growth of around 1.5 to 2% per annum in the medium term; a respectable figure given the country's falling population. [source] Capital quality improvement and the sources of economic growth in the euro areaECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 42 2005Plutarchos Sakellaris SUMMARY Capital quality improvement and Euroland growth Sources of growth Europe's growth slowed in the 1990s, reinforcing the overall impression of a need to catch up with the US regarding standards of living. In reaction, EU leaders adopted the famous Lisbon Agenda in 2000. The Agenda is now under review, the aim being to determine why progress on its pro-growth goals has been unsatisfactory and what can be done about it. The first crucial step in this process is to understand the true sources of the European growth slowdown. Sources-of-growth calculations have always been imprecise, but evidence from the US suggests that ,quality upgrading', especially in capital goods , has substantially worsened the precision problem since the 1990s. Unfortunately, quality adjusted sources-of-growth calculations, however, have not performed satisfactorily for Europe, so Europe's leaders are working with potentially misleading accounts of Europe's growth slowdown. Redressing this omission is the goal of this paper. Failure to account properly for capital quality improvements leads to two mistakes. First, overall GDP is underestimated. Our calculations, for example, show that euro area GDP growth was underestimated on average by 0.7 percentage points annually in the late 1990s. However, similar quality-adjustment figures raise US growth figures in the same period by even more, so quality-adjusting suggests that the US,EU growth gap was even more pronounced than previously believed. Secondly, the sources-of-growth calculations used to prioritize Europe's pro-growth policies are skewed. Our calculations show that the contribution of the slowdown in disembodied technical progress to the overall slowdown is more pronounced after quality adjustment. Our findings point to the need for adoption of microeconomic measures aimed at enhancing overall efficiency and boosting innovation activity. Such measures would aim at a better business environment, e.g. by easing regulatory and administrative burden and liberalizing energy and telecommunications markets. , Plutarchos Sakellaris and Focco Vijselaar [source] Currency boards: More than a quick fix?ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 31 2000Atish R. Ghosh Once a popular colonial monetary arrangement, currency boards fell into disuse as countries gained political independence. But recently, currency boards have made a remarkable come-back. This essay takes a critical look at their performance. Are currency boards really a panacea for achieving low inflation and high growth? Or do they merely provide a ,quick fix' allowing authorities to neglect fundamental reforms and thus fail to yield lasting benefits? We have three major findings. First, the historical track record of currency boards is sterling, with few instances of speculative attacks and virtually no ,involuntary' exits. Countries that did exit from currency boards did so mainly for political, rather than economic reasons, and such exits were usually uneventful. Second, modern currency boards have often been instituted to gain credibility following a period of high or hyperinflation, and in this regard, have been remarkably successful. Countries with currency boards experienced lower inflation and higher (if more volatile) GDP growth compared to both floating regimes and simple pegs. The inflation difference reflects both a lower growth rate of money supply (a ,discipline effect'), and a faster growth of money demand (a ,credibility effect'). The GDP growth effect is significant, but may simply reflect a rebound from depressed levels. Third, case studies reveal the successful introduction of a currency board to be far from trivial, requiring lengthy legal and institutional changes, as well as a broad economic and social consensus for the implied commitment. Moreover, there are thorny issues, as yet untested, regarding possible exits from a currency board. Thus currency boards do not provide easy solutions. But if introduced in the right circumstances, with some built-in flexibility, they can be an important tool for gaining credibility and achieving macroeconomic stabilization. [source] The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor GovernmentsECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2004Axel Dreher The paper develops a model explaining why IMF programs are less likely to be concluded before national election dates. Since conclusion of an IMF arrangement may signal the incumbent's incompetence, rational voters use this signal when deciding upon his re-election. In order to demonstrate competence, politicians may therefore decide not to conclude IMF programs prior to elections. The model also shows that re-election probabilities of politicians who nevertheless conclude arrangements at election times depend on the state of the economy. Using panel data for 96 countries