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Financial Regulation (financial + regulation)
Selected AbstractsRESTRUCTURING U.S. FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATIONCONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 3 2007ROSE M. KUSHMEIDER Despite changes over the past 70 yr, the U.S. federal financial regulatory system remains rooted in the reforms of the 1930s. The institutions governed by this system have, nevertheless, continued to evolve. Today, regulation of large, multiproduct, internationally active financial organizations poses challenges for a system designed largely to regulate smaller, distinct, locally based organizations. Reform of the regulatory system, however, is not an easy task,complex issues regarding deposit insurance, the role of the central bank, and the dual banking system must be addressed. In the absence of a crisis, however, regulatory restructuring will not likely generate much political interest. (JEL G28) [source] Financial Regulation: What Should Be Done?JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2008James S. Sagner The 2007 credit crisis is making us take a second look at regulating the financial sector. Has regulation failed? And what will be the impact on future merger and acquisition activity? © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Due Diligence and "Reasonable Man," OffshoreCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, Issue 4 2005Bill Maurer In the wake of an international crackdown against preferential tax regimes, Caribbean tax havens and other jurisdictions have adopted "due diligence" procedures to manage financial and reputational risk. Due diligence relies on qualitative forms of evaluation and defers grounded and definitive knowledge claims through continuous peer review. In doing so, it mirrors certain forms of ethnographic practice at a number of levels of scale. This article tracks the shifts in financial regulation from crime to harm and from certainty to scrutiny and reflects on their implications for ethnography,as a limited and open-ended process of evaluation warranted by qualitative forms of judgment. It seeks to complicate our picture of contemporary capitalisms by drawing attention to the nonquantifiable and the ethical that lie "inside" them. Where conventional forms of ethnographic critique might look to expose the political or economic interests behind actions, symbols, or social relationships, this article has a more modest goal: to try to understand the similarity of form between due diligence and anthropology. [source] The Regulatory State and Turkish Banking Reforms in the Age of Post-Washington ConsensusDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 1 2010Caner Bakir ABSTRACT The new era of the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC), promoted under the auspices of International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, centres on the need to develop sound financial regulation and strong regulatory institutions, especially in the realm of banking and finance in post-financial crisis developing countries. This article uses an examination of the Turkish banking sector experience with the PWC in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis to show its considerable strengths and weaknesses. The authors argue that the emergent regulatory state in the bank-based financial system has a narrow focus on strengthening prudential regulation, whilst ignoring the increased ,financialization' of the Turkish economy. They identify the positive features of the new era of the PWC in terms of prudential regulation, which has become much more robust in its ability to withstand external shocks. At the same time, however, the article highlights some of the limitations of the new era which resemble the limitations of the PWC. These include the distributional impact of the regulatory reforms within the banking sector, and notably the emergence of foreign banks as the major beneficiaries of this process; weaknesses in promoting productive bank intermediation that finance the real economy and economic growth, leading to poverty reduction via growth of employment whilst stimulating financialization within the economy; and finally, the exclusive focus on prudential regulation, whilst ignoring regulatory costs, consumer protection and competition regulation. [source] Prudential Regulation of Banks in Less Developed EconomiesDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 3 2002S. Mansoob Murshed This article argues that developing countries face inherent obstacles in setting up efficient financial regulation, and building up a sound banking sector: the presence of multiple tasks and multiple principals, poor institutions, lack of economies of scale in the banking sector as well as regulatory supervision, and the lack of reputation. Developing countries need a regulatory framework that rewards prudent risk-taking, but punishes misconduct. This is likely to involve a combination of input-based measures impacting on bankers' incentives, with a few direct controls on the output of the sector. The article concludes with a list of policy options whose appropriateness is judged by their ,friendliness' with local circumstances. [source] IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICE REGULATION IN A DYNAMIC MARKETPLACE: CONSULTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITYECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue S1 2008RIC SIMES The practice of financial regulation in Australia has drifted away from the lighted-handed principles articulated in the Wallis Report. The burden of regulatory compliance has steadily grown. The inconsistency between regulatory principle and practice is explained as the result of perverse incentives facing regulators, an absence of effective consultation with industry regarding the cost burden of regulation, and a failure to properly assess the social benefits and costs of regulatory intervention. The paper argues for the creation of a Bureau of Financial Sector Regulation to improve the accountability of regulators and publish independent social cost,benefit analyses of financial regulation. The paper also calls for a further inquiry into Australia's financial system ten years on from the Wallis Inquiry. [source] Setting the rules: private power, political underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governanceINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2008GEOFFREY R. D. UNDERHILL The role of private market agents in global monetary and financial governance has increased as globalization has proceeded. This shift in both markets and patterns of governance has often been encouraged by states themselves in pursuit of liberalization policies. Much of the literature views these developments in a positive light, yet there are other aspects of these developments that also merit attention. This article supports its central propositions with two cases of emerging global financial governance processes: the Basel II capital adequacy standards for international banking supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions-based transnational regulatory processes underpinning the functioning of cross-border securities markets. Based on the case findings, the article argues first that private sector self-regulation and/or public-private partnership in governance processes can leave public authorities vulnerable to dependence on the information and expertise provided by private agents in a fast-moving market environment. Policy in the vital domain of financial regulation has been increasingly aligned to private sector preferences to a degree that should raise fears of bureaucratic capture. Second, the article contends that the overall outcome in terms of global financial system efficiency and stability has been mixed, bringing a range of important benefits but also instability and crisis for many societies to a degree that has led to challenges to global governance itself. The case material indicates that the input, output and accountability phases of legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance are highly problematic, and much of the problem relates to the way in which private market agents are integrated into the decision-making process. Third, the article posits that a better consideration of these three ,phases' of legitimacy and their interrelationships is likely to enhance the political underpinnings and legitimacy of global financial and monetary order. [source] Transnational Governance in Global Finance: The Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets1INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2010Raymond Ritter This paper analyzes and assesses the "Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets," which have emerged as an important instrument for crisis prevention and crisis resolution in the international financial system. The paper argues that, notwithstanding their low profile, the Principles which were jointly agreed between key sovereign debtors and their private creditors in 2004 have proved to be a useful instrument in spite of their voluntary and non-binding nature. Indeed, an increasing number of sovereign debtors and private creditors have adopted the Principles' recommendations on transparency and the timely flow of information, close dialogue, "good faith" actions, and fair treatment. The paper, taking a rational choice perspective, appraises the Principles as the product of a transnational public-private partnership as well as a soft mode of governance. Moreover, it shows how the Principles have moved somewhat along the continuum of soft law and hard law toward the latter. Finally, the paper makes the case that the Principles and their design features can provide some lessons for the current international policy debate on codes of conduct in global financial regulation. [source] The Effect of Bank Credit on Asset Prices: Evidence from the Japanese Real Estate Boom during the 1980sJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 1 2008NADA MORA bank credit; asset prices; financial regulation This paper studies whether bank credit fuels asset prices. Financial deregulation during the 1980s allowed keiretsus to obtain finance publicly and reduce their dependence on banks. Banks that lost these blue-chip customers increased their property lending, and serve as an instrument for the supply of real estate loans. Using this instrument, I find that a 0.01 increase in a prefecture's real estate loans as a share of total loans causes 14,20% higher land inflation compared with other prefectures over the 1981,91 period. The timing of losses of keiretsu customers also coincides with subsequent land inflation in a prefecture. [source] Regulatory Failure and the Collapse of Japan's Home Mortgage Lending Industry: A Legal and Economic AnalysisLAW & POLICY, Issue 3-4 2000Curtis Milhaupt This article analyzes the dynamics of contemporary cooperation and conflict in Japanese financial regulation through the prism of the "jusen problem," the collapse of Japan's home mortgage lending industry in the 1990s. The jusen problem is one of the most striking examples of regulatory failure, strategic interest group bargaining, and large-scale dispute resolution in Japanese history. [source] International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy StabilityINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2003Scott L. Kastner States' decisions about regulating international capital movements are shaped in part by institutions and partisanship at the domestic level, but the effects of domestic-level variables are themselves contingent on the constraints imposed by the international system. We amend the veto-players hypothesis to account for the effects of international regimes on the political influence of domestic players in state decision-making. The history of changes in international financial regulations over the past four decades provides an ideal case to study the interaction of international regimes and domestic decision-making systems. We create a data set of all capital controls policy changes that 19 OECD parliamentary democracies made during the years 1951,1998. Using these new data, we find that states with a higher number of veto-player parties in government enact fewer capital controls policy changes. Furthermore, ideologically right-of-center governments in these industrialized countries are more likely than others to enact capital controls liberalizations. We also find, however, that the independent effects of these domestic-level variables disappear after the mid-1980s, when the systemic constraints imposed on individual states increased substantially. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||