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Firm-specific Human Capital (firm-specific + human_capital)
Selected AbstractsFirm-Specific Human Capital and Governance in IPO Firms: Addressing Agency and Resource Dependence ConcernsENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 4 2009Jonathan D. Arthurs Entrepreneurs with firm-specific human capital represent both a potential source of competitive advantage and a threat to appropriate the rents that are ultimately generated by a new venture. This situation presents interesting agency and resource dependence challenges. While potential investors in these ventures will want assurances that their interests are protected, they will also want to ensure that these key entrepreneurs remain with the organization. Using agency theory and resource dependence theory, we examine the types of governance mechanisms that are implemented in firms going through an initial public offering comparing those ventures which indicate a dependence on these critical entrepreneurs versus those that do not. Our analysis reveals that ventures exhibiting dependence on key entrepreneurs are associated with higher insider and outsider ownership by the board, greater start-up experience by the board, greater use of contingent compensation, and greater use of involuntary departure agreements. [source] Firm-specific human capital and compensation organizational tenure profiles: An archival analysis of salary data for itHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2007Sandra A. Slaughter We examine determinants of IT compensation using archival salary data from 2,251 IT professionals in Singapore. Consistent with human capital theory, we find that professionals in IT jobs requiring more firm-specific human capital are paid more than those in jobs requiring less firm-specific human capital. Moreover, compensation increases with organizational tenure at an increasing rate for professionals in higher firm-specific human capital IT jobs, but at a decreasing rate for those in lower firm-specific human capital IT jobs. Our results reveal firm-specific human capital as a primary determinant of compensation and a moderator of IT compensation-organizational tenure profiles. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Firm-Specific Human Capital and Governance in IPO Firms: Addressing Agency and Resource Dependence ConcernsENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 4 2009Jonathan D. Arthurs Entrepreneurs with firm-specific human capital represent both a potential source of competitive advantage and a threat to appropriate the rents that are ultimately generated by a new venture. This situation presents interesting agency and resource dependence challenges. While potential investors in these ventures will want assurances that their interests are protected, they will also want to ensure that these key entrepreneurs remain with the organization. Using agency theory and resource dependence theory, we examine the types of governance mechanisms that are implemented in firms going through an initial public offering comparing those ventures which indicate a dependence on these critical entrepreneurs versus those that do not. Our analysis reveals that ventures exhibiting dependence on key entrepreneurs are associated with higher insider and outsider ownership by the board, greater start-up experience by the board, greater use of contingent compensation, and greater use of involuntary departure agreements. [source] Firm-specific human capital and compensation organizational tenure profiles: An archival analysis of salary data for itHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2007Sandra A. Slaughter We examine determinants of IT compensation using archival salary data from 2,251 IT professionals in Singapore. Consistent with human capital theory, we find that professionals in IT jobs requiring more firm-specific human capital are paid more than those in jobs requiring less firm-specific human capital. Moreover, compensation increases with organizational tenure at an increasing rate for professionals in higher firm-specific human capital IT jobs, but at a decreasing rate for those in lower firm-specific human capital IT jobs. Our results reveal firm-specific human capital as a primary determinant of compensation and a moderator of IT compensation-organizational tenure profiles. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Analysing the Gender Wage Gap (GWG) Using Personnel RecordsLABOUR, Issue 2 2009Christian Pfeifer We use monthly personnel records of a large German company for the years 1999,2005 to analyse the gender wage gap (GWG). The unconditional GWG is 15 per cent for blue-collar and 26 per cent for white-collar workers. Different returns to entry age explain a substantial part of the GWG as well as segregation of men and women in different hierarchical levels. The relative GWG increases with increasing tenure for blue-collar but declines for white-collar workers. Taking into account the different impact of general and firm-specific human capital on white-collar and blue-collar occupation, this is consistent with theories of statistical discrimination. [source] Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contractsTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Suman Ghosh This article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up-or-out contracts. Our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives. We find that firms employ up-or-out contracts when firm-specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high. We also find that, if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important, up-or-out is employed when low- and high-level jobs are similar. These results are consistent with many of the settings in which up-or-out is typically observed, such as law firms and academia. [source] |