between 1976 and 1997, the model is tested empirically. The results show that conclusion of an IMF arrangement within six months prior to an election increases re-election probabilities when GDP growth is low, but reduces the chance to win an election with high growth rates. [source] Can Russia be Competitive in Agriculture?EUROCHOICES, Issue 3 2003William M. Liefert Summary Can Russia be competitive inAgriculture? Russian agriculture currently is not internationally cost competitive. Since the mid-1990s Russia has imported large volumes of meat, while the grain trade has fluctuated in most years between small net imports and exports. Russia has, however, exported large quantities of key agricultural inputs, including 80 per cent of fertilizer output, mainly to EU countries. Research indicates that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain compared to meat, but also a comparative advantage in producing agricultural inputs compared to agricultural outputs. The expected real appreciation of the Russian rouble vis-à-vis Western currencies should further damage Russia's cost competitiveness in meat and grain, but this should be offset by modest productivity growth. An expected rise in consumer income, deriving from relatively high annual GDP growth of about 4,5 per cent, should also stimulate demand for meat imports. In spring 2003, Russia imposed tariff rate quotas on its imports of beef and pork, and a pure quota on imports of poultry. For other agricultural commodities, Russia is pushing in its WTO accession negotiations for allowable agricultural import tariffs that are higher than current levels. Taking these changes together, it is likely that Russia will continue as a big meat importer for about the next ten years,with tariff rate quotas probably determining the level of meat imports,and will become a moderate grain exporter. L'agriculture russepourrait-elle être compétitive ? Actuellement, l'agriculture russe n'est pas compétitive. La Russie a importé de gros volumes de viande depuis le milieu des années 90, tandis que la balance des échanges de céréales oscillait entre les faibles excédents et les faibles déficits. Cependant, la Russie est grande exportatrice d'agro-fournitures dont, en particulier, 80% de sa production d'engrais, principalement vers l'Europe. On montre ici que l'avantage comparatif de la Russie se situe dans les céréales plutôt que dans la viande et, surtout, dans les agro-fournitures plutôt que dans les denrées agricoles. La remontée, à laquelle il faut s'attendre, du rouble vis à vis des devises occidentales, devrait encore diminuer la compétitivité de la Russie en matière de viandes et de céréales, ce qui devrait être compensé par des gains de productivité même faibles. La hausse attendue des revenus des consommateurs, engenderée par une croissance élevée du revenu national, de l'ordre de 4 à 5% par an, devrait aussi stimuler la demande de viande importée. Au printemps 2003, la Russie s'est dotée d'un système de droits sur ses importations hors quotas de viande de bæuf et de pore, ainsi que d'un quota d'importation pour les produits avicoles. En ce qui conceme les autres produits agricoles, dans le cadre des négociations relatives à son entrée dans l'OMC, la Russie s'efforce d'obtenir l'autorisation d'augmenter les taxes à l'importation par rapport à leur niveau actuel. Au total done, à un horizon de l'ordre de dix ans, il est probable que la Russie reste un gros importateur de viandes - le niveau des taxes sur le hors quotas déterminant les niveaux d'importation -, et un modeste exportateur de céréales. Kann Russland auf dem Agrarsektorwettbewerbsfähig sein? Die russische Landwirtschaft ist hinsichtlich der Kosten momentan nicht international wettbewerbsfähig. Seit Mitte der 1990er importiert Russland große Mengen an Fleisch, während der Getreidehandel in den meisten Jahren zwischen geringen Nettoimporten und -exporten schwankte. Russland hat jedoch große Mengen an wichtigen landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen, unter anderem 80% seiner Düngerproduktion, hauptsächlich in EU-Länder exportiert. Forschungsergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Russland in der Produktion von Getreide verglichen mit Fleisch einen komparativen Vorteil besitzt; dies trifft jedoch ebenfalls auf die Produktion von landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen verglichen mit landwirtschaftlichen Endprodukten zu. