			Home About us Contact

Fiscal Authorities (fiscal + authority)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	83%

Selected Abstracts

CENTRAL BANKS: FROM POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT TO MARKET-DEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2009
Pedro Schwartz
Responses to the financial crisis are undermining the Chinese walls painfully built between monetary and fiscal authorities. Central banks and state treasuries are working side by side as lenders of last resort. Central banks are helping economic ministers with purchases of public debt and discounting of private paper. Regulation and control of financial institutions is now a political football. Central banks must be seen again as market-dependent institutions in a world of currency competition. Privatisation in law or in fact is back on the table. [source]

FISCAL READJUSTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A NONLINEAR TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

ECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 1 2009
ANDREA CIPOLLINI
We analyze the fiscal adjustment process in the United States using a multivariate threshold vector error regression model. The shift from single-equation to multivariate setting adds value both in terms of our economic understanding of the fiscal adjustment process and the forecasting performance of nonlinear models. We find evidence that fiscal authorities intervene to reduce real per capita deficit only when it reaches a certain threshold and that fiscal adjustment takes place primarily by cutting government expenditure. The results of out-of-sample density forecast and probability forecasts suggest that a shift from a univariate autoregressive model to a multivariate model improves forecast performance. (JEL C32, C53, E62) [source]

A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs.

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 1 2004
Fiscal Approaches
F3 Abstract This paper develops a model for balance-of-payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis. [source]

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2004
HIROSHI FUJIKI
We consider how the second-best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument-independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables. [source]

Undermining State Capacity: Vertical and Horizontal Diffusions of Fiscal Power in China

ASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 3 2009
Jing Vivian Zhan
Since the late 1970s, China's fiscal system has facilitated the initiation and implementation of economic reforms and greatly contributed to China's remarkable economic achievements. However, weaknesses of the fiscal system have been exposed that have aroused concerns about the weakening of state capacity. While many have discussed the loss of central fiscal control over localities under decentralization and its negative consequences, not enough attention has been paid to another major problem: the diffusion of fiscal power to nonfiscal government departments. In this article, I argue that the existence of the extra-budgetary system has granted ad hoc taxation power to nonfiscal departments and led to the mismanagement of fiscal revenue. Compared with the vertical diffusion of fiscal power, i.e., the devolution of fiscal authority from central to lower-level governments, the horizontal diffusion of fiscal power is more difficult to control and more detrimental to the institutionalization of China's fiscal system. [source]