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Full Explanation (full + explanation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences40%

Selected Abstracts

The problem of similarity: analysis of repeated patterns of microsculpture on gastropod larval shells

INVERTEBRATE BIOLOGY, Issue 3 2004
Carole S. Hickman
Abstract. The problem of similarity is one of explaining the causes of striking resemblances between patterns and architectural themes that recur in organisms at various scales of biological organization. Classical explanations that have considered only the alternatives of homology and analogy overlook similarities of form that are primarily a consequence of fabrication, conveying little information about evolutionary relationships or functional role. When viewed at successively higher magnifications and when mapped onto a phylogeny, patterns of delicate cancellate microsculpture and granular microprotuberances on the surfaces of larval shells of marine gastropods fail to meet the predictions of exclusively historical or exclusively functional explanations, but are shown to be rich in fabricational information. Similar patterns suggest that early biomineralization of the initial organic shell is under weaker biological control than the processes that modulate assembly of the multi-layered, hierarchically-organized composite materials of the adult shell. Some patterns suggest remote biomineralization, without direct influence of living tissue. Scanning electron microscopy of larval shell features reveals previously undetected variation on basic themes that may have implications for the traditional disciplines of systematics, functional morphology, and fabricational morphology. The integration of the approaches of the traditional divisions of biology is required for full explanation of similarity and to generate a unified set of principles for the analysis of form in living and fossil organisms. [source]

State, Citizen, and Character in French Criminal Process

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2006
Stewart Field
This paper charts some major differences in the way in which evidence of the defendant's character is treated in France when compared with practice in England and Wales. Such evidence is more pervasive and visible (especially in the most serious cases) and its relevance is more broadly defined. Further, its presentation is shaped by a developed and positive conception of the French citizen. In part, these differences may be explained by differences in procedural tradition: the unitary trial structure in France, the dominance of fact,finding by the professional judiciary, and the rejection of general exclusionary rules of evidence. But a full explanation requires French legal culture to be understood in the context of French political culture. This reveals a very different conception of relations between state and citizen to that of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. As a result the legitimacy of trial is seen in terms of the rehabilitation of the accused as a citizen of the state rather than simply the punishment of a particular infraction. [source]

Why dat now?: Linguistic-anthropological contributions to the explanation of sociolinguistic icons and change1

JOURNAL OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS, Issue 4 2008
Kathryn A. Woolard
One way to renew conversation between linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics is to bring concepts of linguistic ideology to the explanation of the iconization of specific sociolinguistic variables and associated sociolinguistic change. Sociolinguists such as Eckert (2000) and Milroy (2004) have made provocative efforts to incorporate linguistic-anthropological concepts into sociolinguistic explanation. What is still lacking is a full explanation of why specific linguistic variables emerge from the flow of speech and social life to become sociolinguistic icons or emblems and set off relatively rapid or intense changes. This article brings Joseph Errington's (1985) use of the concept of pragmatic salience to bear on insights gleaned from vanguard sociolinguistic and linguistic-anthropological work. Drawing on empirical examples from a spectrum of studies, a model is sketched from these elements to suggest an account of how an ideological bent directs linguistic change. [source]

Avowals and First-Person Privilege

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001
DORIT BAR-ON
When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege. [source]

The DNA Database Search Controversy Revisited: Bridging the Bayesian,Frequentist Gap

BIOMETRICS, Issue 3 2007
Geir Storvik
Summary Two different quantities have been suggested for quantification of evidence in cases where a suspect is found by a search through a database of DNA profiles. The likelihood ratio, typically motivated from a Bayesian setting, is preferred by most experts in the field. The so-called np rule has been suggested through frequentist arguments and has been suggested by the American National Research Council and Stockmarr (1999, Biometrics55, 671,677). The two quantities differ substantially and have given rise to the DNA database search controversy. Although several authors have criticized the different approaches, a full explanation of why these differences appear is still lacking. In this article we show that a P-value in a frequentist hypothesis setting is approximately equal to the result of the np rule. We argue, however, that a more reasonable procedure in this case is to use conditional testing, in which case a P-value directly related to posterior probabilities and the likelihood ratio is obtained. This way of viewing the problem bridges the gap between the Bayesian and frequentist approaches. At the same time it indicates that the np rule should not be used to quantify evidence. [source]