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die erwartete reale Aufwertung des russischen Rubel gegenüber den westlichen Währungen eine zusätzliche Verschlechterung der russischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hinsichtlich der Kosten im Bereich Fleisch und Getreide nach sich zieht; dies sollte sich jedoch durch ein moderates Produktivitätswachstum ausgleichen. Der erwartete Anstieg der Verbrauchereinkommen, der sich aus dem relativ hohen jährlichen Bruttoin-landsproduktzuwachs von ca. 4,5 Prozent ableitet, sollte sich ebenfalls stimulierend auf die Nachfrage nach Fleischimporten auswirken. Im Frühjahr 2003 führte Russland Zolltarifkontingente für seine Schweine- und Rindfleischimporte ein und belegte seine Geflügelfleischimporte mit einem Importkontingent. Im Hinblick auf weitere Agrarerzeugnisse drängt Russland in den WTO-Beitrittsverhandlungen darauf, höhere Einfuhrzölle als die gegenwärtig geltenden zuzulassen. In Anbetracht all dieser Veränderungen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Russland auch für die kommenden zehn Jahre große Mengen an Fleisch importieren,wobei möglicherweise Zolltarifkontingente die Menge bestimmen werden,und sich zu einem mäßigen Getreideexporteur entwickeln wird. [source] Macroeconomic News and Stock Returns in the United States and GermanyGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2006Norbert Funke Stock markets; macroeconomic news Abstract. Using daily data for the January 1997 to June 2002 period, we analyze similarities and differences in the impact of macroeconomic news on stock returns in the United States and Germany. We consider 27 different types of news for the United States and 12 different types of news for Germany. For the United States, we present evidence for asymmetric reactions of stock prices to news. In a boom (recession) period, bad (good) news on GDP growth and unemployment or lower (higher) than expected interest rates may be good news for stock prices. In the period under consideration there is little evidence for asymmetric effects in Germany. However, in the case of Germany, international news appears at least as important as domestic news. There is no evidence that US stock prices are influenced by German news. The analysis of bi-hourly data for Germany confirms these results. [source] Firm Size, Industry Mix and the Regional Transmission of Monetary Policy in GermanyGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2004Ivo J. M. Arnold Monetary transmission; regional effects; industry effects; firm size Abstract. This paper estimates the impact of interest rate shocks on regional output in Germany over the period from 1970 to 2000. We use a vector autoregression (VAR) model to obtain impulse responses, which reveal differences in the output responses to monetary policy shocks across ten German provinces. Next, we investigate whether these differences can be related to structural features of the regional economies, such as industry mix, firm size, bank size and openness. An additional analysis of the volatility of real GDP growth for the period 1992,2000 includes the Eastern provinces. We also present evidence on the interrelationship between firm size and industry, and compare our measure of firm size with those used in previous studies. We conclude that the differential regional effects of monetary policy are related to industrial composition, but not to firm size or bank size. [source] Monetary Policy and Forecasts for Real GDP Growth: An Empirical Investigation for the Federal Republic of GermanyGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2001Gebhardt Kirschgässner Using quarterly data for the Federal Republic of Germany, we generate four-quarter-ahead forecasts for real GDP growth. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, other monetary indicators like real M1 or short-run interest rates clearly outperform forecasts which are based on interest rate spreads. This holds for within as well as for ex-post predictions. The same holds for the development after 1992. Moreover, it is shown that simple forecasts based on M1 or on short-run interest rates outperform the common biannual GNP forecasts of the group of German economic research institutes. [source] An Assessment of the Disorderly Adjustment Hypothesis for Industrial Economies,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2006Hilary Croke Much has been written about prospects for US current account adjustment, including the possibility of what is sometimes referred to as a ,disorderly correction': a sharp fall in the exchange rate that boosts interest rates, depresses stock prices and weakens economic activity. This paper assesses some of the empirical evidence bearing on the plausibility of the disorderly adjustment scenario, drawing on the experience of previous current account adjustments in industrial economies. We examined the paths of key economic performance indicators before, during and after the onset of adjustment, building on the analysis of Freund (2000). We found little evidence among past adjustment episodes of the features highlighted by the disorderly adjustment hypothesis. Although some episodes in our sample experienced significant shortfalls in GDP growth after the onset of adjustment, these shortfalls were not associated with significant and sustained depreciations of real exchange rates, increases in real interest rates or declines in real stock prices. By contrast, it was among the episodes where GDP growth picked up during adjustment that the most substantial depreciations of real exchange rates occurred. These findings do not preclude the possibility that future current account adjustments could be disruptive, but they weaken the historical basis for predicting such an outcome. [source] Structural Traps, Politics and Monetary PolicyINTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2004Robert H. Dugger Structural conditions pose a challenge to monetary policy, as the example of Japan shows. In this paper we develop the concept of structural trap, where the interplay of long-term economic development incentives, politics, and demographics results in economies being unable to efficiently reallocate capital from low- to high-return uses. The resulting macroeconomic picture looks like a liquidity trap , low GDP growth and deflation despite extreme monetary easing. But the optimal policy responses are very different and mistaking them could lead to perverse results. The key difference between a liquidity trap and a structural one is the role of politics. We show how, in the Japanese case, longstanding economic incentives and protections and demographic trends have resulted in a political leadership that resists capital reallocation from older protected low-return sectors to higher-return newer ones. If the Japanese case is instructive, in a structural trap, extremely loose monetary policy perpetuates deflation and low GDP growth, because unproductive but politically important firms are allowed to survive and capital reallocation is prevented. By preventing the needed reduction in excess capacity, a structural trap condemns reflationary policies to failure by making the creation of credible inflation expectations impossible. Faced with a structural trap, an independent central bank with a price stability mandate should adopt a monetary policy stance consistent with restructuring. If political resistance is high, monetary policy decision makers will need to keep nominal rates high enough to ensure that capital reallocation takes place at an acceptable pace. [source] Bayesian counterfactual analysis of the sources of the great moderationJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Issue 2 2008Chang-Jin Kim We use counterfactual experiments to investigate the sources of the large volatility reduction in US real GDP growth in the 1980s. Contrary to an existing literature that conducts counterfactual experiments based on classical estimation and point estimates, we consider Bayesian analysis that provides a straightforward measure of estimation uncertainty for the counterfactual quantity of interest. Using Blanchard and Quah's (1989) structural VAR model of output growth and the unemployment rate, we find strong statistical support for the idea that a counterfactual change in the size of structural shocks alone, with no corresponding change in the propagation of these shocks, would have produced the same overall volatility reduction as what actually occurred. Looking deeper, we find evidence that a counterfactual change in the size of aggregate supply shocks alone would have generated a larger volatility reduction than a counterfactual change in the size of aggregate demand shocks alone. We show that these results are consistent with a standard monetary VAR, for which counterfactual analysis also suggests the importance of shocks in generating the volatility reduction, but with the counterfactual change in monetary shocks alone generating a small reduction in volatility. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] A linear benchmark for forecasting GDP growth and inflation?JOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 4 2008Massimiliano MarcellinoArticle first published online: 30 APR 200 Abstract Predicting the future evolution of GDP growth and inflation is a central concern in economics. Forecasts are typically produced either from economic theory-based models or from simple linear time series models. While a time series model can provide a reasonable benchmark to evaluate the value added of economic theory relative to the pure explanatory power of the past behavior of the variable, recent developments in time series analysis suggest that more sophisticated time series models could provide more serious benchmarks for economic models. In this paper we evaluate whether these complicated time series models can outperform standard linear models for forecasting GDP growth and inflation. We consider a large variety of models and evaluation criteria, using a bootstrap algorithm to evaluate the statistical significance of our results. Our main conclusion is that in general linear time series models can hardly be beaten if they are carefully specified. However, we also identify some important cases where the adoption of a more complicated benchmark can alter the conclusions of economic analyses about the driving forces of GDP growth and inflation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Linear and threshold forecasts of output and inflation using stock and housing pricesJOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 2 2008Greg Tkacz Abstract This study examines whether simple measures of Canadian equity and housing price misalignments contain leading information about output growth and inflation. Previous authors have generally found that the information content of asset prices in general, and equity and housing prices in particular, are unreliable in that they do not systematically predict future economic activity or inflation. However, earlier studies relied on simple linear relationships that would fail to pick up the potential nonlinear effects of asset price misalignments. Our results suggest that housing prices are useful for predicting GDP growth, even within a linear context. Meanwhile, both stock and housing prices can improve inflation forecasts, especially when using a threshold specification. These improvements in forecast performance are relative to the information contained in Phillips-curve type indicators for inflation and IS-curve type indicators for GDP growth. