Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Financial Economists (financial + economist)
Selected Abstracts"Marking-to-Market" and Treasury-Bill Futures Prices: Some Empirical EvidenceFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 1 2000Seungmook Choi G13 Abstract Financial economists have not found empirical evidence of a "marking-to-market" effect in Treasury-bill futures contracts, despite a firm theoretical basis for its existence. Therefore, we speculate that confounding effects, possibly due to liquidity preferences, influence futures-forward price spreads. By using an empirical specification that allows for both effects, we present empirical evidence that Treasury-bill futures-forward price spreads are sensitive to the volatility of the underlying commodity in ways predicted by the theory of the marking-to-market effect. [source] GLOBAL EVIDENCE ON THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUMJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2003Elroy Dimson The size of the equity risk premium,the incremental return that shareholders require to hold risky equities rather than risk-free securities,is a key issue in corporate finance. Financial economists generally measure the equity premium over long periods of time in order to obtain reliable estimates. These estimates are widely used by investors, finance professionals, corporate executives, regulators, lawyers, and consultants. But because the 20th century proved to be a period of such remarkable growth in the U.S. economy, estimates of the risk premium that rely on past market performance may be too high to serve as a reliable guide to the future. The authors analyze a 103-year history of risk premiums in 16 countries and conclude that the U.S. risk premium relative to Treasury bills was 5.3% for that period,lower than previous studies suggest,as compared to 4.2% for the U.K. and 4.5% for a world index. But the article goes on to observe that the historical record may still overstate expectations of the future risk premium, partly because market volatility in the future may be lower than in the past, and partly because of a general decline in risk resulting from new technological advances and increased diversification opportunities for investors. After adjusting for the expected impact of these factors, the authors calculate forward-looking equity risk premiums of 4.3% for the U.S., 3.9% for the U.K., and 3.5% for the world index. At the same time, however, they caution that the risk premium can fluctuate over time and that managers should make appropriate adjustments when there are compelling economic reasons to think that expected premiums are unusually high or low. [source] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCEJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2001Eric Nowak Financial economists continue to point to Germany as a relatively successful model of a "bank-centered," as opposed to a market-based, economy. But few seem to recognize that, in the years leading up to World War I, German equity capital markets were among the most highly developed in the world. Although there are now only about 750 companies listed on German stock exchanges, in 1914 there were almost 1,200 (as compared to only about 600 stocks then listed on the New York Stock Exchange). Since German reunification in 1990, there have been signs of a possible restoration of the country's equity markets to something like their former prominence. The last 10 years have seen important legal and institutional developments that can be seen as preparing the way for larger and more active German equity markets, together with a more "shareholder-friendly" corporate governance system. In particular, the 1994 Securities Act, the Corporation Control and Transparency Act passed in 1998, and the just released Takeover Act and Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act all contain legal reforms that are essential conditions for well functioning equity markets. Such legal and regulatory changes have helped lay the groundwork for more visible and dramatic milestones, such as the Deutsche Telekom IPO in 1996, the opening of the Neuer Market in 1997, and, perhaps most important, the acquisition in 2000 of Mannesmann by Vodafone, the first successful hostile takeover of a German company. [source] The Really Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-Nasdaq EvidenceTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 4 2003Paul A. Gompers Financial economists have intensely debated the performance of IPOs using data after the formation of Nasdaq. This paper sheds light on this controversy by undertaking a large, out-of-sample study: We examine the performance for five years after listing of 3,661 U.S. IPOs from 1935 to 1972. The sample displays some underperformance when event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used. The underperformance disappears, however, when cumulative abnormal returns are utilized. A calendar-time analysis shows that over the entire period, IPOs return as much as the market. The intercepts in CAPM and Fama,French regressions are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no abnormal performance. [source] The Future of Private EquityJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Steve Kaplan A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following: ,With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy? ,How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years? ,With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt? ,If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom-and-bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes? Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as "a permanent asset class." Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the "cov-lite" deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev-eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom-and-bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals. [source] GOLF TOURNAMENTS AND CEO PAY,UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2001John Martin Leading financial economists and activist institutional investors have long argued that the proper alignment of manager and shareholder interests requires the use of performance based compensation. Partly in response to these pressures, and in combination with a change in the tax code that encourages performance-based pay, corporate boards have dramatically increased their use of stock grants and executive stock options. Combine this development with the longest bull market in U.S. financial history, and the result is unprecedented levels of CEO pay at the close of the 20th century. This review of executive compensation reveals that the economic theory of tournaments may provide a rationale for the pattern, if not the level, of executive pay. Specifically it finds that the total compensation of the five highestpaid executives in a cross-section of new and old-economy firms is very similar to the pattern of payouts to players in a golf tournament. The author also reports that recent studies show a significant increase in the pay-for-performance correlation throughout the 1990s. But whether that correlation is as high as it should be, and whether current levels of CEO pay are socially "optimal," are questions that remain unanswered. [source] Monetary Policy and the Stock Market: Theory and Empirical EvidenceJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 4 2001Peter Sellin This paper gives a comprehensive review of the literature on the interaction between real stock returns, inflation, and money growth, with a special emphasis on the role of monetary policy. This is an area of research that has interested monetary and financial economists for a long time. Monetary economists have been interested in the question whether money has any effect on real stock prices, while financial economists have investigated whether equity is a good hedge against inflation. Empirical studies show that money can be helpful in predicting future stock returns. Empirical evidence also suggest that equity is not a good hedge against inflation in the short run but may be so in the long run. The short-run negative relation between stock returns and inflation can easily be explained by theoretical models. If the central bank conducts a countercyclical monetary policy this will result in a negative relation between inflation and stock returns, while if it conducts a procyclical policy we could observe a positive relation. According to both theoretical and empirical studies investors receive an inflation risk premium for holding equity. [source] An outlier robust GARCH model and forecasting volatility of exchange rate returnsJOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 5 2002Beum-Jo Park Abstract Since volatility is perceived as an explicit measure of risk, financial economists have long been concerned with accurate measures and forecasts of future volatility and, undoubtedly, the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model has been widely used for doing so. It appears, however, from some empirical studies that the GARCH model tends to provide poor volatility forecasts in the presence of additive outliers. To overcome the forecasting limitation, this paper proposes a robust GARCH model (RGARCH) using least absolute deviation estimation and introduces a valuable estimation method from a practical point of view. Extensive Monte Carlo experiments substantiate our conjectures. As the magnitude of the outliers increases, the one-step-ahead forecasting performance of the RGARCH model has a more significant improvement in two forecast evaluation criteria over both the standard GARCH and random walk models. Strong evidence in favour of the RGARCH model over other competitive models is based on empirical application. By using a sample of two daily exchange rate series, we find that the out-of-sample volatility forecasts of the RGARCH model are apparently superior to those of other competitive models. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Property and contract in contemporary corporate theoryLEGAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2003Paddy Ireland This paper critically evaluates the contractual theories of companies and company law which have risen to prominence in recent years. It argues that history reveals as misguided the attempt to depict public companies as essentially contractual in nature, one of the most striking features of the development in nineteenth century Britain of the first body of (joint stock) company law having been its gradual move away from the principles of agency and contract underlying the law of partnership from which it emerged. Against this backdrop, the paper moves on to explore the ways in which theorists have tried, against the odds, to characterise public Companies as contractual and the reasons for their attempting to do so. While it might be apposite to view many private or closely held companies through the prism of contract, the paper argues, public companies and much of company law itself can only properly be understood when viewed through the prism of financial property. Indeed, it suggests, this is implicitly confirmed by the Company Law Review and (paradoxically) by the recent work of corporate governance specialists and financial economists in the US, with its focus on investor protection and the preservation of financial property's integrity, and its emphasis on the crucial role of (public) regulation in these processes. The paper concludes that these property forms are not merely the objects, but the products of regulation and that this has important implications for our understanding of both company law and corporate governance. In making these arguments, it seeks to cast some light on the nature of intangible property, on the differences between contract-based and property-based rights, on the neo-liberal idea of ,deregulation', and on the unity and scope of company law as a legal category. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||