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Federal Reserve (federal + reserve)
Selected AbstractsPOLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVEECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2005Jac C. Heckelman The theory of opportunistic political business cycles predicts incumbent politicians will alter their economic policies to spur short-run growth to attract additional votes for the upcoming election. There has not been much emphasis on the possibility of historical political business cycles prior to the Keynesian Revolution. No study has yet undertaken a systematic approach to testing for policy cycles during this period. Our study will bridge this gap by considering cycles in monetary policy for the periods of 1879,1914 until the start of Fed operations, and 1914,1932 until abandonment of the gold standard. To properly test for political cycles, it is necessary to develop reaction functions for the Treasury and compare against the reaction function later held by the Fed. This also reveals that creation of an independent monetary authority to be insulated from political pressures changed the manner in which policy was directed, aside from political issues. The evidence is not consistent, however, with monetary cycles closely tied to electoral concerns. [source] The International Financial Crisis Viewed by ExpertsECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 1-2 2009Antonio Forte The occurrence of the international financial crisis and the spread out of its effects on the global economy prompted experts around the world to think about how to manage the crisis and which measures to implement in order to restore normal economic and financial conditions. In this paper, we present and discuss the results of an international expert survey. We use these experts' perceptions to pursue a twofold target to understand their perceptions about the causes of the crisis, and of the policies to solve it. Interestingly, experts seem to broadly concur on what caused the crisis but their perceptions diverge regarding the policies. Furthermore, substantial differences in perceptions emerge between the Euro Area and the United States. We also find that the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank monetary policies during the crisis are judged barely adequate. Finally, different views distinguish academicians from other experts. [source] Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve's New Discount WindowINTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2003Craig Furfine Standing facilities are designed to place an upper bound on the rates at which financial institutions lend to one another overnight, reducing the volatility of the overnight interest rate, typically the rate targeted by central banks. However, improper design of the facility might decrease a bank's incentive to participate actively in the interbank market. Thus, the mere availability of central-bank-provided credit may lead to its use being greater than what would be expected based on the characteristics of the interbank market. By contrast, however, banks may perceive a stigma from using such facilities, and thus borrow less than what one might expect, thereby reducing the facilities' effectiveness at reducing interest rate volatility. We develop a model demonstrating these two alternative implications of a standing facility. Empirical predictions of the model are then tested using data from the Federal Reserve's new primary credit facility and the US federal funds market. A comparison of data from before and after recent changes to the discount window suggests continued reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve. [source] The historical origins of US exchange market intervention policy,INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2007Michael D. Bordo Abstract This paper examines the historical precedents of US exchange market intervention. Before 1934 we describe operations by the Second Bank of the United States, the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve. We then examine the operations of the Exchange Stabilization Fund, created in 1934 as a Treasury Department agency. Our study, based on unique, unpublished sources, analyses ESF dealings with the Banque de France and the Bank of England before and after the Tripartite Agreement of 1936. Finally, using unique data we discuss US efforts from 1961 through 1972 to defend the dollar's parity under the Bretton Woods System. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Asymmetries in Transatlantic Monetary Policy-making: Does the ECB Follow the Fed?,JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 5 2005ANSGAR BELKE The belief that the European Central Bank (ECB) follows the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) in setting its policy is so entrenched with market participants and commentators that the search for empirical support would seem to be a trivial task. However, this is not the case. We find that the ECB is indeed often influenced by the Fed, but the reverse is true at least as often if one considers longer sample periods. There is empirically little support for the proposition that there has for a long time been a systematic asymmetric leader-follower relationship between the ECB and the Fed. Only after September 2001 is there more evidence of such an asymmetry. There is a clear-cut structural break between the period pre-economic and monetary union (EMU) and EMU itself in terms of the relationship between short-term interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic. [source] The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next-to-Last Resort?JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 4 2010ADAM ASHCRAFT government-sponsored enterprise; lender of last resort; liquidity The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a large cooperatively owned government-sponsored liquidity facility that lends predominately to U.S. depository institutions. This paper documents the significant role played by the FHLB System at the outset of the recent financial crisis and provides evidence on the uses of FHLB funding by member banks and thrifts during that time. We then compare lending activity by the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve during 2007 and 2008, discuss the types of institutions seeking government-sponsored liquidity at various times, and identify the trade-offs faced by borrowers eligible to tap liquidity from both facilities. [source] Asymmetric monetary policy with respect to asset marketsOXONOMICS, Issue 2 2009Andreas Hoffmann The paper suggests that during Greenspan's incumbency the Federal Reserve (Fed) lowered interest rates rapidly when asset price developments suggested a crisis potential. Whereas, when asset markets were growth-supporting, the Fed did not raise interest rates. This asymmetry contributed to a downward-trend in interest rates which pushed US interest rates down to zero in the current crisis. [source] Foreign-Exchange Trading Volume and Federal Reserve InterventionTHE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 9 2001Alain Chaboud We find a large positive correlation between daily trading volume in currency futures markets and foreign-exchange intervention by the Federal Reserve over the period 1979 to 1996. Neither contemporaneous nor predicted volatility can fully account for the increases in trading activity. Whether or not the intervention operation is publicly reported appears to be an important determinant of trading volume. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:851,860, 2001 [source] | ||||||||||