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Nowcasting quarterly GDP growth in a monthly coincident indicator modelJOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 8 2005Luis C. NunesArticle first published online: 20 DEC 200 Abstract This paper presents an extension of the Stock and Watson coincident indicator model that allows one to include variables available at different frequencies while taking care of missing observations at any time period. The proposed procedure provides estimates of the unobserved common coincident component, of the unobserved monthly series underlying any included quarterly indicator, and of any missing values in the series. An application to a coincident indicator model for the Portuguese economy is presented. We use monthly indicators from business surveys whose results are published with a very short delay. By using the available data for the monthly indicators and for quarterly real GDP, it becomes possible to produce simultaneously a monthly composite index of coincident indicators and an estimate of the latest quarter real GDP growth well ahead of the release of the first official figures. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Son, Ltd. [source] Income Inequality and Economic GrowthKYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 3 2000Pak Hung Mo We develop an analytical framework to investigate some plausible channels that income inequality affects economic growth. Our empirical study concludes that income inequality has significant negative effect on the rate of GDP growth. Among the channels suggested by recent literature, we find that the most important one is the transfer channel while the least important one is the human capital channel. However, the direct impact of income inequality on the rate of productivity growth accounts for more than 55 percent of its overall total effect. This indicates that the effects of income inequality on economic growth are much more complicated than what we have perceived or modeled. [source] Fuel demand and car ownership modelling in IndiaOPEC ENERGY REVIEW, Issue 1 2007Taoufik Bouachera Motorisation in Asia is soaring with rapid growth in incomes non-lin-early. Even though car ownership per 1,000 population is still low in countries like China, India or Indonesia, escalating number of cars is affected by GDP growth among other infrastructural factors in a non-linear manner. This quick growth in car ownership may represent a significant implication on road transport fuel demand. This paper forecasts the demand for road transport fuel in India. For this purpose, econometric models, based on time series data, are constructed as for a major factor affecting fuel demand in road transportation i.e. car ownership. Firstly the econometric car ownership model was attempted in this study, for projecting future car stock in India based on cross section time series technique. The car stock is modelled by using three functional forms, which are the logistic, quasi-logistic and Gompertz curves. However, to take into consideration countries with different income levels in that part of the world, these models were estimated by using pooled data of seven Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and India). Then, a set of fuel consumption scenarios were developed in order to make forecast until 2030. These scenarios were generated by taking into consideration car stock, fuel efficiency and the average distance travelled in India. [source] Energy use and GDP growth, 1950,97OPEC ENERGY REVIEW, Issue 3 2002Rögnvaldur Hannesson This paper investigates the relationship between economic growth and growth in energy use in the latter part of the 20th century. The period is divided into five sub,periods, covering the low oil price era before the first energy crisis, the high oil price era, 1974,86, and a ten,year period after the drop in oil prices in 1986. It is found that the relationship between growth in energy use and gross domestic product (GDP) growth became weaker after the first energy crisis, but, after 1986, it seems to have become stronger again in rich countries. Energy use tends to grow more slowly than GDP in rich countries, while the opposite is true for poor countries, reflecting the fact that the energy intensity of GDP falls after countries have reached a certain level of affluence. One intriguing exception to this is China. [source] Mapping Growth into Economic DevelopmentAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 5 2004Has Elite Political Instability Mattered in