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Firm Value (firm + value)
Selected AbstractsTests of a Deferred Tax Explanation of the Negative Association between the LIFO Reserve and Firm Value,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2000DAN S. DHALIWAL Guenther and Trombley (1994) and Jennings, Simko, and Thompson (1996) document a negative association between a firm's last-in, first-out (LIFO) reserve and the market value of its equity. In this paper, we test a deferred tax explanation of this negative association. Specifically, we argue that investors, conditional on adjusting inventory to as-if first-in, first-out (FIFO), estimate a firm's future LIFO liquidation tax burden as its LIFO reserve multiplied by the appropriate corporate tax rate and include this tax-adjusted LIFO reserve in the valuation of a LIFO firm's net assets. On the basis of this argument, the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve is in effect an estimate of an off-balance-sheet deferred tax liability and, as a result, we predict a negative association between the tax-adjusted LIFO reserve and market value of equity. We test our deferred tax explanation by estimating a valuation model in which a firm's market value of equity is expressed as a function of the firm's assets, liabilities, deferred tax liability, and tax-adjusted LIFO reserve; the model is estimated separately in years preceding and following the reduction of tax rates mandated by the US Tax Reform Act of 1986. Test results provide strong support for the deferred tax explanation of the negative association between a firm's LIFO reserve and the market value of its equity. [source] The Proportion and Social Capital of Outside Directors and Their Impacts on Firm Value: evidence from KoreaCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Yangmin Kim This study examines the effects of outside directors' proportion and their social capital on firm value using a sample of 473 large, publicly traded Korean companies from 1998 through 2003. Outside director proportion, which is defined as the ratio of outside directors to the total number of directors of a company, is regarded as a proxy of board independence. Outside director social capital, which is defined as the degree to which outside board members have outside contacts in the external environment, is regarded as a proxy of board's ability to extract valuable resources or information from the environment. It is hypothesised that both the proportion of outside directors to the total directors and outside director social capital will be positively associated with firm value. This study reports strong GLS evidence of the relationship between outside director social capital and firm value but no significant relationship between outside director proportion and firm value. [source] The Relation between Stakeholder Management, Firm Value, and CEO Compensation: A Test of Enlightened Value MaximizationFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Bradley W. Benson Whether firms pursue shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare is a controversial issue whose outcomes seem irreconcilable. We propose that firms are likely to compensate their executives for pursuing the firm's goal be it shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare. In this paper, we examine the correlation between firm value, stakeholder management, and compensation. We find that stakeholder management is positively related to firm value. However, firms do not compensate managers for having good relationships with its stakeholders. These results do not support stakeholder theory. We also find an endogenous association between compensation and firm value. Our results are consistent with Jensen's (2001) enlightened value maximization theory. Managers are compensated for achieving the firm's ultimate goal, value maximization. However, managers optimize interaction with stakeholders to accomplish this objective. [source] Hedging Affecting Firm Value via Financing and Investment: Evidence from Property Insurance UseFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Hong Zou I provide evidence about the value effects of alternative risk management by examining corporate purchase of property insurance, a commonly used pure hedge of asset-loss risks. Using an insurance data set from China, I find that there is an inverted U-shape effect of the extent of property insurance use on firm value measured by several versions of Tobin's Q. Therefore, the use of property insurance, to a certain degree, has a positive effect on firm value; however, over insurance appears detrimental to firm value. Given that the inflection points occur at relatively high levels of the observed insurance spending, insurance use appears beneficial to the majority of my sample firms. The estimated average hedging premium is about 1.5%. I demonstrate that an avenue for insurance to create value in China is that it helps firms secure valuable new debt financing and enhance investment. [source] Does Hedging Affect Firm Value?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2006Evidence from the US Airline Industry Does hedging add value to the firm, and if so, is the source of the added value consistent with hedging theory? We investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the US airline industry during 1992,2003 to examine whether such hedging is a source of value for these companies. We illustrate that the investment and financing climate in the airline industry conforms well to the theoretical framework of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). In general, airline industry investment opportunities correlate positively with jet fuel costs, while higher fuel costs are consistent with lower cash flow. Given that jet fuel costs are hedgeable, airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging future purchases of jet fuel. Our results show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. The coefficients on the hedging variables in our regression analysis suggest that the "hedging premium" is greater than the 5% documented in Allayannis and Weston (2001), and might be as large as 10%. We find that the positive relation between hedging and