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Fiscal Transfers (fiscal + transfer)
Selected AbstractsFiscal Transfers and Distributive Conflict in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model with UnemploymentGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2007Luigi Bonatti Capital,labor conflict; endogenous growth; politico-economic models; tax burden; welfare reforms Abstract. In the simplified formal treatment proposed in this paper, a decrease in a policy parameter , the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP , can monotonically increase long-term growth rate and may lead to a higher employment level. This notwithstanding, the paper shows that the redistributive implications of such a decrease may induce the wage earners to oppose it. As a consequence, policy-makers reflecting social preferences may undertake redistributive transfers generating persistent unemployment and lowering growth even if commitment technologies allowing them to follow preannounced tax policies were feasible. [source] Aid, restitution and international fiscal redistribution in health care: implications of health professionals' migrationJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 6 2006Maureen Mackintosh Abstract High and sustained levels of migration of health professionals from labour-short health services in low-income countries to the health services of rich countries create a perverse subsidy from poor to rich, flowing across national boundaries. This subsidy worsens international inequality, and creates an obligation, both ethical and legal, for the payment of restitution. Drawing on the case of the migration of health professionals from Sub-Saharan Africa to the UK, we argue that this obligation in turn constitutes an opportunity to shift development aid relationships away from a framework of charity towards a less neo-colonial commitment to progressive international fiscal transfers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Equalization and the Decentralization of Revenue,Raising in a FederationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2003Robin Boadway We study federal economies in which regional governments have responsibility for delivering public services and redistributive objectives apply. The implications of these for the assignment of revenue,raising instruments and fiscal transfers, both vertical and horizontal, are considered. Models of heterogeneous regions of varying degrees of complexity and generality are constructed. For each case, we determine what fiscal instruments must be given to the regions and what intergovernmental transfers must be made in order that the social optimum is achieved. With heterogenous households and regions, the social optimum can be decentralized by making regions responsible for redistribution and implementing equalization transfers that depend on the number of households of each type. [source] Perspective on Local Governance Reform in ChinaCHINA AND WORLD ECONOMY, Issue 2 2006Mingxing Liu H57; H71; P32; P35 Abstract This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China's decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials is endogenous to China's central-local structure and that competition among localities has become distorted and constrained by various policy burdens and development mandates imposed from above. The information asymmetry for the enforcement cost of mandates that exists between central and local governments not only leads to difficulties and distortions in local performance evaluations, but also creates opportunities for local bureaucracy expansion and rent-seeking. Enhancing fiscal transfers, or strengthening political restraint, although necessary, would be far from enough to solve the local governance problems. The ultimate solution entails an in-depth deregulation reform on factor mobility and a furthest eradication of policy mandates for the local government. Edited by Xinyu Fan [source] | ||||||||||