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Farm Policy (farm + policy)
Selected AbstractsAfter Cancún: what next for agricultural subsidies?EUROCHOICES, Issue 3 2003Tim Josling Summary After Cancún: what next for agriculturalsubsidies? The collapse of the Ministerial in Cancún highlighted the enhanced role of the developing countries in the WTO and the reduced ability of the US and the EU to manage the trade system. One aspect of these changes has been that developing countries have taken much more interest in the level of domestic support in developed countries. Developed countries believe that the shift of support from production-linked to decoupled instruments has had a positive impact on trade. Developing countries maintain that this reform has not helped them, and has perpetuated inequities in the trade system. Research suggests that the output effect of decoupled support is limited, if not negligible. Such decoupling may be necessary to reform domestic polices. Additionally, domestic policies are being challenged by developing countries using the trade litigation of the WTO. But such challenges risk undermining support for the WTO. Until agreement is reached on these issues there will be little progress in further agricultural trade reform. A political solution must be found that continues the slow process of improvement of domestic farm policies and at the same time offers hope to developing countries that they will benefit from the improvement in the trade conditions for agricultural products. Après Cancún:quel avenir pour les subventions? L'échec de la conférence ministérielle de Cancun met en évidence !e rôle accru des pays en voie de développement à l'OMC, ainsi que la faible aptitude des Etats-Unis et de l'Europe à gérer le système des échanges internationaux. Ces changements impliquent que les pays en voie de développement s'intéressent de plus en plus aux niveaux de protection internes des pays développés. Les pays développés croient que le glissement des aides vers plus de découplage aura eu un effet positif sur les échanges. Mais les pays en voie de développement continuent à penser que ces réformes ne les ont pas aidés, et qu'elles ont perpétué les inégalités du commerce mondial. Le travail présenté ici semble montrer que l'effet du découplage sur l'offre est très faible, voire nul. Peut-être le decouplage est-il utile pour la réforme des politiques internes. Mais, au delà, ces politiques internes sont mises en cause par les pays en voie de développement, qui utilisent à leur encontre les ressources de procédure mises à leur disposition par l'OMC. De telles mises en cause sont de nature à détruire le soutien de l'opinion à l'OMC. II ne faut pas s'attendre à beaucoup de progrès dans les réformes du commerce international agricole tant qu'on n'aura pas trouve un accord sur ces questions. II est done necessaire d'élaborer des solutions qui confortent le lent progrès des politiques internes des pays developpes, tout en offrant aux pays en voie de développement 1, espoir de bénéficier de l'amélioration des conditions des échanges agricoles. Nach Cancún: Was geschieht als nächstes mitAgrarsubventionen? Das Scheitern des Ministerialtreffensin Cancún hob die verbesserte Position der Entwicklungsländer in der WTO und die verminderte Fähigkeit der USA und der EU hervor, das Handelssystem zu lenken. Finer der Aspekte dieser Veränderungen bestand darin, dass die Entwicklungsländer ein sehr viel größeres Interesse am Ausmaß der Inlandsstützung in Industrieländern gezeigt haben. Die Industrieländer glauben, dass sich der Schritt von einer produktionsgebundenen Inlandsstützung hin zu einer entkoppelten Inlandsstützung positiv auf den Handel ausgewirkt hat. Die Entwicklungsländer behaupten jedoch, dass ihnen diese Reform nicht geholfen habe und dass so Ungerechtigkeiten im Handelssystem aufrecht erhalten würden. Forschungsergebnisse legen es nahe, dass sich die entkoppelte Inlandsstützung sehr begrenzt, möglicherweise nur geringfügig, auf die Produktion auswirkt. Eine solche Entkopplung ist möglicherweise notwendig, urn inländische Politikmaßnahmen zu reformieren. Zusátzlich werden die inländischen Politikmaßnahmen von den Entwicklungsländern zur Zeit im Rahmen der WTO-Verfahren zur Beilegung von Handelsstreitigkeiten angefochten. Solche Anfechtungen bergen jedoch immer das Risiko einer abgeschwächten Unterstützung für die WTO. Bis in diesen Punkten Einigkeit herrscht, wird es nur geringe Fortschritte für die Agrarhandelsreformen geben. Es muss eine politische Lösung gefunden werden, welche den langsamen Verbesserungsprozess bei den inländischen Agrarpolitikmaßnahmen voran treibt und welche die Entwicklungsländer zugleich hoffen lässt, von der Verbesserung der Handelsbedingungen für landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse profitieren zu können. [source] Policy dependency and reform: economic gains versus political painsAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2-3 2004David R. Harvey Abstract Economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient and ineffective, and therefore worthy of radical reform. Practical experience, however, indicates that such lessons are hard to learn and implement. Economic analysis tends to ignore the path dependencies generated by the policy evolution process. Without reform strategies that take full account of these dependencies, policy reform will continue to be reluctant, slow and frequently counter-productive. This paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and benefits. In so doing, it re-phrases conventional economic arguments in terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition, which may prove more accessible and credible to policymakers and advisors. The difficulties of reconciling economic efficiency with political acceptability are identified. The paper concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural economics profession. [source] Why Isn't More US Farmland Organic?JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Nicolai V. Kuminoff D81; Q18 Abstract We develop a theoretical model to assess the dollar compensation required to induce conventional growers to convert to organic. The model incorporates the uncertainty in producers' expectations about future returns and about the impact of policy changes on these expectations in particular. We demonstrate that a new policy which favours organic can have opposing effects on the rate of conversion. An increase in relative returns to organic today will increase conversion rates. However, if the future of the policy programme is uncertain, its introduction can increase the value of waiting to switch, which will decrease conversion rates. We then develop an empirical switching regression model that enables direct estimation of the value associated with being able to postpone the conversion decision until some of the uncertainty is resolved. The model is applied to data on organic and conventional soybeans before and after major changes in US farm policy toward organic growers. The results suggest that sunk costs associated with conversion to organic coupled with uncertainty about future returns can help to explain why there is so little organic farmland in the USA. [source] Market power in tobacco: Measuring multiple marketsAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 1 2007Kellie Curry Raper Traditional market power analyses of the U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry consider monopoly power exertion by manufacturers in selling cigarettes to consumers. Market characteristics combined with government policy make it plausible that manufacturers exert monopsony market power in procuring tobacco. We investigate this possibility in the U.S. and international tobacco markets by extending nonparametric tests to include simultaneously potential monopoly market power with potential monopsony market power in multiple input markets, allowing both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change. We use annual data from the cigarette manufacturing industry from 1977 to 1993. Results indicate substantial departures from competitive pricing in the procurement of domestic tobacco, supporting the postulate that cigarette manufacturers appropriate monopsony rents despite, and perhaps at times through, U.S. tobacco farm policy. Results are less clear with respect to monopsony market power exertion in imported leaf tobacco procurement by cigarette manufacturers. Finally, results indicate that monopoly market power exertion is relatively small and that, when the possibility of monopsony market power exertion is admitted, monopoly market power exertion is no longer problematic.[EconLit citations: L100, L660]. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 35,55, 2007. [source] On the Revelation of Private Information in the U.S. Crop Insurance ProgramJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 4 2007Alan Ker The crop insurance program is a prominent facet of U.S. farm policy. The participation of private insurance companies as intermediaries is justified on the basis of efficiency gains. These gains may arise from either decreased transaction costs through better established delivery channels and/or the revelation of private information. We find empirical evidence suggesting that private information is revealed by insurance companies via their reinsurance decisions. However, it is unlikely that such information will be incorporated into subsequent premium rates by the government. [source] |