value increases in capital investment, and that most of the hedging premium is attributable to the interaction of hedging with investment. This result is consistent with the assertion that the principal benefit of jet fuel hedging by airlines comes from reduction of underinvestment costs. [source] Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and Shareholder RightsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2005Jianxin (Daniel) Chi I explore the relation between firm value and the shareholder rights-based Governance Index "G," which has become a popular measure of governance quality among researchers and investors. I show that the relation is not spuriously driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity or an assortment of observable firm characteristics, such as firm growth potential and profitability. The causality seems to run from G to firm value, rather than from firm value to G. My results suggest that granting more rights to shareholders could be an effective way to reduce agency costs and enhance firm value. [source] Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas ProducersTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2006YANBO JIN ABSTRACT This paper studies the hedging activities of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 and evaluates their effect on firm value. Theories of hedging based on market imperfections imply that hedging should increase the firm's market value (MV). To test this hypothesis, we collect detailed information on the extent of hedging and on the valuation of oil and gas reserves. We verify that hedging reduces the firm's stock price sensitivity to oil and gas prices. Contrary to previous studies, however, we find that hedging does not seem to affect MVs for this industry. [source] Corporate Diversification, Relatedness, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korean Firms,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2008Sung C. Bae Abstract We examine the valuation effects of diversification activities for Korean firms by diversification type and the occasion of the Korean financial crisis. Employing a unique dataset of 2,894 firm-years for the entire manufacturing industries, we find that diversification by Korean firms on average decreases firm value but its effect varies by the type of diversification. While unrelated diversification erodes firm value, related diversification is associated with a non-negative effect on firm value. These valuation effects are more pronounced before the crisis than after the crisis. Our results also show an important role of a firm's affiliation to a large business group, known as chaebols, that related diversification by chaebol-affiliated firms comes with a significant value gain. We further find that the different valuation effects of unrelated and related diversification are closely related to a firm's ownership concentration and financial leverage. Our results are robust to different samples and regression model specifications. [source] Firm value, managerial confidence, and investments: The case of ChinaJOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES, Issue 3 2008Bei Ye The purpose of this article is to test empirically the impact of Chinese managerial confidence on firm value through investment decisions. We use a simultaneous equation model, which treats firm value, investments, and managerial confidence as endogenous to the firm. With a sample of 329 Chinese listed firms and a confidence measure based on management shareholding, the 3SLS regression results show significant interactions among the three variables. Firm value has a positive impact on managerial confidence while the latter's impact on the former turns from positive to negative at a certain point. The results suggest a non-monotonic relationship between managerial self-confidence and firm value and imply an optimal level of managerial confidence. Therefore, while the leader selection process encourages confident talents to become decision-makers, proper measures are required to prevent the confidence transformed into overconfidence. [source] WARRANT PRICING USING OBSERVABLE VARIABLESTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2004Andrey D. Ukhov Abstract The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm-value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm-value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm-value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided. [source] Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting-Based Debt Covenants,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2003Alan V. S. Douglas Abstract This paper studies the conditions under which accounting-based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting-based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend-based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting-based covenants. [source] The Proportion and Social Capital of Outside Directors and Their Impacts on Firm Value: evidence from KoreaCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Yangmin Kim This study examines the effects of outside directors' proportion and their social capital on firm value using a sample of 473 large, publicly traded Korean companies from 1998 through 2003. Outside director proportion, which is defined as the ratio of outside directors to the total number of directors of a company, is regarded as a proxy of board independence. Outside director social capital, which is defined as the degree to which outside board members have outside contacts in the external environment, is regarded as a proxy of board's ability to extract valuable resources or information from the environment. It is hypothesised that both the proportion of outside directors to the total directors and outside director social capital will be positively associated with firm value. This study reports strong GLS evidence of the relationship between outside director social capital and firm value but no significant relationship between outside director proportion and firm value. [source] What Do Shareholders' Coalitions Really Want?