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For-profit Providers (for-profit + provider)
Selected AbstractsThe impact of managed competition on diversity, innovation and creativity in the delivery of home-care servicesHEALTH & SOCIAL CARE IN THE COMMUNITY, Issue 4 2008Glen E. Randall PhDArticle first published online: 28 JUN 200 Abstract Reforming publicly funded healthcare systems by introducing elements of competition, often by allowing for-profit providers to compete with not-for-profit providers, is a strategy that has become commonplace in Western democracies. It is widely thought that the competitive forces of the marketplace will lead to greater efficiency, diversity and even innovation in the delivery of services. Between 1997 and 2000, a model of ,managed competition' was introduced as a major reform to the delivery of home-care services in Ontario, Canada. It was expected that by allowing greater competition within the home-care sector, this model would constrain costs and encourage provider agencies to become more innovative and creative in meeting service delivery needs. The purpose of this case study is to explore the impact of the managed competition reform on the for-profit and the not-for-profit organisations that provided rehabilitation home-care services, and, more specifically, to assess the extent to which the goal of greater diversity, innovation and creativity was achieved following implementation of the reform. A purposive sample of 49 key informants were selected for in-depth interviews, and a survey of the 36 organisations that provided rehabilitation home-care services and the 43 community care access centres that purchased services from these provider agencies was conducted. Data were collected between November 2002 and May 2003. Findings demonstrate that a combination of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures have constrained diversity, innovation and creativity within the home-care sector. The implication is that the features that have traditionally distinguished for-profit and not-for-profit provider agencies from each other are rapidly disappearing, and a new hybrid organisational structure is evolving. [source] Don't Leave Me Hanging on the Anglophone: The Potential for Online Distance Higher Education in the Asia-Pacific RegionHIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 2-3 2004Simon MarginsonArticle first published online: 9 DEC 200 Abstract In the last decade there have been many attempts to mount online distance higher education programs on a global scale, led by the e-learning industry and university companies and consortia, some with government support: e.g. Universitas21 Global, Cardean University, Fathom, NYUOnline and the UKe-University. A primary commercial objective has been student markets in the Asia-Pacific nations, especially China, given unmet domestic demand and the growth of cross-border education. However while for-profit providers such as the University of Phoenix Online have shown mass online programs are viable in targeted markets, albeit more expensive than face-to-face programs, would-be global ventures have faltered or collapsed. The paper reviews the failure of English language global e-learning in the light of industry marketing strategies, the economics of online education, and the specifics of Asia-Pacific nations including unmet demand for education. It argues that for exporter universities, the potential of cross-border online education can only be realised if communications capacity in the Asia-Pacific nations is enhanced; and online programs are teaching-intensive, and customised for cultural and linguistic variations. Long-term equal partnerships with local and system providers are essential. For policy makers, the implosion of global e-learning points to the need to use expert judgment in relation to the different options for enhancing the capacity of higher education at home and abroad. It also suggests the need for greater scepticism about commercially driven scenarios and claims of company prospectuses, and about the viability of market-controlled paths of development. [source] Employment, privatization, and managerial choice: Does contracting out reduce public sector employment?JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2007Sergio Fernandez We examine the effects of governments' use of alternative service provision on public employment using panel data from a nationally representative sample of local governments. We model the effects of alternative service provision on the size of the public workforce and hypothesize that alternative provision jointly impacts both full- and part-time employment. We find evidence of an inter-relationship between these employment types. Our results from seemingly unrelated and 3SLS regressions indicate that full-time employment in the public sector declines when additional services are provided by for-profit providers, while part-time employment increases. The net employment effect in the public sector is negative when government services are moved to the for-profit sector. These combined effects result in a compositional shift toward more part-time public sector employment. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management [source] Outsourcing Oversight: A Comparison of Monitoring for In-House and Contracted ServicesPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Mary K. Marvel The public sector contracting literature has long argued that outsourced services need to be and, in fact, are subject to a more elevated level of scrutiny compared to internally delivered services. Recently, the performance measurement and management literature has suggested that the twin themes of accountability and results have altered the management landscape at all levels of government. By focusing on performance monitoring, the implication is that monitoring levels for internally provided services should more closely approximate those for contracted services. The analysis provided here yields empirical comparisons of how governments monitor the same service provided in-house and contracted out. We find evidence that services provided internally by a government's own employees are indeed monitored intensively by the contracting government, with levels of monitoring nearly as high as those for services contracted out to for-profit providers. In contrast, however, we find strong evidence that performance monitoring by the contracting government does not extend to nonprofit and other governmental service providers, each of which is monitored much less intensively than when comparable services are provided internally. For such service providers, it appears that monitoring is either outsourced along with services, or simply reduced. [source] TOWARDS A PARADIGM OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND CO-PRODUCTION OF PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES IN SWEDENANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2009Victor Pestoff ABSTRACT:,Many countries in Europe are now searching for new ways to engage citizens and involve the third sector in the provision and governance of social services in order to meet major demographical, political and economic challenges facing the welfare state in the 21st Century. Co-production provides a model for the mix of both public service agents and citizens who contribute to the provision of a public service. Citizen participation involves several different dimensions: economic, social, political and service specific. The extent of citizen participation varies between different providers of welfare services, as too does user and staff influence. Empirical materials from a recent study of childcare in Sweden will be used to illustrate these points. However, the role of citizens and the third sector also varies between countries and social sectors. Third sector providers facilitate citizen participation, while a glass ceiling for participation exists in municipal and for-profit providers. Moreover, co-production takes place in a political context, and can be crowded-in or crowded-out by public policy. These findings can contribute to the development of a new paradigm of participative democracy. [source] | ||||||||||