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Fund Industry (fund + industry)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Effects of Market Segmentation and Bank Concentration on Mutual Fund Expenses and Returns: Evidence from Finland

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2004
Timo P. Korkeamaki
G15; G18; G20 Abstract A tremendous amount of research examines US mutual funds, but fund markets also thrive in other countries. However, research about these fast growing markets is lacking. This study addresses Finnish funds. Fast growth of the Finnish fund industry, strong bank dominance in the industry and recent EU membership make it an interesting market to examine. The Finnish fund market is also of particular interest since it had the fastest growth among the EU countries during 1996,2000. We find evidence that bank-managed and older funds charge higher expenses but investors are not compensated for paying higher expenses with higher risk-adjusted returns, suggesting a potential agency problem. Overall, Finnish fund expenses have decreased over time, consistent with EU membership reducing market segmentation and generating competition. [source]

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

FINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2000
Wei Wang Rowe
G20/G23/J63 Abstract Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed-end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed-end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results. [source]

Can Mutual Fund "Stars" Really Pick Stocks?

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2006
New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis
ABSTRACT We apply a new bootstrap statistical technique to examine the performance of the U.S. open-end, domestic equity mutual fund industry over the 1975 to 2002 period. A bootstrap approach is necessary because the cross section of mutual fund alphas has a complex nonnormal distribution due to heterogeneous risk-taking by funds as well as nonnormalities in individual fund alpha distributions. Our bootstrap approach uncovers findings that differ from many past studies. Specifically, we find that a sizable minority of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs. Moreover, the superior alphas of these managers persist. [source]

Risk Measurement and Investment Myopia in Hedge Fund Management,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2009
Xun Li
Abstract Lo (2001) surveys the literature on risk management for hedge funds, and recommends a dynamic and transparent risk measurement for the evolutionary hedge fund industry by citing Albert Einstein's comments. This study is to explore the feasibility and advantages of adopting a dynamic absolute-deviation risk measurement in hedge fund management. It does not only provide an optimal asset allocation strategy both analytically and numerically in a dynamic mean-absolute deviation (DMAD) setting for hedge fund managers, but also contributes to mitigation of potential investment myopia problems in their risk-taking behaviors. It sheds light on risk management and investor-fund manager agency conflicts in the hedge fund industry and adds to the literature on portfolio selection and optimal asset allocation. [source]

Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate Governance

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2006
Robert F. Radin
Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds. [source]