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2007Evidence from Italian voting trusts This paper studies the effects of having multiple large shareholders who share the control of firms, by analysing a unique dataset of Italian shareholders' agreements (voting trusts). We investigate the separation between ownership and control granted by such agreements, showing that, on average, a voting trust owning 52 per cent of the total company's cash-flow rights is able to exercise up to 87 per cent of the total board rights; the wedge is particularly beneficial to the largest shareholder within the voting trust who is able to get the majority of board rights despite owning only a minority fraction of the company's cash-flow rights. Then, an event-study analysis of a sample of voting trusts' announcements is performed. The results support the "entrenchment effects" hypothesis (Stulz, 1988) linking the ownership structure and the firm value, and are consistent with the view that, in Italy, voting trust agreements are mainly aimed at both protecting controlling shareholders from hostile takeovers and entrenching incumbent management. [source] Communication via responsibility reporting and its effect on firm value in FinlandCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010Hannu Schadewitz Abstract n this paper, we first analyzed the responsibility reporting literature with an emphasis on the linkage between responsibility reporting and a firm's performance and valuation. Based on the literature review, we developed a research question: How does communication via responsibility reporting affect firm value? We analyzed the market valuation of listed Finnish firms through a conventional valuation model combined with responsibility reporting. The starting point for our valuation was the Ohlson model. We expanded upon the conventional valuation by studying whether communication via responsibility reporting is related to firm valuation. Our research question is linked to the broader academic question of whether earnings worth as an information source has been erased over the last few years. In addition, we contribute to the literature that tries to understand the link between corporate social responsibility and firm performance/share performance. Specifically, we focused on responsibility reporting according to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and especially on whether the existence of these reports provides a further explanation for firm value. Our sample was a population type that covered all listed Finnish firms that have adopted GRI. No other responsibility reporting practice was used by listed firms in their responsibility reporting communication during the years 2002,2005. The other necessary information for valuation models was obtained from Thomson Financial Services (commercial database). The applied model supported the conclusion that communication via GRI responsibility reporting is an important explanatory factor for a firm's market value. The result indicates that responsibility reporting is a part of a firm's communication tools in order to decrease information asymmetry between managers and investors. In other words, GRI responsibility reporting is called for in order to produce a more precise market valuation of a firm. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Advancing Loss Given Default Prediction Models: How the Quiet Have QuickenedECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 2 2005Greg M. Gupton We describe LossCalcÔ version 2.0: the Moody's KMV model to predict loss given default (LGD), the equivalent of (1 , recovery rate). LossCalc is a statistical model that applies multiple predictive factors at different information levels: collateral, instrument, firm, industry, country and the macroeconomy to predict LGD. We find that distance-to-default measures (from the Moody's KMV structural model of default likelihood) compiled at both the industry and firm levels are predictive of LGD. We find that recovery rates worldwide are predictable within a common statistical framework, which suggests that the estimation of economic firm value (which is then available to allocate to claimants according to each country's bankruptcy laws) is a dominant step in LGD determination. LossCalc is built on a global dataset of 3,026 recovery observations for loans, bonds and preferred stock from 1981 to 2004. This dataset includes 1,424 defaults of both public and private firms , both rated and unrated instruments , in all industries. We demonstrate out-of-sample and out-of-time LGD model validation. The model significantly improves on the use of historical recovery averages to predict LGD. [source] The Underinvestment and Overinvestment Hypotheses: an Analysis Using Panel DataEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2003Artur Morgado G31 We study the relationship between firm value and investment to test the underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses. The results obtained, using panel data methodology as the estimation method, indicate that the abovementioned relation is quadratic, which implies that there exists an optimal level of investment. As a consequence, firms that invest less than the optimal level suffer from an underinvestment problem, while those investing more than the optimum suffer from overinvestment. The quadratic relation is maintained when firms are classified depending on their investment opportunities, the optimum being in accordance with the quality of investment opportunities. [source] The Relation between Stakeholder Management, Firm Value, and CEO Compensation: A Test of Enlightened Value MaximizationFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Bradley W. Benson Whether firms pursue shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare is a controversial issue whose outcomes seem irreconcilable. We propose that firms are likely to compensate their executives for pursuing the firm's goal be it shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare. In this paper, we examine the correlation between firm value, stakeholder management, and compensation. We find that stakeholder management is positively related to firm value. However, firms do not compensate managers for having good relationships with its stakeholders. These results do not support stakeholder theory. We