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Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

Assessment of a New Experimental Model of Isolated Right Ventricular Failure

ARTIFICIAL ORGANS, Issue 3 2009
Petronio G. Thomaz
Abstract We assessed a new experimental model of isolated right ventricular (RV) failure, achieved by means of intramyocardial injection of ethanol. RV dysfunction was induced in 13 mongrel dogs via multiple injections of 96% ethanol (total dose 1 mL/kg), all over the inlet and trabecular RV free walls. Hemodynamic and metabolic parameters were evaluated at baseline, after ethanol injection, and on the 14th postoperative day (POD). Echocardiographic parameters were evaluated at baseline, on the sixth POD, and on the 13th POD. The animals were then euthanized for histopathological analysis of the hearts. There was a 15.4% mortality rate. We noticed a decrease in pulmonary blood flow right after RV failure (P = 0.0018), as well as during reoperation on the 14th POD (P = 0.002). The induced RV dysfunction caused an increase in venous lactate levels immediately after ethanol injection and on the 14th POD (P < 0.0003). The echocardiogram revealed a decrease in the RV ejection fraction on the sixth and 13th PODs (P = 0.0001). There was an increased RV end-diastolic volume on the sixth (P = 0.0001) and 13th PODs (P = 0.0084). The right ventricle showed a 74% ± 0.06% transmural infarction area, with necrotic lesions aged 14 days. Intramyocardial ethanol injection has allowed the creation of a reproducible and inexpensive model of RV failure. The hemodynamic, metabolic, and echocardiographic parameters assessed at different protocol times are compatible with severe RV failure. This model may be useful in understanding the pathophysiology of isolated right-sided heart failure, as well as in the assessment of ventricular assist devices. [source]

Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: evidence from Taiwan

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2004
Tsun-Siou Lee
Prior empirical evidence supports the wealth expropriation hypothesis that weak corporate governance induced by certain types of ownership structures and board composition tends to result in minority interest expropriation. This in turn reduces corporate value. However, it is still unclear whether corporate financial distress is related to these corporate governance characteristics. To answer this question, we adopt three variables to proxy for corporate governance risk, namely, the percentage of directors occupied by the controlling shareholder, the percentage the controlling shareholders shareholding pledged for bank loans (pledge ratio), and the deviation in control away from the cash flow rights. Binary logistic regressions are then fitted to generate dichotomous prediction models. Taiwanese listed firms, characterised by a high degree of ownership concentration, similar to that in most countries, are used as our empirical samples. The evidence suggests that the three variables mentioned above are positively related to the risk for financial distress in the following year. Generally speaking, firms with weak corporate governance are vulnerable to economic downturns and the probability of falling into financial distress increases. [source]

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2008
Yves Bozec
Abstract:, Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders. [source]

To Signal or to Control: The Determinants of Open-Market Share Repurchases in Japan,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2009
Dong Keun Choi
Abstract Using listed firm-level data in the Tokyo Stock Exchange for the 1995,2006 period, we show that ultimate owners of firms with large cash flow and voting rights deviations announce and repurchase stocks more aggressively than do those of firms with small deviations. We also find that Keiretsu (business group)-affiliated firms are most aggressive in repurchasing their own shares when large deviations exists between cash flow rights and voting rights. Consistent with the view of the takeover deterrence hypothesis, our findings suggest that firms with greater deviations in these two rights are likely to make large stock repurchases to increase both the cost of toehold and the price of the offer. [source]