Sub-Saharan Africa? The study finds that elite political instability (PI),the incidence of coups d'etat,has negatively influenced the mapping of GDP growth into economic development, measured as the algebraic difference in the United Nations Human Development Index, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) between 1970 and 1985. Taking into account the additional adverse impact of PI on economic development through its deleterious influence on economic growth, the study estimates that PI has exacted a substantial toll in SSA's economic development. [source] It's the Economy Stupid: Macroeconomics and Federal Elections in AustraliaTHE ECONOMIC RECORD, Issue 235 2000LISA CAMERON In this paper we examine the impact of macroeconomic conditions on Federal electoral performance in 20th-century Australia. We find that the electorate penalizes a government for high inflation and high unemployment relative to trend. Real GDP growth and real wage growth were not found to have a systematic relationship with incumbent vote share at the Federal level. We also examine the voteshare of the Federal incumbent in three electorates: the safe Liberal seat of Kooyong, the safe Labor seat of Melbourne Pans, and the swinging seat of Latrobe. We find some evidence that unemployment affects electoral outcomes in the swinging seat, but no macroeconomic variables affect outcomes in the safe seats. [source] Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2001An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk This paper uses a disaggregated approach to study the volatility of common stocks at the market, industry, and firm levels. Over the period from 1962 to 1997 there has been a noticeable increase in firm-level volatility relative to market volatility. Accordingly, correlations among individual stocks and the explanatory power of the market model for a typical stock have declined, whereas the number of stocks needed to achieve a given level of diversification has increased. All the volatility measures move together countercyclically and help to predict GDP growth. Market volatility tends to lead the other volatility series. Factors that may be responsible for these findings are suggested. [source] Measuring Human Capital Like Physical Capital: What Does It Tell Us?BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002Ruth Judson In this paper, I develop a measure of human capital stock that is similar to measuring physical capital by its replacement cost. This measure builds on measures of average educational attainment of the labour force. While it is far from an ideal measure, it is an interesting complement to the educational attainment series and other existing measures of human capital accumulation. In cross,country panel regressions, use of this measure of human capital accumulation yields a positive and significant, but relatively small (about ten per cent) elasticity with percapita GDP growth. Unlike physical capital, the stock of human capital as a share of GDP increases with GDP. This is consistent with the Barro et al. (1995) model of growth with non,mobile human capital and with some predictions of Romer's (1990) model of endogenous growth, but it is not consistent with the predictions of some other growth models. [source] Effect of Money Supply on Real Output and Price in ChinaCHINA AND WORLD ECONOMY, Issue 2 2009Chih-Hsiang Chang F01; Q13; Q41 Abstract Over the past 30 years, China has achieved remarkable long-term economic growth. Using quarterly data, we study the effects of money supply on real output and inflation in China between 1993 and 2008. To this end, we use money supply shocks after filtering out the expected component of the money supply. Our findings provide evidence supporting the asymmetric effect of positive and negative money supply shocks on real output and inflation in China. That is, real GDP growth in China responds to negative money supply shocks but not positive money supply shocks. In addition, inflation responds to positive money supply shocks but not negative money supply shocks. We conclude that the People's Bank of China's policy of steady monetary growth appears to be appropriate. Our study offers important policy implications for China. [source] How China Could Contribute to a Benign Global Rebalancing?CHINA AND WORLD ECONOMY, Issue 5 2008Pingfan Hong E21; F32 Abstract Our study shows that China could contribute to an orderly global rebalancing using a package of policies to stimulate its domestic consumption. These policies include a progressive appreciation of the RMB, fiscal stimulation by increasing expenditure on education, health care, social safety nets and poverty reduction, income policies to reduce inequality and to strengthen wage income, and reforms of the financial system to improve financial efficiency and to mitigate financial constraints. By implementing such policies, China's external surplus could be narrowed and its domestic imbalances improved. The excessively high savings rate could be lowered and the share of household consumption increased, even though GDP growth would moderate slightly. [source] | |||||||||||||