			Home About us Contact

Fiscal Imbalance (fiscal + imbalance)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	50%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

Fiscal Federalism in Australia

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 1 2004
Iain McLean
Australia displays high vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) for historical and constitutional reasons. It also attempts to achieve the highest degree of horizontal fiscal equalization (HFE) to be found in any democratic federation. The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), a non-partisan body at arm's length from politicians, oversees the regime. A recent report claims that equity, efficiency and transparency would all improve if the regime were abolished. Such a change is politically unachievable, but it raises interesting issues in public finance and public administration, which carry over to other federations and union states. An economically efficient system would: minimize perverse incentives, especially incentives to seek rent; encourage states to grow; discourage suboptimal location decisions; minimize transaction costs. An equitable system would maximize equity between relevantly similar individuals. Aspects of the Australian system that should be copied include the non-partisan agency and the target of HFE between component parts of the country. Aspects that should be discussed and perhaps copied include the very extensive equalization, including the feature of equalizing away the effects of grants for special purposes. Aspects that should probably not be copied include the cumbersome formulae and some of the perverse methods of calculating for ,needs'. All abbreviations and acronyms are spelt out in the Appendix on page 37. [source]

Intergovernmental relations, social policy and federal transfers after Romanow

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2004
Tom McIntosh
Though the provinces have agreed to the split, the federal government undertook the allocation of the transfer to the new Canada Health Transfer and the Canada Social Transfer unilaterally. At the same time, the federal government has simultaneously been increasing its own social spending in areas of provincial jurisdiction in recent years. In response, the provinces have been taking an increasingly hard line towards Ottawa's unilateral actions, as demonstrated by the creation of the Council of the Federation and its focus on the so-called fiscal imbalance in the federation. These dynamics make the intergovernmental commitment to collaborative federalism ring somewhat hollow. The article argues that the inability of both orders of government to take collaborative federalism and policy interdependence seriously poses significant threats not only to the health of the federation but also to efforts to create healthy public policy. Sommaire: Le présent article porte sur les nouvelles et anciennes dynamiques inter-gouvemementales concernant les transferts accordés par le fédéral aux provinces pour le financement des politiques sociales et de santé, qui ont découlé du Rapport Romanow et de la décision de scinder le Transfert canadien en matiè-e de santé et de programmes sociaux (TCSPS) en deux composantes distinctes. Quoique les provinces aient accepté la scission, le gouvernement fédéral a entrepris de procéder unilatérale-ment à l'affectation des paiements aux nouveaux Transfert canadien en matière de santé et Transfert canadien en matière de programmes sociaux. Simultanément, ces dernières années, le gouvernement fédéral a accru ses propres dépenses sociales dans des domaines de juridiction provinciale. Face à cela, les provinces ont adopté une position de plus en plus intransigeante à l'egard des initiatives unilatéralcs d'Ottawa comme le démontrent la céeation du Conseil de la fédération et sa concentration sur le soi-disant déséquilibre financier au sein de la fédération. Cette dynarnique fait que l'engagement intergouvernemental envers le fédéralisme de collaboration sonne plutôt vide. L'article soutient que L'inaptitude des deux ordres de gouverncment a prendre au serieux le fédéralisme de collaboration et L'interdépendance politique représente une forte menace, non seulement pour la santé de la fédération, mais aussi pour les efforts visant à créer un politique publique saine. [source]

Mechanisms for intergovernmental relations in federations

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, Issue 167 2001
Brian R. Opeskin
Federations employ a large variety of mechanisms for conducting relations between central, regional, and local levels of government. These mechanisms span the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government within each level. Executive involvement ranges widely in degree of formality, from the making of formal intergovernmental agreements to informal liaison between governmental officers. Executive mechanisms have also evolved for correcting vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in federal systems. Legislatures play an important role in giving the force of law to cooperative policies initiated by the executive. These legislative mechanisms include reciprocal schemes, complementary schemes, mirror legislation, and the reference or delegation of powers from one level of government to another. The judiciary, though often undervalued, is significant for its role in establishing the legal framework within which other branches of government conduct their intergovernmental relations, through articulation of powers and competencies. The article concludes that policy makers should exercise care in selecting mechanisms that are appropriate to their task. In particular, regard should be had to the efficiency of each mechanism, and its conformity with federal values and the rule of law. [source]

CURRENCY CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE CASE OF POST-LIBERALIZATION TURKEY

THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 4 2008
Mete FERIDUN
F31; F37 This article investigates the determinants of currency crises in Turkey. It analyzes the two major currency crises of 1994 and 2000,2001 in the light of the existing theoretical models. The present study uses logit, probit, and limited dependent models to explain the currency crises in the post,capital account liberalization era. The results obtained from the three approaches are generally consistent and the coefficients obtained for the explanatory variables generally have the same sign. The findings suggest that the currency crises in Turkey are associated with global liquidity conditions, fiscal imbalances, capital outflows, and banking sector weaknesses. [source]