Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Fiscal Competition (fiscal + competition)
Selected AbstractsFiskalischer Wettbewerb und EinkommensumverteilungPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2000Lars P. Feld Fiscal competition is supposed to lead to the collapse of the welfare state because, first, it will become difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy a redistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, and second, such a policy, if undertaken in one jurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from other jurisdictions and erode the internal redistribution policy. In this paper, theoretical and empirical studies concerning the impact of taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers are reviewed. The relationship of fiscal competition and the erosion of the welfare state is illustrated with aggregate data on income redistribution in Switzerland. [source] TAX COMPETITION IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF CRIME PREVENTION,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 5 2007Santiago M. Pinto ABSTRACT The paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition when local governments choose the level of public goods that generate spillover effects elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement activities affect both the crime level in the jurisdiction providing the good and in neighboring communities. The model shows that when local governments rely on capital taxation to finance these expenditures the spillover effects may not lead to an inefficient provision of public goods as predicted by the tax competition literature. In the model, capital is costlessly mobile and offenders relocate responding to differential criminal opportunities and differential local law enforcement efforts. [source] DIVISIONS OF LABOUR, SPECIALIZATION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSISPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2004Li Ke The model suggests that fiscal competition between states facilitates important circular effects, which propel improvements in economic welfare and promote economic growth. In particular, improvements in institutional efficiency expand the demand for transactions, which in turn increases the need for further third-party protection of property rights. We illustrate our results using the growth of the state system in Western Europe. [source] Die eigentümliche Diskussion um Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung in der EuropapolitikPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2004Thomas Apolte It is argued that large parts of this discussion rest on a flawed analogy of the liberal concept of normative individualism on the one hand and the concept of political decentralization in federal multi-layer systems on the other. Based on this flawed analogy an unusual and partly misleading notion of decentralization has widely been used in the discussion of European Integration. As a result, there are a number of misjudgements in some central topics of European Integration. These topics are the question of institutional competition among governments, the effects of fiscal competition on the tax burden of citizens and a future European constitution. [source] Fiskalischer Wettbewerb und EinkommensumverteilungPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2000Lars P. Feld Fiscal competition is supposed to lead to the collapse of the welfare state because, first, it will become difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy a redistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, and second, such a policy, if undertaken in one jurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from other jurisdictions and erode the internal redistribution policy. In this paper, theoretical and empirical studies concerning the impact of taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers are reviewed. The relationship of fiscal competition and the erosion of the welfare state is illustrated with aggregate data on income redistribution in Switzerland. [source] | ||||||||||