also find an endogenous association between compensation and firm value. Our results are consistent with Jensen's (2001) enlightened value maximization theory. Managers are compensated for achieving the firm's ultimate goal, value maximization. However, managers optimize interaction with stakeholders to accomplish this objective. [source] Hedging Affecting Firm Value via Financing and Investment: Evidence from Property Insurance UseFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Hong Zou I provide evidence about the value effects of alternative risk management by examining corporate purchase of property insurance, a commonly used pure hedge of asset-loss risks. Using an insurance data set from China, I find that there is an inverted U-shape effect of the extent of property insurance use on firm value measured by several versions of Tobin's Q. Therefore, the use of property insurance, to a certain degree, has a positive effect on firm value; however, over insurance appears detrimental to firm value. Given that the inflection points occur at relatively high levels of the observed insurance spending, insurance use appears beneficial to the majority of my sample firms. The estimated average hedging premium is about 1.5%. I demonstrate that an avenue for insurance to create value in China is that it helps firms secure valuable new debt financing and enhance investment. [source] The Impact of Fundamentals on IPO ValuationFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2009Rajesh Aggarwal We examine how initial public offering (IPO) valuation has changed over time by focusing on three time periods: 1986-1990, January 1997 to March 2000 (designated as the boom period), and April 2000 to December 2001 (designated as the crash period). Using a sample of 1,655 IPOs, we find that firms with more negative earnings have higher valuations than do firms with less negative earnings and firms with more positive earnings have higher valuations than firms with less positive earnings. Our results suggest that negative earnings are a proxy for growth opportunities for Internet firms and that such growth options are a significant component of IPO firm value. [source] Does Hedging Affect Firm Value?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2006Evidence from the US Airline Industry Does hedging add value to the firm, and if so, is the source of the added value consistent with hedging theory? We investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the US airline industry during 1992,2003 to examine whether such hedging is a source of value for these companies. We illustrate that the investment and financing climate in the airline industry conforms well to the theoretical framework of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). In general, airline industry investment opportunities correlate positively with jet fuel costs, while higher fuel costs are consistent with lower cash flow. Given that jet fuel costs are hedgeable, airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging future purchases of jet fuel. Our results show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. The coefficients on the hedging variables in our regression analysis suggest that the "hedging premium" is greater than the 5% documented in Allayannis and Weston (2001), and might be as large as 10%. We find that the positive relation between hedging and value increases in capital investment, and that most of the hedging premium is attributable to the interaction of hedging with investment. This result is consistent with the assertion that the principal benefit of jet fuel hedging by airlines comes from reduction of underinvestment costs. [source] Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and Shareholder RightsFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2005Jianxin (Daniel) Chi I explore the relation between firm value and the shareholder rights-based Governance Index "G," which has become a popular measure of governance quality among researchers and investors. I show that the relation is not spuriously driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity or an assortment of observable firm characteristics, such as firm growth potential and profitability. The causality seems to run from G to firm value, rather than from firm value to G. My results suggest that granting more rights to shareholders could be an effective way to reduce agency costs and enhance firm value. [source] Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm ValueFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 1 2003David A. Carter This study examines the relationship between board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. Board diversity is defined as the percentage of women, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics on the board of directors. This research is important because it presents the first empirical evidence examining whether board diversity is associated with improved financial value. After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, we find significant positive relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the board and firm value. We also find that the proportion of women and minorities on boards increases with firm size and board size, but decreases as the number of insiders increases. [source] Market's perception of deferred tax accrualsACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2009Cheryl Chang G14; M41 Abstract This study investigates the value relevance and incremental information content of deferred tax accruals reported under the ,income statement method' (AASB 1020 Accounting for Income Taxes) over the period 2001,2004. Our findings suggest that deferred tax accruals are viewed as assets and liabilities. We document a positive relation between recognized deferred tax assets and firm value using the levels model, while the results from the returns model suggest that deferred tax liabilities reflect future tax payments. The balance of unrecognized deferred tax assets provides a negative signal to the market about future profitability, particularly for companies from the materials and energy sectors and loss-makers. [source] Are non-audit services associated with firm value?ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Evidence from financial information system-related services M42 Abstract The purchase of non-audit services from incumbent auditors has generated considerable attention. Surprisingly, limited empirical evidence exists on the association of non-audit services with firm value. Focusing on services related to financial information system (FIS), we find that the market value of equity is greater for firms that purchase FIS-related services from their incumbent auditors relative to firms that do not. The levels of FIS fees are also positively related to firm value after controlling for total other fees, or total other non-audit fees. Hence, despite the negative perception associated with non-audit services, investors regard FIS-related services as value-adding activities. [source] Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from SpainACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2009Julio Pindado G31; G32 Abstract This paper investigates how ownership affects the investment-cash flow sensitivity by taking into account the non-linearities of ownership with respect to firm value, and using a free cash flow index and a criterion for financial constraints to disentangle underinvestment and overinvestment. Interesting results are provided by estimating using the Generalized Method of Moments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The alignment of interests between owners and managers and the monitoring by concentrated ownership both alleviate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow both in underinvestor and overinvestor firms. However, in the presence of controlling owners, underinvestment and overinvestment are exacerbated. [source] Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2003Martin Lee We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency,cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post,listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness. [source] A Reexamination of the Tradeoff between the Future Benefit and Riskiness of R&D IncreasesJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2008ALLAN EBERHART ABSTRACT Many previous studies document a positive relation between research and development (R&D) and equity value. Though R&D can increase equity value by increasing firm value, it can also increase equity value at the expense of bondholder wealth through an increase in firm risk because equity is analogous to a call option on the underlying firm value. Shi [2003] tests this hypothesis by examining the relation between a firm's R&D intensity and its bond ratings and risk premiums at issuance. His results show that the net effect of R&D is negative for bondholders. We reexamine Shi's [2003] findings and in so doing make three contributions to the literature. First, we find that Shi's [2003] results are sensitive to the method of measuring R&D intensity. When we use what we argue is a better measure of R&D intensity, we find that the net effect of R&D is positive for bondholders. Second, when we use tests that Shi [2003] recognizes are even better than the ones that he uses, we find even stronger evidence of the positive effect of R&D on bondholders. Third, we examine cross-sectional differences in the effect of R&D on debtholders. Consistent with our main finding, we document a negative relation between R&D increases and default risk. The default risk reduction is also more pronounced for firms with higher initial default scores (where the debtholders have more to gain from an R&D increase) and for firms with more bank debt (where the debtholders have greater covenant protection from the possible detriments associated with R&D increases). [source] Capital Gains Taxes and Equity Trading: Empirical EvidenceJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2003Jennifer L. Blouin Individual investors have an incentive to defer selling appreciated stock until it qualifies for tax-favored, long-term capital gains treatment. Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002] show that these incentives can affect equity trading around public disclosures. This article provides some empirical support for their theory with evidence of price increases and equity constrictions around announcements of quarterly earnings and additions to the S&P 500 index. We find share returns rise and trading volume falls with the incremental taxes saved by deferring the sale of appreciated property. The price increases, however, are temporary, reversing in subsequent trading days. The results are consistent with buyers believing the compensation to sell before long-term qualification (through higher prices) is less costly than holding an inappropriately weighted portfolio. This finding,that personal capital gains taxes affect equity trading,adds to a growing literature that challenges longstanding assumptions that firm value is independent of shareholders and their taxes. [source] ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBTJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2001John Graham The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt. Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980,1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch. [source] The Influence of Takeover Protection on Earnings ManagementJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2008Yijiang Zhao Abstract:, We examine the relationship between takeover protection and earnings management. Existing theories suggest two contradictory effects of takeover protection on opportunistic earnings management: entrenchment theory suggests an exacerbating effect, whereas both alignment theory and quiet life theory posit a mitigating effect. We find that takeover protection is associated with lower levels of abnormal working capital accruals, lower levels of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals and timelier recognition of losses. Further tests show that takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, which contradicts alignment theory but supports quiet life theory. The results suggest that takeover protection allows managers to enjoy the quiet life and thus mitigates earnings management. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||