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Free Cash (free + cash)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Terms modified by Free Cash

  • free cash flow
    		•

    Selected Abstracts

    FREE CASH FLOW AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF ALASKA

    JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2000
    Dwight R. Lee
    In a widely cited 1986 article in the American Economic Review, Michael Jensen gave the concept of free cash flow (FCF) a new twist by redefining it as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects with positive net present values. Put another way, FCF represents funds available in the firm that managers may choose to hold as idle cash, return to shareholders, or invest in projects with returns below the firm's cost of capital. In redefining FCF in this way, Jensen converted FCF from a measure of economic income and value into a measure of corporate assets available for discretionary, and potentially value-destroying, use by firm managers. And, as he argued in his important article, managers in mature businesses with substantial free cash flow have a tendency to destroy value by plowing too much capital back into those businesses or, often worse, making ill-advised acquisitions in unrelated businesses. Several methods have been developed in financial markets and internal corporate governance systems to discourage managers from wasting FCF. Better monitoring by boards of directors, large ownership blocks, and properly aligned management compensation contracts are all parts of the solution. And the extraordinary increase in stock repurchases in recent years, invariably applauded by investors, is another illustration of the market's success in encouraging companies to address their free cash flow problems. But if the "FCF problem" of the private sector has attracted considerable attention from finance scholars, the problem is even more acute in the public sector, where FCF can be thought of as tax revenue in excess of what is required to finance well-defined and generally accepted levels of public services. Unlike the private sector, in the public sector there are neither measures nor mechanisms by which to monitor and constrain wasteful spending by elected officials. In this article, the authors attempt to measure the costs to taxpayers of government FCF using the case of Alaska, which since 1969 has received a huge windfall of tax revenue from North Slope oil leases. After examining the state's public finances from 1968 through 1993, the authors offer $25 billion as a conservative estimate of the social losses from Alaska's waste of free cash flow during that 25-year period. [source]

    The determinants of corporate sustainability performance

    ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2010
    Tracy Artiach
    M14 Abstract This paper investigates the factors that drive high levels of corporate sustainability performance (CSP), as proxied by membership of the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index. Using a stakeholder framework, we examine the incentives for US firms to invest in sustainability principles and develop a number of hypotheses that relate CSP to firm-specific characteristics. Our results indicate that leading CSP firms are significantly larger, have higher levels of growth and a higher return on equity than conventional firms. Contrary to our predictions, leading CSP firms do not have greater free cash flows or lower leverage than other firms. [source]

    The Role of Executive Stock Options in On-Market Share Buybacks,

    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010
    ASJEET S. LAMBA
    ABSTRACT The increasing use of on-market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on-market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on-market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on-market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration. [source]

    Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2008
    Yves Bozec
    Abstract:, Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders. [source]

    The Free Cash Flow Anomaly Revisited: Finnish Evidence

    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 7-8 2006
    Annukka Jokipii
    Abstract:, This paper examines the performance of an investment strategy based on free cash flows using financial statement data of Finnish companies during the period 1992-2002. The analysis in this paper is motivated by the so-called free cash flow anomaly previously documented e.g. in Hackel, Livnat and Rai (2000). Using annual financial statement information, we identify large-capitalization companies with positive free cash flows, low free cash flow multiples, and low financial leverage. Since a portfolio of these companies is found to consistently outperform the market index, our results suggest that the free cash flow anomaly also exists in the Finnish stock market. [source]

    IMPACT OF DIVIDEND-PROTECTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS ON PAYOUT POLICIES: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

    PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2008
    Ming-Cheng Wu
    Abstract. This study used a sample of 1035 Taiwanese firms to examine the impact of dividend protected employee stock options on stock repurchase and cash dividend policies from 2000 to 2005. This study finds a positive relationship between cash dividends and executive options, implying that executives holding stock options might prefer to distribute cash dividends to boost the stock price. This result, unlike in earlier studies, arises from the dividend protected characteristic of Taiwanese employee stock options. Finally, free cash flow, firm profitability, level of debt, investment opportunities and firm size are found to considerably influence payout decisions. [source]